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osition, north of the railroad, was practicable. They confirmed the previous reports of our scouts, that the besieging army was covered by a line of field-works, extending from the railroad-bridge to the Yazoo; that the roads leading to this line had all been obstructed with felled trees, and that strong bodies of Federal infantry and cavalry observed and guarded the river. This observation of ours, however, was not extended below the railroad. I determined to move on the morning of the 5th, by Edwards's Depot, to the south of the road-thinking, from the reports of the officers who had reconnoitred on that side, that the Federal works there were less strong, and the river unguarded, and the chances of success, therefore, much better on that side; although the consequences of defeat would have been more disastrous, as General Sherman's troops, in the line between the bridge and Yazoo, might have intercepted retreat. On the 3d a courier from Vicksburg arrived, but without dis
and could not, therefore, have been moved, with any hope of success, against that powerful army, already protected by lines of counter and circumvallation. All the supplies that had been collected in the department were, of course, with the troops in Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The troops coming from the East, by railroad, had brought neither artillery nor wagons. Frequent drafts upon the country had so much reduced the number of horses and mules, that it was not until near the end of June that artillery and wagons, and draught-animals enough for them, could be procured, generally from long distances-most of the artillery and wagons from Georgia. Some twelve pieces, found without carriages, were mounted on such as could be made in Canton. There was no want of provision and forage in the department, but they were still to be collected; and we had small means of collecting them, and none of transporting them with a moving army. On the 23d, a dispatch was received from M
d. I determined to move on the morning of the 5th, by Edwards's Depot, to the south of the road-thinking, from the reports of the officers who had reconnoitred on that side, that the Federal works there were less strong, and the river unguarded, and the chances of success, therefore, much better on that side; although the consequences of defeat would have been more disastrous, as General Sherman's troops, in the line between the bridge and Yazoo, might have intercepted retreat. On the 3d a courier from Vicksburg arrived, but without dispatches from General Pemberton. He had been in such danger of capture, he said, as to think it necessary to destroy the letter he was bringing. He had left Vicksburg on the 28th of June, and the letter had that date. In a note dispatched at night General Pemberton was informed of this; and told that we were about to attempt to create a diversion, to enable him to cut his way out of the place, and hoped to attack the enemy, for this object, on
ary value of Vicksburg, expressed five or six weeks earlier, might not have seemed unreasonable; for then the commanders of the United States squadrons believed, apparently, that its batteries were too formidable to be passed by their vessels-of-war. But, when Lieutenant-General Pemberton wrote the letter quoted from, those batteries had been proved to be ineffective, for Admiral Porter's squadron had passed them, and in that way had made the severance of the Confederacy, before the end of April, that General Pemberton apprehended would be permitted, if he obeyed my order, to save his army by withdrawing it to the northeast, on the 18th of May. In my reply to this letter, dispatched promptly, I said: I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you. Hold out. On the same day instructions were sent to Major-General Gardner, both by telegraph and by courier, to evacuate Port Hudson, and march toward Jackson. After General Pemberton's investment in Vicksburg, t
a telegram of the 3d, Mr. Seddon explained his estimate of my force; asked what his mistake was; expressed great anxiety concerning my plans, and desired me to inform him of them as far as I might think it safe to do so. To this I replied on the 4th: The mistake on your part is, that all your numbers are too large; in reference to General Beauregard, nearly as ten to six. The troops you mention, including Jackson's, just arrived, are less than twenty-six thousand. My only plan is to relieveeft Vicksburg on the 28th of June, and the letter had that date. In a note dispatched at night General Pemberton was informed of this; and told that we were about to attempt to create a diversion, to enable him to cut his way out of the place, and hoped to attack the enemy, for this object, on the 7th. But, in the evening of the 4th, intelligence of the surrender of Vicksburg was received; in consequence of which the army fell back to Jackson, which it reached on the afternoon of the 7th.
June 28th (search for this): chapter 7
re were less strong, and the river unguarded, and the chances of success, therefore, much better on that side; although the consequences of defeat would have been more disastrous, as General Sherman's troops, in the line between the bridge and Yazoo, might have intercepted retreat. On the 3d a courier from Vicksburg arrived, but without dispatches from General Pemberton. He had been in such danger of capture, he said, as to think it necessary to destroy the letter he was bringing. He had left Vicksburg on the 28th of June, and the letter had that date. In a note dispatched at night General Pemberton was informed of this; and told that we were about to attempt to create a diversion, to enable him to cut his way out of the place, and hoped to attack the enemy, for this object, on the 7th. But, in the evening of the 4th, intelligence of the surrender of Vicksburg was received; in consequence of which the army fell back to Jackson, which it reached on the afternoon of the 7th.
June 21st (search for this): chapter 7
and two thousand cavalry. was ordered to march next morning toward the Big Black River. In the afternoon of July 1st, Loring's, French's, and Walker's divisions bivouacked near Birdsong's Ferry, on that river, and Breckenridge's, with the floating-bridge, near Edwards's Depot. The cavalry, under General W. H. Jackson, was placed in observation along the river. This expedition was not undertaken in the wild spirit that dictated the dispatches from the War Department, of the 16th and 21st of June. I did not indulge in the sentiment that it was better for me to waste the lives and blood of brave soldiers, than, through prudence even, to spare them; and therefore intended to make such close and careful examination of the enemy's lines as might enable me to estimate the probability of our being able to break them; and, should the chances of success seem to justify it, attack in the hope of breaking them, and rescuing the army invested in Vicksburg. There was no hope of saving the
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