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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 9. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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W. O. Dodd (search for this): chapter 11.109
Reminiscences of Hood's Tennessee campaign. By Captain W. O. Dodd. [The following is also one of the valuable series of papers read before the Louisville Branch of the Southern Historical Society:] It is my purpose to give only personal observation and experience of the important movement of the Western armies in the fall and winter of 1864. The advance of General Hood on Nashville was the last important movement in the West during the war. In the summer of 1864 General Sherman, with a large and victorious army, occupied Atlanta, the very centre of the Confederacy. General Johnston had been removed, causing much dissatisfaction both in military and civil life, and General Hood placed in command, whose patriotism and courage were recognized by all, but whose ability to command the entire army was much questioned. It had been demonstrated that Gen. Hood must either be reinforced or retreat before the advancing columns of Sherman. Reinforcements could not be supplied, a
J. B. Hood (search for this): chapter 11.109
omery and Mobile. It was determined to throw Hood's army in the rear of Sherman. and destroy theving a portion of his army in Atlanta, and give Hood an opportunity of fighting him in detail. The forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood's army into Tennessee and destroy Thomas and thck and join Thomas, securing the destruction of Hood. It was at first determined to cross the Tenne follow as night follows day. The command under Hood had crossed the river that morning about four meen or heard of a denial from him. Finally, General Hood, in his book, Advance and retreat, charges or in any way questioned the correctness of General Hood's statements. But I do not think Cheatham no material trouble in crossing the pike. General Hood says it got dark about 4 o'clock, which is rted on his march to the sea about the same day Hood started to the North. In quick succession reveral Cheatham is still living, and surely if General Hood is wrong the truth of history demands that [13 more...]
Forrest (search for this): chapter 11.109
t first determined to cross the Tennessee river above Decatur, but Forrest was near Jackson, Tennessee, and unacquainted with the plan of camcross the entire army at that point, and as soon as our commander (Forrest) received orders we hastened to Tuscumbia, where we joined Hood's fantry commanded by Generals Stewart, S. D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. The entire force numbered about thirtye had two corps and a division of infantry and the greater part of Forrest's cavalry. Our force was fully sixteen thousand men, and I think id at the time, and I have always believed it to be true, that General Forrest asked permission to place his command across the pike, but wasblame for the blunder? No one accuses either General Stewart or Forrest of being in any way responsible. It was either the fault of Gener best of all our gallant army, with a picked command, and aided by Forrest, covered the retreat and enabled us to get out with 18,000 men. We
Schofield (search for this): chapter 11.109
k river, Cheatham being to the right. General Schofield retired to the north side of Duck river,pt up during the 28th. General Hood supposed Schofield would remain a day or two on the opposite siould not easily be crossed under the fire of Schofield's guns. So he concluded to leave General Lea few miles above, and intercept the rear of Schofield at Spring Hill, twelve miles in rear, on thed across the pike, and then the surrender of Schofield would follow as night follows day. The commar our horses from the adjoining fields. General Schofield was permitted to march by that night wita corn-field and an open piece of woodland. Schofield's command did not reach Spring Hill until 11 can hardly picture. So, if we had captured Schofield, as could easily have been done at a triflin we were in our saddles, and pushed on after Schofield's command, which was rapidly hastening to Frincapacity had occasioned the preceding day. Schofield had as many or more men in Franklin than we [1 more...]
Alexander P. Stewart (search for this): chapter 11.109
y, and about the 19th of November, 1864, the army was put in motion. General Hood commanded the expedition, with three army corps of infantry commanded by Generals Stewart, S. D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. The entire force numbered about thirty thousand. It was as gallant an army as ever any Capfield would follow as night follows day. The command under Hood had crossed the river that morning about four miles above Columbia, Cheatham in front, followed by Stewart and Johnson's division of Lee's corps. We had but little artillery, as the roads were too rough for moving it. It was about 3 or 4 o'clock when everything wasby that night without firing a gun, and the great and only opportunity of the campaign was lost. Who was to blame for the blunder? No one accuses either General Stewart or Forrest of being in any way responsible. It was either the fault of General Hood or of General Cheatham, in my opinion both were to blame, but the princip
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 11.109
o one of the valuable series of papers read before the Louisville Branch of the Southern Historical Society:] It is my purpose to give only personal observation and experience of the important movement of the Western armies in the fall and winter of 1864. The advance of General Hood on Nashville was the last important movement in the West during the war. In the summer of 1864 General Sherman, with a large and victorious army, occupied Atlanta, the very centre of the Confederacy. General Johnston had been removed, causing much dissatisfaction both in military and civil life, and General Hood placed in command, whose patriotism and courage were recognized by all, but whose ability to command the entire army was much questioned. It had been demonstrated that Gen. Hood must either be reinforced or retreat before the advancing columns of Sherman. Reinforcements could not be supplied, and an emergency had to be met. General Thomas commanded a large force in Tennessee, which was
Pat Cleburne (search for this): chapter 11.109
I went with the advance into town. As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were gone, I made a torch and went over the battle-field. To those unaccustomed to such things, no description can give an idea of the sight. The dead were literally piled up, and to my sorrow I saw that our loss was much the greatest. We had pressed them into their last line, and there the dead lay mangled together. Entire companies were literally gone. And just a little back the gallant old soldier, General Pat Cleburne, lay dead. He was the idol of his command, and a better soldier never died for any cause. Brigadier-General Adams was killed, he and his horse falling together, just on the earthworks of the enemy. Our loss was about 5,000 men, including five Generals killed and six wounded. I could not but feel that the lives of these men were a useless sacrifice. It seemed to me to be a rashness occasioned by the blunder of the day before. It was an attempt to make good by reckless daring th
Chalmers (search for this): chapter 11.109
s soon as our commander (Forrest) received orders we hastened to Tuscumbia, where we joined Hood's army. Some delay was occasioned in repairing the Memphis and Charleston railroad so as to bring sufficient supplies for the expedition. The country is poor from Florence northward until you reach the neighborhood of Pulaski and Mount Pleasant, and we were required to take sufficient forage to last until we could reach the fertile country of Middle Tennessee. Our division, commanded by General Chalmers, covered the left of the army, and about the 19th of November, 1864, the army was put in motion. General Hood commanded the expedition, with three army corps of infantry commanded by Generals Stewart, S. D. Lee and Cheatham, with Forrest in command of the cavalry. The entire force numbered about thirty thousand. It was as gallant an army as ever any Captain commanded. The long march from Atlanta had caused the timid and sick to be left behind, and every man remaining was a veteran
W. T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 11.109
t in the West during the war. In the summer of 1864 General Sherman, with a large and victorious army, occupied Atlanta, tr be reinforced or retreat before the advancing columns of Sherman. Reinforcements could not be supplied, and an emergencycommanded a large force in Tennessee, which was protecting Sherman's rear and guarding his lines of communication and supplies. Should Sherman advance southward from Atlanta with Hood in front, Thomas could easily overrun Alabama and capture Selma, . It was determined to throw Hood's army in the rear of Sherman. and destroy the railroad, hoping thereby to draw ShermanSherman out, leaving a portion of his army in Atlanta, and give Hood an opportunity of fighting him in detail. The movement was madn successful, except no opportunity was given for engaging Sherman's forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood's aember, 1864. What stirring events were then happening! Sherman started on his march to the sea about the same day Hood st
George Thomas (search for this): chapter 11.109
columns of Sherman. Reinforcements could not be supplied, and an emergency had to be met. General Thomas commanded a large force in Tennessee, which was protecting Sherman's rear and guarding his lf communication and supplies. Should Sherman advance southward from Atlanta with Hood in front, Thomas could easily overrun Alabama and capture Selma, Montgomery and Mobile. It was determined to tSherman's forces in detail. It was then resolved to move Hood's army into Tennessee and destroy Thomas and then take possession of Kentucky and threaten Ohio. The conception was a bold one. Its e unobstructed to the sea, cutting again in twain the Confederacy, or it would move back and join Thomas, securing the destruction of Hood. It was at first determined to cross the Tennessee river abov, and were not strong enough to make a good picket line. The rout and retreat were inevitable. Thomas accumulated an army of 82,000. The only wonder is that he did not capture us all. General Walth
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