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Hatch (search for this): chapter 10
13, he had ordered Jackson, with Taliaferro's and Ewell's divisions, to Gordonsville, to oppose reported advances of Pope. The latter had, on July 14, ordered Gen. Hatch to seize Gordonsville, then held by only about 200 infantry and a few cavalry. Hatch, however, lost time by listening to false reports that the Confederates weHatch, however, lost time by listening to false reports that the Confederates were near at hand, and by waiting to take infantry, artillery, and a wagon-train, along with the considerable cavalry force which Pope had intended should alone be used. It alone would have been ample, as Jackson's troops did not reach Gordonsville until July 19. Hatch's expedition, therefore, was a failure. Jackson, on his arrHatch's expedition, therefore, was a failure. Jackson, on his arrival, was anxious to undertake some aggressive operation against Pope, but found his force — only about 12,000 men — inadequate to accomplish anything against Pope's 47,000; so he appealed to Lee for reenforcement. Not yet assured that McClellan would not soon resume the offensive, Lee hesitated; but, on July 27, ordered A. P. Hil
Franklin (search for this): chapter 10
et us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents and leave our own to take care of themselves. . . . Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. . . . The arrogance of this address was not calculated to impress favorably officers of greater experience in actual warfare, who were now overslaughed by his promotion. McDowell would have been the fittest selection, but he and Banks, both seniors to Pope, submitted without a word; as did also Sumner, Franklin, Porter, Heintzelman, and all the major-generals of McClellan's army. But Fremont protested, asked to be relieved, and practically retired from active service. Meanwhile, after the discomfiture of McClellan, Mr. Lincoln felt the want of a military advisor, and, on July 11, appointed Gen. Halleck commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, and summoned him to Washington City. Ropes's Story of the civil War thus comments upon this appointment: — It is easy to see how t
Falls (search for this): chapter 10
er proof of its terrific character can be given than the fact that of the three remaining regiments which continued the charge (28th N. Y., 46th Pa., and 5th Conn.) every field-officer and every adjutant was killed or disabled. In the 28th N. Y., every Company officer was killed or wounded; in the 26th Pa., all but five, and in the 5th Conn. all but eight. A combat more persistent or heroic can scarcely be found in the history of the war, but men, even of this unequalled heroism, could not withstand the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, especially when left without the encouragement and direction of officers. An incident of the battle was a charge upon Taliaferro's brigade by two squadrons of the 1st Pa. Cav., under Maj. Falls, when the brigade, in some disorder, was pressing hard upon the retreat of the Federal infantry. The charge successfully rode through the Confederate skirmish-line, but was driven back by the fire of the line of battle with the loss of 93 men out of 164.
R. H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 10
ould be inspired by it and his own boastings to follow. This strategy was very nearly successful. On Aug. 12, Pope, having heard that the reenforcements under Burnside would soon join him, wired Halleck that, on their arrival, he would cross the Rapidan and advance upon Louisa C. H. This would have given the Confederates the very opportunity desired. On Aug. 13, Lee had ordered Longstreet and Hood, with 12 brigades, to proceed by rail to Gordonsville, and, on the 14th, he also ordered up Anderson's division of infantry, three brigades, and Stuart's cavalry. On the 15th he went up in person and took the command. The casualties at Cedar Mountain had been as follows: — Confederate:killed 229,wounded 1047,missing 31,total 1307 Federal:killed 314,wounded 1445,missing 622,total 2381 The Confederate losses were distributed among nine brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, and were greatest in Garnett's and Taliaferro's, of Jackson's division, slightly over 300 in each. The F
Branch (search for this): chapter 10
losses were distributed among nine brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, and were greatest in Garnett's and Taliaferro's, of Jackson's division, slightly over 300 in each. The Federal losses were in eight brigades of infantry and one of cavalry. Crawford's brigade lost 857, Geary's 465, Prince's 452, and Gordon's 344. The fighting upon Jackson's left, where Garnett's and Taliaferro's brigades were broken by the charge of Crawford's and Gordon's brigades, and the line reestablished, by Branch's, Archer's, and Winder's brigades, was very desperate, as is shown by the casualties of some of the Federal regiments. Gen. Williams, in his official report, says: — The 3d Wis., especially, fell under a partial flank fire from the underbrush, and woods, which swept its right companies with great destruction, and under which Lt.-Col. Crane fell pierced with several fatal wounds, and the regiment was obliged to give way. The enemy was, however, driven out of the open field by the other
E. P. Lawton (search for this): chapter 10
commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be saved you in arranging details, and they can aid more intelligently. The whole incident shows that our staff service was poorly organized, and not efficient in its operations. The result of all this delay was that it was about 3 P. M. on the 9th before Ewell's division on the right, and Winder's on the left, had formed line in front of Banks's corps, which had been encountered at Cedar Mountain, some seven miles south of Culpeper. Lawton's large brigade of Ewell's division and Gregg's of Hill's division, had been left behind to guard the wagon-trains against the enemy's superior force of cavalry. The remainder of Hill's division was not yet up, and, while waiting their arrival, 26 rifled guns were brought up by Jackson and opened upon the enemy's lines and batteries. The left of Winder's division rested along the front edge of a considerable body of wood, which had not been thoroughly examined. Pope, in his report, asse
Davis (search for this): chapter 10
e night action. Jackson's ruse. casualties. The close of the Seven Days found both armies greatly in need of rest. Lincoln called upon the governors of the Northern States for 300,000 more men, and bounties, State and Federal, were offered to secure them rapidly. They were easily obtained, but a mistake was made in putting the recruits in the field. They were organized into entirely new regiments, which were generally hurried to the field after but little drilling and training. President Davis also called for conscripts, — all that could be gotten. No great number were obtained, for those arriving at the age of conscription usually volunteered in some selected regiment. Those who were conscripted were also distributed among veteran regiments to repair the losses of the campaign, and this was done as rapidly as the men could be gotten to the front. Although this method allowed no time for drill or training, yet it was far more effective in maintaining the strength of the ar
Fitz-John Porter (search for this): chapter 10
dy the probable lines of retreat of our opponents and leave our own to take care of themselves. . . . Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. . . . The arrogance of this address was not calculated to impress favorably officers of greater experience in actual warfare, who were now overslaughed by his promotion. McDowell would have been the fittest selection, but he and Banks, both seniors to Pope, submitted without a word; as did also Sumner, Franklin, Porter, Heintzelman, and all the major-generals of McClellan's army. But Fremont protested, asked to be relieved, and practically retired from active service. Meanwhile, after the discomfiture of McClellan, Mr. Lincoln felt the want of a military advisor, and, on July 11, appointed Gen. Halleck commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, and summoned him to Washington City. Ropes's Story of the civil War thus comments upon this appointment: — It is easy to see how this unfor
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 10
ow. This strategy was very nearly successful. On Aug. 12, Pope, having heard that the reenforcements under Burnside would soon join him, wired Halleck that, on their arrival, he would cross the Rapidan and advance upon Louisa C. H. This would have given the Confederates the very opportunity desired. On Aug. 13, Lee had ordered Longstreet and Hood, with 12 brigades, to proceed by rail to Gordonsville, and, on the 14th, he also ordered up Anderson's division of infantry, three brigades, and Stuart's cavalry. On the 15th he went up in person and took the command. The casualties at Cedar Mountain had been as follows: — Confederate:killed 229,wounded 1047,missing 31,total 1307 Federal:killed 314,wounded 1445,missing 622,total 2381 The Confederate losses were distributed among nine brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, and were greatest in Garnett's and Taliaferro's, of Jackson's division, slightly over 300 in each. The Federal losses were in eight brigades of infantry and
Ropes (search for this): chapter 10
s still representing to his government that Lee had 200,000 men. If he really believed this, it is not strange that he kept closely within his intrenchments; but Mr. Ropes, the most careful historian of the war, asserts that neither McClellan nor Halleck believed this preposterous story. McClellan told it, and stuck to it, trying to scare the administration into giving him unlimited reenforcements: but his real belief, Mr. Ropes thinks, is apparent in his offer to undertake the new campaign with only 20,000 reenforcements, raising his force to only 110,000. Mr. Ropes says that Halleck saw and appreciated McClellan's insincerity, but, wishing to have the armMr. Ropes says that Halleck saw and appreciated McClellan's insincerity, but, wishing to have the army brought back, he affected to believe in the 200,000 men, and easily confounded McClellan's arguments by pointing out what such a force might do under such generals as Lee and Jackson. Halleck had visited McClellan on the James soon after his arrival in Washington, and the matter was argued, pro and con, in correspondence after
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