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Will's Valley (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
nd wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz., Generals Davis and Slocum. . . . I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson to report to you. . . . I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south
Milledgeville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
ta, and may move to Tennessee by Decatur. He cannot cross the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are patrolled by our gunboats. I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah or Charleston. 1 think this far better than defending a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting material. But a few days later Sherman had made a radical change in his previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November 1, as follows: As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy
Purdy (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
ions of his army from the fall of Atlanta down to the time of his writing, by which he had completely defeated his adversary's designs, closing with the following language: Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. . . . These are the reasons which have determined my former movements. General Sherman then continues by explaining the reasons which induced him not to carry out the movement above suggested. Now come the reasons for the future movements upon which Sherman had then fully decided, after having obtained General Grant's consent, and which he was about to begin. After stating what he had done in the last ten days to prepare for his march, he said: Then the qu
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of Kentucky—an event much less improbable than many that have actually occurreForrest, with his troopers, would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched to the Ohio. What offset to this would have best, with the evident intention to carry the war into Tennessee and Kentucky, why a change of base by Sherman in the opposite direction, to Sav or Mississippi, was it wise to run the risk of transferring it to Kentucky or Ohio? Perhaps no movement which could have been contemplated brgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being onssee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity of actionto make things sure, he might call on the governors of Indiana and Kentucky for some militia! In the meantime, he (Sherman) would destroy all
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
To avoid a transfer of the battlefield from Georgia to Alabama or Mississippi, was it wise to runt is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to its fate in the vain hope of putting Shermought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commandAs suggested by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished that destruction as wfere in some way with Sherman's march through Georgia. Hood could not have got within two hundred an before the latter had destroyed as much of Georgia as he wished, and then captured Savannah. Ofld be compelled by public clamor to return to Georgia to defend that State against Sherman's furthe ten days. If I were to let go Atlanta and north Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did herng siege, I will destroy all the railroads of Georgia and do as much substantial damage as is possihe gulf, with a view to further operations in Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a[16 more...]
Augusta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
. . I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individk up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah or Charleston. 1 think this far better than defending a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my division behind me, and take with me only the
Florence, Ala. (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,--000, with Wheeler's and Roddey's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five transports. General Thomas has nehen determined on, in lieu of that which had contemplated holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, as follows: Despatch of last night received. The fact that Forrest is down about Johnsonville, while Hood, with his infantry, is still about Florence and Tuscumbia, gives you time for concentration. The supplies about Chattanooga are immense, and I will soon be independent of them; therefore I would not risk supplies coming in transitu from Nashville to Chattanooga. In like manner, we have
Cartersville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
f the million of men they then had on the muster-and pay-rolls. To have given the still more convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time. The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should be able to hold the line of the Tennessee firmly, and the corresponding information and instructions to Thomas: Sherman to Grant. Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864, 12 M. . . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa; twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nashville. Grant to Sherman. City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11 A. M. Your despatch received. Does it
Savannah (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
wn. When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he had not, as events proved,en two, of Sherman's corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well as four, and such need existed. When Sherman started for Savannah from Atlanta, the Confederate force in the Gu Records, Vol. XXXIX, part II, pp. 364, 411. Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by milita that Hood might possibly oppose his march to Savannah. He could have meant by what he said in his to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independerence in war is full 25 per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoocherom Georgia to make his own change of base to Savannah? Did Sherman not, in fact, really expect Hooprepared to resist his future operations from Savannah? Sherman repeatedly said, in his despatches What was Sherman's plan when he started for Savannah? Was it simply to effect a change of base, o[9 more...]
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 16
arch of a formidable army capable of crushing anything that might get in its way, and that without waiting for anything that might occur in its rear. Such a march of such an army might well have been sufficient to convince everybody that the United States had the military power to crush the rebellion, and even destroy everything in the South, before the world should find out that the resources of the government had been exhausted, and that the United States had not the financial strength necesUnited States had not the financial strength necessary to make any further military use of the million of men they then had on the muster-and pay-rolls. To have given the still more convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time. The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should be able to hold the line of the Tennessee firmly, and the corresponding information and instructions to Thom
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