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Caperton (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to its maturity. As to details, I propose to take General Howard and his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz., Generals Davis and Slocum. . . . I will send General Stanley, with the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson to report to you. . . . I want you to retain command in Tennessee, and before starting I will give you delegated authority over Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to push south from Decatur and
Rome, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
e its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah or Charleston. 1 think this far better than defending a long line of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all my division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting material. But a few days later Sherman had made a radical change in his previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November 1, as follows: As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,--000, with Wheeler's and Roddey's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General Th
Mobile, Ala. (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
ng to Grant's assistance, where he was not needed, and leaving Hood's army behind him? A change of base to Savannah or Mobile had been contemplated as a probable necessity of future operations in Georgia or in the Gulf States, upon the capture of several objectives open to him as the goal of his march, reserving to himself finally the choice between three,—Savannah, Mobile, and Pensacola,—trusting to Richmond papers to keep Grant well advised of his movements and of his final choice of the ob10, 1864, 12 M. . . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa; twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the t, and, it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make its inhabitants feel that war and individual
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
e being provided, Sherman could move out from Atlanta with twenty or thirty days supplies in wagonsions. The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy's cavalry were then known to b that unless he drew Slocum's corps back from Atlanta, and abandoned that place, his army would beve movement. Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to Chattanooga, abandon Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and may move to Tennessee by Decatur. He caee in less than ten days. If I were to let go Atlanta and north Georgia and make for Hood, he wouldse [some Confederate movements about Rome and Atlanta] also seem to indicate that Beauregard expect act . . . on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th instant with about 60,000 well prre considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I had been perfectly familiar with th[15 more...]
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
y cripple Hood's army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of Kentucky—an event much less improbable than many that have actually occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for it was not defensible by the force Thomas then had there. Thomas's cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, would have had nenot begin to arrive at Nashville until the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan. The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to sa
America (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
fer of the battlefield from Georgia to Alabama or Mississippi, was it wise to run the risk of transferring it to Kentucky or Ohio? Perhaps no movement which could have been contemplated by the Confederate authorities would have been more greatly to Sherman's advantage over Hood than the one they adopted. I cannot better show my own exact impression at the time respecting the operations of Sherman and Hood in 1864, than by an illustration that will be at once appreciated on every farm in America. When two fighting-cocks meet for the first time, battle is joined without delay, and is prosecuted with all possible vigor and skill. If the result is decisive the victor's triumph is loudly proclaimed, while the defeated combatant, with lowered crest, seeks safety in flight. If, on the contrary, the result is a drawn battle, the two antagonists, as if by common consent, slowly separate, carrying their heads high, and sharply watching each other. When distance has assured the close of
Dalton, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 16
Grant to Sherman. October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M. Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best. Sherman to Thomas. October 20, 1864. . . . I want all things bent to the following general plan of action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and at Atlanta I propose to organize not cross the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are patrolled by our gunboats. I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men
George H. Thomas (search for this): chapter 16
efensible by the force Thomas then had there. Thomas's cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, events proved, sufficient reason for assuming Thomas's strength and ability to meet Hood in the opend Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly eady commencing an aggressive campaign against Thomas in Tennessee! It is equally impossible to speGrant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should be able to hold the line of the Tennessy letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defende points hitherto indicated, trusting that General Thomas, with his present troops and the influx ofbut afterward reinforcements will pour to you (Thomas). He convinced himself that Thomas had troops t, six weeks instead of a very few days before Thomas was able to assume the offensive. It was not Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully[52 more...]
Christmas (search for this): chapter 16
hat have actually occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for it was not defensible by the force Thomas then had there. Thomas's cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched to the Ohio. What offset to this would have been the capture of Savannah as a Christmas gift to the nation? The situation at that time was certainly a perplexing one to Sherman. He could not permit Hood to put him, with his superior force, on the defensive, nor even to appear to do so for a moment; and it was not easy for him to consent that his enemy should entirely nullify all his elaborately considered plans for future operations in Georgia. What operations Sherman decided on in that unprecedented case is well known. When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah
J. H. Wilson (search for this): chapter 16
takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood going north. With Wilson turned loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. Shd, will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive. Hood's cavalry may do a good deal of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, retaining only about 4500. This is the best I can do, and shall, therefore, when I cann to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated mou will have Generals Schofield and Stanley and General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still believ
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