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Chattahoochee River, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
But Hood signalized his accession to the command by the boldest kind of tactics, amounting even to rashness in the commander of a force so inferior to that of his adversary. Yet Sherman continued his own cautious methods to the end. Even his last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta,—the only one which had even the general appearance of boldness,—was, in fact, marked by the greatest prudence throughout. The Twentieth Corps occupied a strongly fortified bridge-head at the Chattahoochee River, and the Twenty-third Corps another equally strongly fortified pivot around which the grand wheel of the army was made. That moving army was much larger than Hood's entire force, and had all the advantage of the initiative, which completely disconcerted the opposing commander, and caused him to commit a blunder that ought to have proved fatal, namely, that of dividing his inferior force and permitting his superior opponent to occupy a position between the widely separated wings of hi
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 17
after he had concentrated his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive the latt the fall of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured or destroyed, the surrspondence between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, including the letters of Splan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had gone so far, and his designs wers had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf States, whereby the fragments of f like prudence in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to the command by the tions, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was tempted to make at Franklin one of those fu the Union army, because the force assaulted by Hood might always have had a more powerful army nearturned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes. If the purpose that prome back to Tennessee was to serve as a decoy to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport would hav[22 more...]
Montgomery (search for this): chapter 17
xecuted by Sherman as a preliminary to the march northward for the capture of Lee's army, with the previous far-reaching strategic plans of Grant, of which Sherman and other chief commanders were informed in the spring of 1864. Grant's plans had in view, as their great object, again to cut in two the Confederate territory, as had been done by the opening of the Mississippi River to the gulf. This next line of section might be Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Savannah, or Chattanooga, Atlanta, Montgomery, and Mobile. But with the disappearance of Hood's army from that theater of operations, all reason for that plan of territorial strategy had disappeared, and the occasion was then presented, for the first time, for the wholly different strategical plan of Sherman, of which Lee's army was the sole military objective. Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Sherman in giving the latter full credit for this last plan; and he modestly refrained from any more than a brief mention of
George H. Thomas (search for this): chapter 17
good reason to expect, and evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated his t with him so large an army, while leaving with Thomas one so much smaller, on the ground that he migare the Twenty-third Corps to go back and help Thomas. If any question can possibly exist as to whahave a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas had failed to obey his instructions to pursue agments of that broken and dispirited army, as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under is now, that in view of his exact knowledge of Thomas's character and habits of thought and action, with two or three corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood. Then, if the ive as they actually were with the smaller one Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta alhis great campaign, General Sherman said: Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments his mind when he ordered me back to report to Thomas, and when he wrote his special field order. I[3 more...]
J. E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 17
l 4, was as follows: You I propose to move against Johnston's army to break it up, and to get into the interion the four months of almost constant fighting with Johnston's army. In the comments I have made upon the Atlaner in which that army, then under Hood instead of Johnston, was finally broken up, by Sherman's subordinates n comparison with the total strength of his army. Johnston displayed similar qualities in an equal degree so ing a superior force against such an antagonist as Johnston could be. regarded as wise, it surely could not agar from lacking skill as a tactician. Both he and Johnston might well be likened to masters of the sword so sthat an end was put to that duel by the removal of Johnston, and the military world thus deprived of a completly as far from an end as it was the first of May! Johnston would have been there in front of Sherman, all theplish the first part of Grant's plan in respect to Johnston's army,— namely, to break it up,—the second part,
John M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 17
ly a single day while Hood was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by Hood might always have had a more powerful army near at hand to support it if necessary. In his special field order of January 8, 1865, announcing to all the troops of his military division the results of his great campaign, General Sherman said: Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes. If the purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to serve as a decoy to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in the season, when Sherman was near by with his sixty thousand men to help bag the game. It has occurred to me as at least possible that Sherman's recollection of the sugge
Americans (search for this): chapter 17
bjective. Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Sherman in giving the latter full credit for this last plan; and he modestly refrained from any more than a brief mention of his own plans, which unforeseen events had made it unnecessary fully to execute. But history will do justice to Grant's great strategical designs as well as to his great achievements. I trust it may be my good fortune to contribute something hereafter toward the payment of this debt of gratitude which all Americans owe to the greatest soldier of the Union. The fact that Savannah was one of the points in both Grant's plans and Sherman's was merely an incident, and a very unimportant one. Indeed, after Hood got out of his way, Sherman might as well, and I think better, have marched direct to Augusta, and thence northward, wholly ignoring Savannah as well as Charleston, except that he would have arrived in Virginia rather early in the season. Savannah was a good place to go to in order to spend the
Forrest (search for this): chapter 17
winter, besides destroying Georgia en route. Of course it is much easier to see what might have been done than to see in advance what can or ought to be done. But it can hardly be believed that Sherman did not think of everything that was possible, as well as many things that were not. At least, so simple a proposition as the following could not have escaped his mind. Sherman was, as he so confidently said, absolute master of the situation? before he started for Savannah. Hood and Forrest had utterly failed so to damage his communications that they could not be put in order again in a few days. He was able, if he chose, to remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood. Then, if the result of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops he had sent to Ten
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 17
was not war. Sherman was not a man to be left out, no matter what might happen. But Sherman's good fortune was almost equal to his strategy and his skill in marching an army. Although, as fate would have it, he did not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf States, whereby the fragments of that broken and dispirited army, as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under their old, able commander, General Johnston, and appeared in Sherman's front to oppose his northward march, and finally to capitulate to him at Bennett's House in North Carolina. The remnant of that army which Sherman had disdained to pursue into Alabama or Mississippi had traveled a thousand miles to surrender to him! No story of fiction could be more romantic than that fact of real war history. It was not necessary for Sherman to produce his letter of November 6, 1864; but I have quoted from it here very largely to show th
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 17
ntil the National Government might abandon it. Grant's letters at that time confirm this view of ton Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the capture of Lee's army, and the other wan, and the time had arrived for him to consult Grant about the future. Yet in Sherman's remarkableter it was too late to have any influence upon Grant's approval of Sherman's march, he disclosed to of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after Sherman started. The first thought suVirginia. He telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November 6 wrote him vercluding the adverse opinions and advice of General Grant. Hence, as was his habit in such cases, hh Lee's army was the sole military objective. Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Shct that Savannah was one of the points in both Grant's plans and Sherman's was merely an incident, h the operations of all the other armies under Grant's general plans and direction, there was nothi[25 more...]
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