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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 11. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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July 30th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 15
were designed to check the enemy should he penetrate them. Where the ammunition is safe to be fired over the heads of the first line, it would doubtless be an excellent plan to put all of the rifled guns in detached batteries in rear of exposed points, where they would have an excellent effect in checking an enemy who should penetrate and either seek to advance or sweep down the lines. An instance of the effect of such batteries may be found in the battle of the Crater, at Petersburg, July 30th 1864, which is indeed about the only case where the Confederate lines ever had even detached batteries in rear of a point gotten possession of by the enemy. Flanner's battery in the Jerusalem plankroad five hundred yards directly in rear of the Crater, and Wright's, about the same distance towards the left, checked every effort of the enemy to advance upon Cemetery Hill according to his programme, or to move down the lines on either side of the Crater for some hours, and until an infantry f
January, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 15
the heads of the infantry with such danger and demoralization to the latter that it was seldom attempted. Earnest requests were made of the Ordnance Department to substitute for the Bormann fuse, the common paper-fuses, to be cut to the required length and fixed on the field, as being not only more economical and more certain, but. as allowing, what is often very desirable, a greater range than five seconds, which is the limit of the Bormann fuse. These requests, repeated and urged in January, 1863, on the strength of casualties occurring from our own guns among the infantry in front during the battle of Fredericksburg, were at length successful in accomplishing the substitution. The ammunition already on hand, however, had to be used up, and its imperfections affected the fire even as late as Gettysburg. The paper-fuse was found to answer much better, and no further complaints of ammunition came from the smooth-bores. The difficulties which beset the rifled guns and their amm
March 25th, 1865 AD (search for this): chapter 15
ce upon Cemetery Hill according to his programme, or to move down the lines on either side of the Crater for some hours, and until an infantry force was collected to retake it. Each battery took in flank any advance upon the other, and the enemy was kept under shelter of the earth thrown up by the explosion. A somewhat similar position of batteries first checked the Yankee advance after the capture of Fort Harrison, Sept. 29th, 1864, and the Confederate assault on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March 1865 was discomfitted in the same way. Indeed the Federal intrenchments very frequently comprised a second line of redoubts, if not of infantry parapet, in rear of the first, and its very moral effect often prevented attempts upon the first which promised well. Lest some of the statements of this article should be misunderstood to reflect in any way upon the Ordnance Bureau of the War Department, it is but just to close it, not only by disclaiming any such intention, but with the express
July 18th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 15
day, under the direction of the Ordnance Departments of Confederate or State governments, and soon turned out a number, generally of three inches calibre, and with five or seven grooves. They were all adapted to the same ammunition, but were not of uniform length or shape, and varied in weight from a thousand to twelve hundred pounds. Several of these guns were used at the first battle of Manassas, and three of them were engaged in the first artillery duel at Blackburn's Ford on the 18th of July, 1861. The projectiles furnished for them at that time were of two kinds, known as the Burton and the Archer, both of which were expected to receive the rotary motion from a leaden ring or sabot which the discharge forced into the grooves. They differed about two pounds in weight, and the charges for them differed three ounces; but as the latter could not be easily distinguished from each other, they were used indiscriminately. In the excitement of the battle these projectiles were suppos
January 19th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 15
t Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, and the utility of the organization being now proven, it was no longer left to division-commanders to effect, (in some divisions it had even yet been but partially done, owing to a lack of field-officers of artillery,) but it was formally adopted by order, and general orders from the War Department directed a similar organization in all the armies of the Confederacy. This was the intent of ¶ 2, General Order No. 7, Adjutant-General's Office, Richmond, January 19, 1863, though the language is ill-chosen, viz: Hereafter, all field-artillery belonging to any separate army will be parked together under the direction of the general or other chief officer of artillery having control of the same, to be distributed when required according to the judgment of the Commanding General of such army. General Lee's order effecting this organization was issued on the 15th of February, 1863. It divided the artillery of each of his two army corps into six battalions,
1861 AD (search for this): chapter 15
as all put up with the Bormann fuse, and this fuse being adopted by the Confederate Ordnance Department, a factory was established for its manufacture. Large quantities of ammunition fitted with these fuses were sent to the field in the summer of 1861, and complaints of its bad quality were immediately made. Careful test being made of it, it was found that fully four-fifths of the shell exploded prematurely, and very many of them in the gun. The machinery for their manufacture was overhauled, and allow the flame from the composition to reach the charge of the shell without burning around to the magazine of the fuse. Attempts were made to correct the evil by the use of white-lead, putty and leather under the fuse, and in the winter of 1861 these correctives were applied to every shell in the army with partial but not universal success. Repeated attempts were made to improve the manufacture, but they accomplished nothing, and until after the battle of Chancellorsville the Bormann fu
October, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 15
st as many shells could be made percussion as the gunner wished. This perfection of the fuse, however, was only reached during the fall of 1864, and before that period the percussionshell had a fuse-plug specially fitted to it at the arsenal, and the supply furnished was very small. The scarcity and bad quality of our rifle-ammunition gave security to the enemy on many occasions where he could have been seriously annoyed, if not materially damaged. When Bragg invested Chattanooga, in October 1863, the Confederate guns with good ammunition could have reached every foot of Grant's crowded camps, and with an abundance of it could have made them untenable. The effort which was made only showed how much demoralization and harm an effective shelling might have accomplished. In many other instances the Confederate artillery was amiable and forbearing by force of necessity, one illustration of which will be sufficient. At Bermuda Hundreds the enemy erected a signal-tower of open frame-
February 15th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 15
was the intent of ¶ 2, General Order No. 7, Adjutant-General's Office, Richmond, January 19, 1863, though the language is ill-chosen, viz: Hereafter, all field-artillery belonging to any separate army will be parked together under the direction of the general or other chief officer of artillery having control of the same, to be distributed when required according to the judgment of the Commanding General of such army. General Lee's order effecting this organization was issued on the 15th of February, 1863. It divided the artillery of each of his two army corps into six battalions, all of which were to be entirely under the command of the Chief of Artillery of the corps, and the whole force to be superintended by and to report to the Chief of Artillery of the army, who also personally commanded a small reserve of two battalions. In the Second Corps four of these battalions numbered four batteries each, one numbered five, and one six. In the First Corps five battalions numbered four
1862 AD (search for this): chapter 15
an that of the smooth-bores, their inaccuracy was excessive; and in addition to this not one shell in twenty exploded. Their manufacture was discontinued early in 1862, and a new projectile, having a saucer-shaped copper sabot attached by bolts after the shell was cast, was substituted for it. This shell, called the Mullane orn the copper sabot to allow the flame of the discharge to pass, but they did not succeed. This was the condition of the three-inch rifled guns during the whole of 1862, and these projectiles were used also in the beautiful United States three-inch Ordnance Rifles, of which about forty were captured during the year. In 1863 severost ludicrously illustrated by single batteries of four guns, of four different calibres, and it was only after the battalions were well organized in the winter of 1862 that anything was done to simplify this matter. The heavy guns which defended the James river against the enemy's fleet were principally the ordinary eight-inch
1863 AD (search for this): chapter 15
ficers of these grades. The promotions, however, were either never made in full, or else the officers appointed were sent to other duties, for during the whole of 1863 the majority of the battalions had but one field-officer, which was often insufficient. The staff-officers for the battalions, and for the Chiefs of Artillery, wele of 1862, and these projectiles were used also in the beautiful United States three-inch Ordnance Rifles, of which about forty were captured during the year. In 1863 several improvements were attempted in the method of attaching the copper to the shell, and the saucer-shaped sabot was finally exchanged for a band or ring of coprought iron balls with very high charges against the ironclads, which would doubtless have been extremely effective at short ranges. On several occasions during 1863 and 1864 where mortar-fire was desirable in the field, the twelve and twenty-four pounder howitzers were used for the purpose very successfully, by sinking the tra
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