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nd grievous mistakes on points of capital importance. It is incredible that these two reports of the battle were signed by General Lee without reading them. It is inconsistent with his habit in other cases. We know that he took time to read Gen. Pickett's report of the battle. Why not then read his own report? And if General Lee read them, then certainly their salient statements, to say the least, have the stamp of his authority. But Col. Mosby asserts that it was not Lee's purpose on the Lee, is contained in the following paragraph: There is a floating legend that General Lee assumed all the blame of his defeat. He did not: his reports put all the blame on Stuart. That General Lee said to his soldiers after the repulse of Pickett's charge that he was responsible for the failure is not a floating legend but a well attested fact. That he refrained from reproaching his three Lieutenants, Hill and Ewell and Longstreet, with their share in the defeat is another well known fa
Rebellion Records (search for this): chapter 1.17
on its arrival at Chambersburg and camped near Fayetteville. This, he thinks, conclusive against any such intention. But General Hill in his report says: (Rebellion Records, Vol. XXVII, pt. 2, p. 606.) On the morning of June 29th, the Third corps —— was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village orve that when General Lee gave General Stuart this order to take position on General Ewell's right, that officer was just leaving Hagerstown. In his report (Rebellion Records, Vol. XXVII, part 2, p. 443,) he says that on June 22nd, he received orders from the Commanding General to take Harrisburg, and next morning Rodes and Johns and York is about 80 miles from the ford. More important is the statement of General Stuart himself in his report in more than one place. Thus, on p. 695, Rebellion Records, Vol. XVII, he says, speaking of the engagement at Hanover: If my command had been well closed now, this column would have been at our mercy; but, owing
Snowden Andrews (search for this): chapter 1.17
infers they must have started on the evening of the 28th. But why? If they had started at 9 or 10 A. M., on the 29th, could not the head of the train have covered 30 miles and reached Chambersburg by one or two hours after midnight? Thirty miles in sixteen hours is not at all extraordinary, especially in an emergency. Mr. Hoke, whom Mosby cites as a witness, says the trains were moving hurriedly—at a trot. This shows they were making a forced march. If this was the artillery of Col. Snowden Andrews, that was camped five miles south of Carlisle, so that it had only twenty-five miles to march to Chambersburg. Turn now to Early's report. He says that on the evening of the 29th, he received Gen. Ewell's instructions to move back to the west side of South Mountain, together with a copy of Lee's order to him-evidently the first order. Now if my hypothesis is correct, and if Ewell received Lee's letter in the early hours of the 29th, what was to prevent Captain Elliott Johnson f
ng on the 29th for that place when ordered by the General Commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown. Again, it appears that Johnson's reserve artillery and trains were passing through Chambersburg after midnight of the 29th. Mr. Jacob Hoke, Mosby's authority, says it was between 1 and 2 A. M. From this Col. Mosby infers they must have started on the evening of the 28th. But why? If they had started at 9 or 10 A. M., on the 29th, could not the head of the train have covered 30 miles and reached Chambersburg by one or two hours after midnight? Thirty miles in sixteen hours is not at all extraordinary, especially in an emergency. Mr. Hoke, whom Mosby cites as a witness, says the trains were moving hurriedly—at a trot. This shows they were making a forced march. If this was the artillery of Col. Snowden Andrews, that was camped five miles south of Carlisle, so that it had only twenty-five miles to march to Chambersburg. Turn now to Early's report. He says tha
I affirm, on the contrary, that the reports of Ewell and Early are irreconcilable with the accuracythis hypothesis harmonizes with the Reports of Ewell and Lee and with the dates when the Divisions 28th, dispatched at midnight, and received by Ewell by 6 or 7 A. M., of the 29th, orders to Gen. Erder. Now if my hypothesis is correct, and if Ewell received Lee's letter in the early hours of thof the campaign as reflected in the reports of Ewell and Early. Either Colonel Venable in writing ou can for the use of the army. One column of Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehaeneral Stuart to move to Pennsylvania and join Ewell on the Susquehanna, (p. 88.) Throughout the whght and to place himself in communication with Ewell, and be at hand for whatever service his cavalsly as possible, to effect a junction with General Ewell. It cannot be supposed that when Lee gaveidea that that officer would not report to General Ewell until the 1st of July--the 9th day after. [48 more...]
itiously as possible, to effect a junction with General Ewell. It cannot be supposed that when Lee gave Stuart his instructions on June 22nd, he had any idea that that officer would not report to General Ewell until the 1st of July--the 9th day after. Colonel Mosby says that Stuart's cavalry could not have been of any material service to Lee even had they been present at Gettysburg from the beginning of the battle, and yet he says (page 189), that the withdrawal of Buford's cavalry left Sickels' flank in the peach orchard uncovered— in the air , and that Longstreet took advantage of it and struck him a stunning blow. These two statements are inconsistent. Col. Henderson is of opinion that the skillful handling of the Federal cavalry practically decided the issue of the conflict. Science of War, p. 278. Colonel Mosby makes much of the alleged inconsistency of the statement in General Lee's Report of Jan., 1864, that Stuart was instructed to lose no time in placing his comman
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 1.17
of Cavalry. (P. 89.) Again, Lee had informed Stuart that he would find Ewell on the Susquehanna. ehanna, as Colonel Mosby states the case. General Stuart also tells us that General Lee directed meConfederacy, (1905), he says, referring to General Stuart's raid: By the light of what happened, It must also be acknowledged, I think, that Stuart erred in judgment again in the course he took 9. There can be no doubt that the march of Stuart's horsemen was seriously impeded by the capturell. It cannot be supposed that when Lee gave Stuart his instructions on June 22nd, he had any idea Now General Lee's Report does reflect on General Stuart, so far as to intimate surprise that he di, and when he states in his report the fact of Stuart's absence, and the embarrassment it caused himartisan Colonel whether or not the presence of Stuart and his horsemen would have been of great servve quoted on a previous page a passage from Gen. Stuart's report of his operations, in which he sta[74 more...]
tating that Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick county. I directed you in my letter to move your forces to this point. Col. Mosby declares that this letter refutes every word of the statements of Gen. Longstreet, Col. Marshall, Gen. Long, Col. Waiter Taylor, Gen. Fitz Lee and Gen. Lee's own report in regard to the compaign in the particulars above named. He further says that Gen. Well's and Gen. Early's reports show that the movement against Harrisburg was arrested on June 27th, and thus agree with the statements of the letter of June 28th, which he quotes. Now I affirm, on the contrary, that the reports of Ewell and Early are irreconcilable with the accuracy of the date of this famous letter. Nobody can reconcile this letter, as dated (June 28th, 7:30 A. M.), with the indisputable facts of the campaign. The genuineness of the letter is undisputed—it is in the well
Jubal A. Early (search for this): chapter 1.17
named. He further says that Gen. Well's and Gen. Early's reports show that the movement against Haron the contrary, that the reports of Ewell and Early are irreconcilable with the accuracy of the dae reports of Gen. Longstreet, Gen. Ewell and Gen. Early. Now this famous letter turns out to havethe 28th, how can we account for the fact that Early did not receive Ewell's order till the eveningofficer to transmit General Lee's order to General Early at York. Then finally there is the improbpaign as reflected in the reports of Ewell and Early. Either Colonel Venable in writing the letterMarshall the night of the 28th of June. General Early also in his report says it had been his inthe 28th, he could easily have reported to General Early at York (30 miles farther), before nightfad have been able to effect a junction with General Early at York by the evening of the 29th, or thehtown, and he would have marched that day with Early towards Cashtown. his cavalry would in all pro[5 more...]
Cecil Battine (search for this): chapter 1.17
y prevent the main object of his expedition, which was to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania on its march towards the Susquehanna. These observations receive support from the comment of an able and accomplished military critic, Captain Cecil Battine. In his Crisis of the Confederacy, (1905), he says, referring to General Stuart's raid: By the light of what happened, it may now be said that the raid was a mistake, and especially when Stuart found the Federal army to be moving nortd to Culpepper, they could have reached there by rail in a few days, and the moral effect would have been such as probably to turn back some of Hooker's army for the defence of Washington—greatly to Lee's advantage in the approaching battle. Capt. Battine, a military critic of ability, remarks that it would have been worth incurring great risks to have drawn four of these brigades—to comply with this suggestion about Beauregard, p. 166. Again, Colonel Mosby challenges General Lee's stateme
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