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Gist, was moved from the mountain during the night and posted on Missionary Ridge to the right. Stevenson was left in command on Lookout his own division and Cheatham's. These , it was believed, if property be sufficient to hold the position in Lookout Valley, understood corps of 12,000 men, under Hooker on of Stevenson's t between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. --Hardee commanded the right wing, his forces consisting of Cleburne's, Stevenson's, Walker's, commanded by Gist, and Cheatham's divisions, Cheatham having arrived the previous evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's divisCheatham having arrived the previous evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, and had been acting under Hardee, but the latter could not take charge of it during the battle, owing to the intervening distance, and it was consequently left in the hands of Gen. Anderson, one of the coolest and most sagacious officers in the entire army.--Reynolds's brigade, of Buckner's div
William S. Jenkins (search for this): article 7
12,000 men, from the Potomac — time to march up from Shellmound and take position in the valley late in the afternoon of the 30th. During the following night Gen. Jenkins was ordered by Gen. Longstreet to make a night attack, not upon the forces at the ferry, but upon the reinforcements that had come up from below and gone into camp two miles from the ferry.--Jenkins's command consisted of Hood's division, except Anderson's brigade. Three brigades — Benning's, Lane's, and Robertson's — were ordered to hold the forces at the ferry in check, whilst Jenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and maJenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and made by an insufficient force. Thus the enemy got possession of Lookout Valley, the railroad, and the river from Brown's Ferry down to Bridgeport; and thus all doubt was removed as to his ability to subsist his forces in Chattanooga during the winter. The occupation of the ferry was the turning point in this part of the campaig<
in front and a gutting fire on his flank, it was unpassable for him to maintain his ground. He gave way, therefore, slowly and stubbornly, losing many prisoners and a heavy percentage of killed and wounded, but striking back with the desperation of a wounded gladiator who knows no such word as surrender. In the meantime Gen. Stevenson was perched upon Lookout Point, a spectator of the unequal conflict. He had six other brigades, some of which finally took part in the conflict, especially Pettus's and Moore's, which fought well; but I have the authority of the Commander-in-Chief for saying they were put in too late to accomplish much good, and that if they had been brought forward at the right time and property handled, the enemy would certainly have been beaten back. But instead of this, our lines were pushed back from the western slope of the mountain, around the north face, and thence past Craven's house to within a few hundred yards of the road leading to the top of the mountai
the river. A line of breastworks had been thrown up on the north fact, running from the river up towards Lookout Point, and passing near Craven's house. The enemy's batteries in the valley and on Moccasin Point opened at 11 o'clock, and kept up a heavy fire until half-past 12, when his infantry advanced in double lines. The crest of the mountain was enveloped in a thick fog, which prevented our batteries from responding. This fog extended down the mountain side as far as the left of Walthall's brigade, which was posted in front, and was the first, and indeed almost the only, brigade to receive the shock of the enemy's assault.--Under cover of this fog, it is stated, the enemy gained his left flank. He and his brigade behaved with great gallantry and fought desperately; but with an overwhelming force in front and a gutting fire on his flank, it was unpassable for him to maintain his ground. He gave way, therefore, slowly and stubbornly, losing many prisoners and a heavy percen
; but it was soon discovered that the distance was too great for our shot to accomplish anything. In the meantime Gen. Wheeler, in obedience to orders from headquarters, proceeded to cross the Tennessee on the 30th September at Cotton Port, a fe, and immense commissary and quartermaster stores, destroyed, together with a large number of mules, which were killed. Wheeler brought away a considerable number of horses and mules, and all the supplies his men could well carry on horseback.--His returned with his forces to the main army. Longstreet took with him McLaw's and Hood's divisions, and two divisions of Wheeler's cavalry, Wheeler himself accompanying and commanding his troopers. Of the operations in East Tennessee I shall not heWheeler himself accompanying and commanding his troopers. Of the operations in East Tennessee I shall not here speak, not being sufficiently informed of what has been done in that quarter. It may be stated however, that the expedition was undertaken with the knowledge and approbation of the President, who visited the Army of Tennessee a short time after
this division, beyond what is here stated, are without foundation. Breckinridge's division, commanded by Bate, and not Lewis, as has been stated, was the next on the left, and was the first in receive the enfilading fire of the enemy on the crest. Bate had repulsed the enemy handsomely, and would have maintained his position had Anderson on his right and Stewart on his left been equally successful. Bate's brigade, commanded by Col. Tyler, of Tennessee, until he was wounded, then by Col. Rudler, of the 37th Georgia, until he was wounded, and then by Lieut. Col. Smith, of the same regiment, behaved with conspicuous gallantry. After the right and left had given way, Col. Smith found no difficulty in rallying the brigade upon a line of bills in the rear, where a stand was made by Gen. Bate and the enemy handsomely repulsed. The Florida brigade, commanded by Lieut Col. Finley, and Lewis's Kentucky brigade, of the same division, taught with equal spirit. Indeed, I may say of the F
port with two corps d'arme, of 12,000 men, from the Potomac — time to march up from Shellmound and take position in the valley late in the afternoon of the 30th. During the following night Gen. Jenkins was ordered by Gen. Longstreet to make a night attack, not upon the forces at the ferry, but upon the reinforcements that had come up from below and gone into camp two miles from the ferry.--Jenkins's command consisted of Hood's division, except Anderson's brigade. Three brigades — Benning's, Lane's, and Robertson's — were ordered to hold the forces at the ferry in check, whilst Jenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and made by an insufficient force. Thus the enemy got possession of Lookout Valley, the railroad, and the river from Brown's Ferry down to Bridgeport; and thus all doubt was removed as to his ability to subsist his forces in Chattanooga during the winter. The occupation of the ferry was the turning point<
t in the great events then evidently at hand. It was now apparent that a master spirit was directing the movements of the Federal army, and no doubt was felt that Grant himself was present. On Monday forenoon, when the fog lifted, it was discovered that the enemy had massed a heavy force on his left. This force was deployed ith one of his brigades and assisted materially in cheeking the enemy and in finally driving him back some distance. During the afternoon it was observed that Grant continued to extend his lines up the river towards the mouth of the Chickamauga. Heavy forces were sent up the north bank, also, and then crossed over by a small resh danger in this flank movement. Hooker commanded the Federal right, Thomas the centre, and Sherman the left, Grand being in supreme command of the whole. Grant's forces, at a low calculation, did not number less than 85,000 men, exclusive of cavalry. Bragg's did not number half so many. This immense superiority of numbe
S. D. Lewis (search for this): article 7
ame involved and retreated. I would add that the reports in circulation in regard to Deas's brigade and other brigades in this division, beyond what is here stated, are without foundation. Breckinridge's division, commanded by Bate, and not Lewis, as has been stated, was the next on the left, and was the first in receive the enfilading fire of the enemy on the crest. Bate had repulsed the enemy handsomely, and would have maintained his position had Anderson on his right and Stewart on hiight and left had given way, Col. Smith found no difficulty in rallying the brigade upon a line of bills in the rear, where a stand was made by Gen. Bate and the enemy handsomely repulsed. The Florida brigade, commanded by Lieut Col. Finley, and Lewis's Kentucky brigade, of the same division, taught with equal spirit. Indeed, I may say of the Florida troops generally that I have never known them to fail in the hour of trial. While these events were transpiring on the right and left centr
sition by assault. Accordingly, no reflecting man in the army was surprised next morning, Tuesday, the 24th November, when Hooker's guns opened on Lookout.--Gen. Hardee, who, had been in command on the left, was transferred to the right, and Walker's division, commanded in his absence by Gen. Gist, was moved from the mountain during the night and posted on Missionary Ridge to the right. Stevenson was left in command on Lookout his own division and Cheatham's. These , it was believed, if y, the 25th of November. The fight was opened by the enemy at 10 o'clock A. M. on the right, and on the centre and left between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. --Hardee commanded the right wing, his forces consisting of Cleburne's, Stevenson's, Walker's, commanded by Gist, and Cheatham's divisions, Cheatham having arrived the previous evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, and had been
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