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Robertson (search for this): article 7
orps d'arme, of 12,000 men, from the Potomac — time to march up from Shellmound and take position in the valley late in the afternoon of the 30th. During the following night Gen. Jenkins was ordered by Gen. Longstreet to make a night attack, not upon the forces at the ferry, but upon the reinforcements that had come up from below and gone into camp two miles from the ferry.--Jenkins's command consisted of Hood's division, except Anderson's brigade. Three brigades — Benning's, Lane's, and Robertson's — were ordered to hold the forces at the ferry in check, whilst Jenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and made by an insufficient force. Thus the enemy got possession of Lookout Valley, the railroad, and the river from Brown's Ferry down to Bridgeport; and thus all doubt was removed as to his ability to subsist his forces in Chattanooga during the winter. The occupation of the ferry was the turning point in this part <
ge him. Nothing was done, however, that day or the next, which gave Hooker — who had reached Bridgeport with two corps d'arme, of 12,000 men, the ferry in check, whilst Jenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and made byeyond reasonable doubt, but, by opening up a shorter route, enabled Hooker and Sherman, with their columns, to form a junction with the main ae army was surprised next morning, Tuesday, the 24th November, when Hooker's guns opened on Lookout.--Gen. Hardee, who, had been in command onposition in Lookout Valley, understood corps of 12,000 men, under Hooker on of Stevenson's command was posted mountain; the remainder alon While these events were transpiring on the right and left centre, Hooker had got possession of McFarlan's Gap at Rossville, and was moving ager, would have encountered a fresh danger in this flank movement. Hooker commanded the Federal right, Thomas the centre, and Sherman the lef
d easily have done, that the same results would have followed, together with the enforced evacuation of East Tennessee by Burnside. If, therefore, Gens. Polk and Hindman failed to come to time in McLemore's Cove, and thus prevented the destruction of the Federal army, impartial justice requires it to be stated that the General comkamauga on the right, a distance of five or six miles. The pickets alone were left in the trenches at the foot of the ridge, except in front of Patton Anderson's (Hindman's) division. It was my opinion then, and is now, that it would have been better if Gen. Bragg had carried out his original intention and retired across the Cvisions, Cheatham having arrived the previous evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, and had been acting under Hardee, but the latter could not take charge of it during the battle, owing to the intervening distance, and it w
orps of 20,000 men had probably passed around to the north of Chattanooga, and gone to the assistance of Burnside, and this led Gen. Bragg to order Cleburne's and Buckner's corps to take the cars at Chickamauga Station and proceed with all possible dispatch to Lenoir Station, on the Chattanooga and East Tennessee road, and head offthe direction at Knoxville, but was in the vicinity of Chattanooga ready to unite in an assault upon our positions. Cleburne's division and Reynolds's brigade of Buckner's division, which had not then left the station, were recalled and returned in time to take part in the great events then evidently at hand. It was now apparent g distance, and it was consequently left in the hands of Gen. Anderson, one of the coolest and most sagacious officers in the entire army.--Reynolds's brigade, of Buckner's division, having been turned back at Chickamauga Station, was temporarily attached to Anderson's division. As it was only a few days ago that you were furn
ed Bridgeport with two corps d'arme, of 12,000 men, from the Potomac — time to march up from Shellmound and take position in the valley late in the afternoon of the 30th. During the following night Gen. Jenkins was ordered by Gen. Longstreet to make a night attack, not upon the forces at the ferry, but upon the reinforcements that had come up from below and gone into camp two miles from the ferry.--Jenkins's command consisted of Hood's division, except Anderson's brigade. Three brigades — Benning's, Lane's, and Robertson's — were ordered to hold the forces at the ferry in check, whilst Jenkins with his own brigade, assaulted Hooker's column below. The attack failed, being badly planned and made by an insufficient force. Thus the enemy got possession of Lookout Valley, the railroad, and the river from Brown's Ferry down to Bridgeport; and thus all doubt was removed as to his ability to subsist his forces in Chattanooga during the winter. The occupation of the ferry was the tur<
Patton Anderson (search for this): article 7
ins's command consisted of Hood's division, except Anderson's brigade. Three brigades — Benning's, Lane's, anes at the foot of the ridge, except in front of Patton Anderson's (Hindman's) division. It was my opinion left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, andce, and it was consequently left in the hands of Gen. Anderson, one of the coolest and most sagacious officers t Chickamauga Station, was temporarily attached to Anderson's division. As it was only a few days ago thasuccessful in the centre and on the left. Half of Anderson's division, under Brig.-Gen. Deas, was left (perhablood! It was here that our lines first gave way, Anderson's old brigade, composed of Mississippians, and onebreak, and not Reynolds's, as was first reported. Anderson strove to meet this new danger by forming a line asomely, and would have maintained his position had Anderson on his right and Stewart on his left been equally
north of Chattanooga, and gone to the assistance of Burnside, and this led Gen. Bragg to order Cleburne's and Buckner's corps to take the cars at Chickamauga Station and proceed with all possible disville, but was in the vicinity of Chattanooga ready to unite in an assault upon our positions. Cleburne's division and Reynolds's brigade of Buckner's division, which had not then left the station, wn 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. --Hardee commanded the right wing, his forces consisting of Cleburne's, Stevenson's, Walker's, commanded by Gist, and Cheatham's divisions, Cheatham having arrived ttery,) have been recovered, the enemy being unable to get them off after his bloody repulse by Cleburne at Ringgold Gap. Our loss in stores was inconsiderable, and in wagons about one hundred. The still encamped. The pursuit of the enemy was vigorous until the 27th, when it was repulsed by Cleburne with a loss of 300 prisoners, 2,000 killed and wounded, and three flags. On the 29th Gen. Brag
rman had not gone in the direction at Knoxville, but was in the vicinity of Chattanooga ready to unite in an assault upon our positions. Cleburne's division and Reynolds's brigade of Buckner's division, which had not then left the station, were recalled and returned in time to take part in the great events then evidently at hand.wing to the intervening distance, and it was consequently left in the hands of Gen. Anderson, one of the coolest and most sagacious officers in the entire army.--Reynolds's brigade, of Buckner's division, having been turned back at Chickamauga Station, was temporarily attached to Anderson's division. As it was only a few dayst our lines first gave way, Anderson's old brigade, composed of Mississippians, and one of the best in the Confederate service, being the first to break, and not Reynolds's, as was first reported. Anderson strove to meet this new danger by forming a line across the ridge, but his men melted away to the rear in spite of all his ef
Robt E. Lee (search for this): article 7
cessary to prepare his commissariat for so important an undertaking; yet, granting this to be true, there was nothing to prevent an immediate assault upon Chattanooga, which, if properly conducted, could hardly have failed to be successful. But Gen. Lee made a similar mistake at Fredericksburg from a want of timely information as to the real condition of the enemy — a mistake which the most sagacious commander is liable to commit — and which, therefore, we should not be too hasty to criticise either in Gen. Bragg or Gen. Lee. Upon his arrival before Chattanooga, Gen. Bragg proceeded to invest the place on the south side of the Tennessee. He covered Lookout Mountain with his forces, and threw his pickets well down the river below the mountain. The opinion prevailed for some days that Rosecrans would attempt to evacuate the town by night, and, consequently, demonstrations were made in force on two successive nights to ascertain, it possible, the situation and designs of the enemy
g man in the army was surprised next morning, Tuesday, the 24th November, when Hooker's guns opened on Lookout.--Gen. Hardee, who, had been in command on the left, was transferred to the right, and Walker's division, commanded in his absence by Gen. Gist, was moved from the mountain during the night and posted on Missionary Ridge to the right. Stevenson was left in command on Lookout his own division and Cheatham's. These , it was believed, if property be sufficient to hold the position inr. The fight was opened by the enemy at 10 o'clock A. M. on the right, and on the centre and left between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon. --Hardee commanded the right wing, his forces consisting of Cleburne's, Stevenson's, Walker's, commanded by Gist, and Cheatham's divisions, Cheatham having arrived the previous evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, and had been acting under Hardee, b
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