hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Fitzhugh Lee 465 11 Browse Search
James Longstreet 457 5 Browse Search
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) 301 1 Browse Search
Gederal Meade 240 0 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 182 0 Browse Search
Jefferson Davis 151 5 Browse Search
Ewell 141 29 Browse Search
Pickett 141 11 Browse Search
Grant 130 12 Browse Search
Fitz Lee 120 4 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 295 total hits in 77 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
McLaws (search for this): chapter 3.24
broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drI quoted from General Lee's report as follows: But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines, etc. But having become separated from McLaws, etc., were compelled to retire. This is certainly sufficient authority; but I quote further. General Ander: A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left. This testimony is corroborated by General McLaws, the division commandeGeneral McLaws, the division commander on his right, and by General Humphries, the brigade commander on his right. It is a plain case. General Wilcox was given the directing brigade and ordered to cover McLaws' left flank. He failed to do this. There is no doubt that he and his. troops fought gallantly, as did those of Wright's and Perry's brigades. Their courag
A. P. Hill (search for this): chapter 3.24
t and rear on the night of the 1st, and placed between him and his capital, and thus forced him to attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thus prevented a concentration of the whole Federal army at the point I was assaulting; seventh, on the morning of the 3d we should still have moved to the right, and manceuvred the Federals into attacking usly amendment that would have ensued, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy's right when it was guarded by a single brigade, run over their works, and fall upon their rear while I engaged them in front, and while Hill lay in a threatening position in their centre. Had this co-operative movement been made, the battle would, in all probability, have been ours. As it was, no disposition of the men under my charge, no change in the time or method or spirit of the
J. A. Early (search for this): chapter 3.24
gh the failure of the troops ordered to co-operate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's corps to cooperate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were: First. the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so manoeuvre as to force the Federals to attack us; speond, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpeper Courthouse, wh
A. A. Humphreys (search for this): chapter 3.24
eneral Wilcox, their work was not as effective as it should have been. In this connection it may be noted that the Federal line in front of these troops was not broken so much by direct assault as by crushing in the lines on their left. General Humphreys was forced to change front partially two or three times to meet threatened flank movements against him, and he was in that way drawn off from immediate connection with his right. The skillful handling of these troops, commanded by General General A. A. Humphreys, was noted at the time, and has been particularly noted since by General Humphries, of Mississippi. At this late day the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought into question. He is credited with having used uncomely remarks concerning me, in the presence of a number of subordinate officers, just on the eve of battle. It is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is hardly possible
A. H. Garland (search for this): chapter 3.24
reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.. Truly and respectfully yours, . H. Taylor, A. A. G. To General Longstreet. Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866. My dear General: Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. Can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing memoirs of the war? Every officer whose position
Corse (search for this): chapter 3.24
ing the detachments that would join him on the march, a trifle over 70,000. On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at 52,000 bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me upon the subject he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left in Virginia, or some other detachments made during the march. If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them. I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article. As to the strength of General Meade's army, I take his own statement for that. In his evidence taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 337 of their report) he says: My strength was a little under 100
Geary (search for this): chapter 3.24
e changed the result for the better. Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had wed my movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results-except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of a sunrise attack. Colonel Taylor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: Round Top, the key of
John H. Evans (search for this): chapter 3.24
m to prepare for the forced reconnoissance. The reconnaissance was successfully made at nightfall. During the night several of my brigadiers came in and they all agreed in reporting the position very strong. At about midnight Generals Hood and Evans,%and possibly one or two others, came to my headquarters and made similar reports, expressing apprehensions as to the result of the attack. Everything developed by this closer reconnaissance went to confirm the impression made upon me by my recokson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackso
Sickles (search for this): chapter 3.24
esistance of the Third corps, under Major-General. Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of nutuation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between Geneorps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position there. At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our movtime to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left, were simply this position until the battle had finally opened. He had ordered Sickles to occupy it if practicable ; but it was not occupied in force whe
W. H. Taylor (search for this): chapter 3.24
, and with the same results-except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of a sunrise attack. Colonel Taylor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: Round Top, the key of their position, which was not occupied in the morning, was now held in force. The answer to this statement, direct and anthoritative, is at hand. General Meade sath 30,000 men instead of 15,000. It seems from recent publications that my column of attack on the 2d was only about 12,000. It was given me as 15,000 men at the time.--F-E I doubt now if 30,000 men could have made a successful attack, if Colonel Taylor is correct in his idea as to the manner in which General Lee would have fought them. He says that General Lee ordered that the column should go to the attack with its right flank exposed to the enveloping forces on the Federal left. Under t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8