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William T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 17
Sherman— master of the situation the fame of Sherman's grand marches his great ability as a stratwriters have attempted to explain and justify Sherman's action in taking with him so large an army,ho had loudly proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect that State from aast for that purpose. If that had been done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenis perceived instantly the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the moment that an started. The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement leaving open the road to Ms one of the points in both Grant's plans and Sherman's was merely an incident, and a very unimports clearly enough what kind of modification of Sherman's tactical methods was requisite to enable him to reach the same result in Georgia. Sherman's tactical operations during the entire Atlanta cdversary in command of a superior force. But Sherman's own knowledge of his own impulsive nature m[91 more...]
H. W. Halleck (search for this): chapter 17
as expressed, in his last words: If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days leave of absence to see the young folks. Their joint action against Lee does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after Sherman started. The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement leaving open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta, as embodied in his despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the ulterior purpose to reinforce our armies in Virginia. He telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 17
ndoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably be able to withdraw his army towy mind in the fall of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured or destroyedcerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be arranged could well be considered latee the young folks. Their joint action against Lee does not appear to have been suggested by eithens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally cod not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas had failed to obey his instructions to inary to the march northward for the capture of Lee's army, with the previous far-reaching strategirand strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not necessitate or justify his actioeir complete ultimate success in the capture of Lee's army. If Grant had not captured that army, Sherman would. And the surrender of Lee was necessarily followed by that of all the other Confedera[7 more...]
November 30th (search for this): chapter 17
in fact, due largely to an accident which, in the ordinary course of military operations, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was tempted to make at Franklin one of those furious assaults upon troops in position and ready to receive him which are almost always disastrous. It was just the kind of temptation to Hood's army that was necessary to break it up, and it did so very effectually. The old Army of Tennessee, which had been so formidable, ceased to be a formidable army on November 30. Its fighting days were nearly over. After that it never did any fighting at all worthy of its old record. And there was hardly a single day while Hood was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by Hood might always have had a more powerful army near at hand to support it if necessary. In his special field order of January 8, 1865, a
September 12th (search for this): chapter 17
ia. Of course Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the moment that move was suggested. The question in what manner that concerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be arranged could well be considered later, after that march had been made and a new base established at Savannah. The correspondence between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, including the letters of September 12 and 20, simply shows that neither had at that time conceived the possibility of any movement of Sherman toward Virginia. All their thoughts had reference to continuing operations in the south, Sherman's most important object being to get control of the Savannah River; or, as expressed, in his last words: If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days leave of absence to see the young folks. Their joint action against Lee does not appea
November 1st (search for this): chapter 17
espatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the ulterior purpose to reinforce our armies in Virginia. He telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November 6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah on December 24: I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant was strictly confidential. I have still some thoughts . . . that should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else] as
September 20th (search for this): chapter 17
urse Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the moment that move was suggested. The question in what manner that concerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be arranged could well be considered later, after that march had been made and a new base established at Savannah. The correspondence between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, including the letters of September 12 and 20, simply shows that neither had at that time conceived the possibility of any movement of Sherman toward Virginia. All their thoughts had reference to continuing operations in the south, Sherman's most important object being to get control of the Savannah River; or, as expressed, in his last words: If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days leave of absence to see the young folks. Their joint action against Lee does not appear to have be
January 8th, 1865 AD (search for this): chapter 17
y on November 30. Its fighting days were nearly over. After that it never did any fighting at all worthy of its old record. And there was hardly a single day while Hood was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by Hood might always have had a more powerful army near at hand to support it if necessary. In his special field order of January 8, 1865, announcing to all the troops of his military division the results of his great campaign, General Sherman said: Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes. If the purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to serve as a decoy to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in the season, when Sherman was
November 6th (search for this): chapter 17
young folks. Their joint action against Lee does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after Sherman started. The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's moveme ulterior purpose to reinforce our armies in Virginia. He telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November 6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savght them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant was strictly confidential. I have still some thoughts . . . that should be confided to you [that is, to Granty take part in the capture of either of the Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his march, in his letter of November 6 to Grant he explained that his march would be statesmanship anyway, even if it was not war. Sherman was not a man to b
December 24th (search for this): chapter 17
e to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the ulterior purpose to reinforce our armies in Virginia. He telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November 6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah on December 24: I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant was strictly confidential. I have still some thoughts . . . that should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else] as a key to future developments. Neither Grant nor Sherman appears to have made any use of that key for the public benefit. But it now unlocks the store-house
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