Eliza Lee Follen.
There can be no doubt that the acquisition of Texas hastened the overthrow of the Slave Power, by making it over-confident, by fostering dreams of an indefinite Southern expansion in case of separation from the North, by training the hot youth of the South to arms when Mexico was invaded and reduced—yet training not only Jefferson Davis, Lee, Stonewall Jackson, the two Johnstons, and so many other future chiefs of the Confederate army, but also Grant, Thomas, Meade, Hancock, and their fellow-emancipationists of the Federal army; above all, by enlarging with the national domain the points of contact between free and slave institutions, involving fresh conflicts and compromises—perpetual irritation of the national sore.
Thomas Corwin correctly predicted that, in the event of a cession of territory by Mexico to the United States, the question of the further extension of slavery must arise in a form which would necessarily array the North and the South
Did they mean, asked Mr. Garrison, to act that farce over again?
Charles Francis Adams objected to jeoparding united action by any such radical proposition, and both the Lovejoy and Garrison resolutions were laid on the
Lib. 15.18. table.
Months passed, during which inaction on the part of the North paved the way to the catastrophe, and sapped the
Lib. 15.82. courage of the resistants—the political and practical resistants.
William H. Seward, in a public letter to Salmon P. Chase, submitted in advance to the inevitable
Lib. 15.113. annex ation of Texas, repudiating disunion.
His counter measure was to enlarge the area of freedom—as if the South did not provide for that by coupling the admission of a slave State with that of a free State.
Already, in February, Florida had been thus admitted into the Union, paired with
Lib. 15.34, 39. Iowa, in spite of the intense Northern feeling against more slave States aroused in the case of Texas; in spite, too, of the