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possession of the Valley as soon as they did, no alternative would have been left them but retreat or starvation. Previous to the events here related Stevenson had been sent into East Tennessee to observe the movements of Burnside, and preventin junction of his forces with those at Chattanooga. Subsequently, on the 5th of November, Gen. Longstreet being an experienced officer, was sent to relieved Stevenson, who returned with his forces to the main army. Longstreet took with him McLaw's and Hood's divisions, and two divisions of Wheeler's cavalry, Wheeler himself accompanying and commanding his troopers. Of the operations in East Tennessee I shall not here speak, not being sufficiently informed of what has been done in that quarter. It may be stated however, that the expedition was undertaken with the knowledge and approbation of the President, who visited the Army of Tennessee a short time after the battle of Chickamauga. Opinion is divided as to the wisdom of this di
Claiborn Thomas (search for this): article 7
ies had to be hauled, and the heavy rains and swollen streams by which his trains were delayed, reduced his successor, Gen. Thomas, to this unpleasant condition: He must either re-open the railroad line, restrict his troops to quarter rations or lesoga rather than move across the river upon the enemy's rear. Be this as it may, on the night of the 28th of October, Thomas threw a force over the Tennessee, at Brown's Ferry, four or five miles below the town by the river, and a little more thale. Indeed, it is the belief of Gen. Bragg and intelligent officers generally, that but for the adroit manœuvre by which Thomas got possession of Lookout Valley, he would have been forced to abandon Chattanooga some weeks ago. Even the Federal newspts ground much longer, would have encountered a fresh danger in this flank movement. Hooker commanded the Federal right, Thomas the centre, and Sherman the left, Grand being in supreme command of the whole. Grant's forces, at a low calculation,
he enemy had retired. Information was received about the same time that Sherman's corps of 20,000 men had probably passed around to the north of Chattanooga, and gone to the assistance of Burnside, and this led Gen. Bragg to order Cleburne's and Buckner's corps to take the cars at Chickamauga Station and proceed with all possible dispatch to Lenoir Station, on the Chattanooga and East Tennessee road, and head off Sherman, or at all events to joint Longstreet. But only Bushrod Johnson's and Gracie's brigades had embarked on the cars when it was ascertained that Sherman had not gone in the direction at Knoxville, but was in the vicinity of Chattanooga ready to unite in an assault upon our positions. Cleburne's division and Reynolds's brigade of Buckner's division, which had not then left the station, were recalled and returned in time to take part in the great events then evidently at hand. It was now apparent that a master spirit was directing the movements of the Federal army, and
Rosecrans (search for this): article 7
Tennessee. He covered Lookout Mountain with his forces, and threw his pickets well down the river below the mountain. The opinion prevailed for some days that Rosecrans would attempt to evacuate the town by night, and, consequently, demonstrations were made in force on two successive nights to ascertain, it possible, the situati Running-water, on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, had been destroyed, and this fact, together with our position in Lookout Valley, made it necessary for Rosecrans to rely upon his wagon trains alone for the transportation of his supplies. The distance and the mountainous country over which these supplies had to be hauled,ituation remained without change until about the 21st of November, when the enemy made a feint in the neighborhood of Stephens's Gap, as if he intended to repeat Rosecrans's movement upon our left flank. A column was put in motion in that direction, but it had not proceeded far before it was discovered that the enemy had retired.
is position had Anderson on his right and Stewart on his left been equally successful. Bate's brigade, commanded by Col. Tyler, of Tennessee, until he was wounded, then by Col. Rudler, of the 37th Georgia, until he was wounded, and then by Lieut. Col. Smith, of the same regiment, behaved with conspicuous gallantry. After the right and left had given way, Col. Smith found no difficulty in rallying the brigade upon a line of bills in the rear, where a stand was made by Gen. Bate and the enemy hCol. Smith found no difficulty in rallying the brigade upon a line of bills in the rear, where a stand was made by Gen. Bate and the enemy handsomely repulsed. The Florida brigade, commanded by Lieut Col. Finley, and Lewis's Kentucky brigade, of the same division, taught with equal spirit. Indeed, I may say of the Florida troops generally that I have never known them to fail in the hour of trial. While these events were transpiring on the right and left centre, Hooker had got possession of McFarlan's Gap at Rossville, and was moving around to the rear of our left wing. It is not improbable, therefore, that the left wing, had
evening. Breckinridge commanded on the left, his divisions being Stewart's and Bate's. Patton Anderson's division, (Hindman's,) was in the centre, and had been acti here stated, are without foundation. Breckinridge's division, commanded by Bate, and not Lewis, as has been stated, was the next on the left, and was the first in receive the enfilading fire of the enemy on the crest. Bate had repulsed the enemy handsomely, and would have maintained his position had Anderson on his right and Stewart on his left been equally successful. Bate's brigade, commanded by Col. Tyler, of Tennessee, until he was wounded, then by Col. Rudler, of the 37th Georgia,lying the brigade upon a line of bills in the rear, where a stand was made by Gen. Bate and the enemy handsomely repulsed. The Florida brigade, commanded by Lieut Closs in killed and wounded was far heavier than ours. In front of our right and Bate's division the ground was blue with their slain. The army retired to Chicka
W. R. Polk (search for this): article 7
t, they might have reoccupied Chattanooga, captured a large part of the Federal army, and dispersed the remainder through the mountains north of the Tennessee, where they would have been an easy prey to our cavalry; or, failing to adopt that plan, if the army had been moved across the river above, and had gained the rear of the enemy, as it could easily have done, that the same results would have followed, together with the enforced evacuation of East Tennessee by Burnside. If, therefore, Gens. Polk and Hindman failed to come to time in McLemore's Cove, and thus prevented the destruction of the Federal army, impartial justice requires it to be stated that the General commanding fell into an error in the course he pursued which has been, though it was not necessarily, quite as fatal. It may be that his transportation was insufficient for a march into the heart of Tennessee, and that time was necessary to prepare his commissariat for so important an undertaking; yet, granting this to b
r orders without the loss of a gun or a prisoner. Unfortunately, we were not so successful in the centre and on the left. Half of Anderson's division, under Brig.-Gen. Deas, was left (perhaps under a misapprehension of orders) in the trenches at the foot of the ridge, with instructions to retire to the crest whenever the enemy advanced within two hundred yards of their line. In executing this difficult order against which Gen. Deas is understood to have protected, the men were much exposed as they ascended the ridge, and so completely exhausted when they reached the crest that they were unfit for duty for fifteen minutes, and many of them actually vomited rear in spite of all his efforts, until finally his whole di vision became involved and retreated. I would add that the reports in circulation in regard to Deas's brigade and other brigades in this division, beyond what is here stated, are without foundation. Breckinridge's division, commanded by Bate, and not Lewis,
Fingerson (search for this): article 7
urs, and have lost it on Missionary Ridge, where, it the disparity in numbers was greater, the position was as favorable to us as it was possible to make it. Our casualties will probably not exceed 900 killed and 1,500 wounded. Our loss in prisoners especially stragglers, is considerable, exceeding, I fear, 5,000, with their arms. Of guns we lost thirty-four in the battle, two siege pieces which we destroyed at Chickamauga Station, and four on the retreat. These last-mentioned guns (Fingerson's battery,) have been recovered, the enemy being unable to get them off after his bloody repulse by Cleburne at Ringgold Gap. Our loss in stores was inconsiderable, and in wagons about one hundred. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was far heavier than ours. In front of our right and Bate's division the ground was blue with their slain. The army retired to Chickamauga Station the night after the battle, and next day marched to Ringgold, and on the succeeding day, the 27th, rea
Longstreet (search for this): article 7
tely to entrench and fortify itself. On the 29th, Gen. Longstreet, who commanded on the left, was directed to reconnoitrDuring the following night Gen. Jenkins was ordered by Gen. Longstreet to make a night attack, not upon the forces at the fer been fought so soon, and more time would have been left Longstreet to complete his work at Knoxville. Indeed, it is the beat Chattanooga. Subsequently, on the 5th of November, Gen. Longstreet being an experienced officer, was sent to relieved Stevenson, who returned with his forces to the main army. Longstreet took with him McLaw's and Hood's divisions, and two divishe cavalry to prevent the junction of Burnside, and keep Longstreet, and his veterans at the point of greatest danger. If tee road, and head off Sherman, or at all events to joint Longstreet. But only Bushrod Johnson's and Gracie's brigades had ered of great importance to hold the enemy in check until Longstreet could effect the reduction of Knoxville — a consummation
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