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1862 AD (search for this): chapter 18
er in the Army of Northern Virginia, from General Lee to the drummer boy, who did not believe, when we invaded Pennsylvania in 1863, that it was able to drive the Federal army into the Atlantic Ocean. Not that the fighting capacity of its great adversary was under-estimated, but possibly the Army of Northern Virginia had an overweening opinion of its own prowess. Just here let us take a retrospective view, and consider what the Army of Northern Virginia had in one year accomplished. In 1862, eighty thousand strong, it attacked the Federal army, one hundred thousand strong, and after seven days fighting drove that army to shelter under its gunboats. Following up this success, after a series of engagements, Pope was driven across the Potomac. Then followed the battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam), when possibly the fighting capacity of the Army of Northern Virginia never shone brighter. Its numbers reduced by fighting, fatigue, and hard marching to less than forty thousand strong, i
May, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 18
have been from the series of battles I would have been compelled to fight had I remained in Virginia. General Lee, says Major Seddon, then rose from his seat, and with an emphatic gesture said, and sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg, and it will be seen for the next six months that that army will be as quiet as a sucking dove. The Army of the Potomac made no aggressive movement, saving the fiasco known as Mine Run, from the 3d of July, 1863, until General Grant crossed the Rapidan in May, 1864, precisely ten months afterward. Whatever opinions may be entertained in regard to the details of the Battle of Gettysburg, whether if Stonewall Jackson had been in command of Hill's corps on the first day-July 1st-a different result would have been obtained; whether Longstreet unnecessarily delayed his attack on the second day; whether, as expresses it, the way in which the fights of the second day were directed does not show the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Sou
June 30th (search for this): chapter 18
at or near Carlisle. Hearing that a supply of shoes was to be obtained in Gettysburg, eight miles distant from Cashtown, and greatly needing shoes for.my men, I directed General Pettigrew to go to Gettysburg and get these supplies. On the 30th of June General Pettigrew, with his brigade, went near Gettysburg, but did not enter the town, returning the same evening to Cashtown, reporting that he had not carried out my orders, as Gettysburg was occupied by the enemy's cavalry, and that some ofwould have known of Reynolds' approach in the direction of Gettysburg twenty-four hours before this corps reached Gettysburg. General Lee could and probably would, had he known the enemy were in motion, have occupied Gettysburg on the 29th or 30th of June, and rendered his position impregnable. Had our cavalry been in position, General Lee, if he saw proper, could have permitted Reynolds' corps to have occupied Gettysburg as it did-but instead of this corps being unmasked by two brigades of
1863 AD (search for this): chapter 18
ical Society: My dear Sir:---- , referring to the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, says: The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the Northern States, was mral Lee to the drummer boy, who did not believe, when we invaded Pennsylvania in 1863, that it was able to drive the Federal army into the Atlantic Ocean. Not that ndpoint, and especially looking at the sequel of the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, he is correct, and I have no doubt that by far the greater number of historians the great cause which brought about the failure of the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863. The failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863, in the opini1863, in the opinion of almost all the officers of the Army of Northern Virginia, can be expressed in five words — the absence of our cavalry. Train a giant for an encounter and hefter the fight, as he remarked to me, at Orange Courthouse, during the winter of 1863-64, when, animadverting upon the criticisms made upon the Gettysburg fight, espe
April 5th (search for this): chapter 18
nds us a copy of the following letter to General Longstreet. In a note to the Secretary accompanying this letter General Hood says: It does not cover all the points upon which you desire information, but may prove of interest. We feel sure that our readers will be glad to have the statement of this gallant and accomplished soldier. Letter from General John B. Hood. New Orleans, La., June 28th, 1875. Gen. James Longstreet: General: I have not responded earlier to your letter of April 5th, by reason of pressure of business, which rendered it difficult for me to give due attention to the subject in regard to which you have desired information. You are correct in your assumption, that I failed to make a report of the operations of my division around Suffolk, Va., and of its action in the battle of Gettysburg, in consequence of a wound which I received in this engagement. In justice to the brave troops under my command at this period, I should here mention another cause
June 29th (search for this): chapter 18
e, and you, and all my officers know that I am always ready and anxious to have their suggestions. The fact is, General Lee believed the Army of Northern Virginia, as it then existed, could accomplish anything. Had our cavalry been in position, General Lee would have known of Reynolds' approach in the direction of Gettysburg twenty-four hours before this corps reached Gettysburg. General Lee could and probably would, had he known the enemy were in motion, have occupied Gettysburg on the 29th or 30th of June, and rendered his position impregnable. Had our cavalry been in position, General Lee, if he saw proper, could have permitted Reynolds' corps to have occupied Gettysburg as it did-but instead of this corps being unmasked by two brigades of my division, it would have been attacked by Longstreet, Ewell and Hill's corps. In that case the fate of this corps no one can doubt; and had the enemy thrown forward reinforcements as he did, they would have been crushed in detail.
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 18
nnsylvania, as given by him to me and to another. A short time before General Grant crossed the Rapidan, in the spring of 1864, General Lee said to me: If I could do so-unfortunately I cannot — I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania play in warfare is very sure to be eradicated by actual participation in such a war as raged in this country from 1860 to 1864. The fight at Gettysburg on July 1 was without order or system, the several divisions attacking the enemy in their froeve to have been General Lee's views after the fight, as he remarked to me, at Orange Courthouse, during the winter of 1863-64, when, animadverting upon the criticisms made upon the Gettysburg fight, especially referring to the fight of July 3, afteized the plans of the greatest of American soldiers in his seven days fights around Richmond, his discomfiture of Pope, his Chancellorsville fight, and his series of battles in 1864, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Yours truly, Henry Heth.
June, 1877 AD (search for this): chapter 18
Witnesses: H. B. Deas, R. J. Deas. Letter from Major-General Henry Heth, of A. P. Hill's corps, A. N. V. [The following letter from General Heth was originally addressed to the Secretary of our Society, and was duly forwarded to our distinguished foreign correspondent, whose letter of enquiry to us called it forth. It has been recently published in the Philadelphia Times, but will be none the less acceptable to our readers as one of our Gettysburg series.] Richmond, Va., June, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., Secretary Southern Historical Society: My dear Sir:---- , referring to the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, says: The Army of Northern Virginia, when it invaded the Northern States, was more powerful than it had ever been before. If---- , in using the term more powerful, means that the numerical strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, on this occasion, was greater than ever before, he is wrong, as the subjoined statement of the strength of that army, take
July 3rd, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 18
at Gettysburg; but in my opinion no greater than it would have been from the series of battles I would have been compelled to fight had I remained in Virginia. General Lee, says Major Seddon, then rose from his seat, and with an emphatic gesture said, and sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg, and it will be seen for the next six months that that army will be as quiet as a sucking dove. The Army of the Potomac made no aggressive movement, saving the fiasco known as Mine Run, from the 3d of July, 1863, until General Grant crossed the Rapidan in May, 1864, precisely ten months afterward. Whatever opinions may be entertained in regard to the details of the Battle of Gettysburg, whether if Stonewall Jackson had been in command of Hill's corps on the first day-July 1st-a different result would have been obtained; whether Longstreet unnecessarily delayed his attack on the second day; whether, as expresses it, the way in which the fights of the second day were directed does not show th
May 5th (search for this): chapter 18
n my front completely and utterly routed, and my division in hot pursuit. I was then shot and rendered insensible for some hours. I mention this attack, made by my division on the first of July, and its results, to show,--as far as my observation and opinion goes, that is wrong in supposing that the Federal troops at Gettysburg fought ten times better than in Virginia. The Federal troops fought quite as well when we attacked them on the second day at Chancellorsville, and better on the 5th of May in the Wilderness, and again at Spotsylvania Courthouse. I speak, of course, of my individual experience and observation in those several engagements. The sentimental idea desired to be conveyed by--, in saying that the Federal troops fought ten times better at Gettysburg than in Virginia, is based upon the supposition that troops are much more willing to die when fighting on their own soil and in its defence. Attacking a sentiment is not popular, I know. I am not singular, I am sati
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