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Sharpsburg (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
sequently did, without difficulty. The chance of increasing the fighting qualities of the enemy by drawing him on his own soil was not considered by General Lee when he was forming his plan of invasion. Neither from history nor experience have I been able to learn that the fighting of a regular army is influenced by locality or country. I have been taught to believe that quality to be derived from its commander. It was not discovered that Federal troops fought better at Boonesboroa, Sharpsburg and Gettysburg than they did at Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Could the French troops have fought better in France than they did at the Pyramids, Marengo or Austerlitz? or did the English display less valor in Spain or in the Crimea than they would have done in England under their favorite leaders? 3d. The way in which the fights of the second of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and
Africa (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
greater portion of Longstreet's corps, was in camp at Chambersburg from Saturday, June 27th, to Tuesday, June 30th, and on the latter date we moved in direction of Gettysburg, about 10 miles, and about 2 P. M. encamped at a small village called Greenwood. General Lee was in camp very near us during the same afternoon. On Wednesday, July 1st, we (the reserve artillery) remained in camp all day, and heard nothing of the battle which was begun at Gettysburg until about dark, when orders were rec I copy the following entries, showing movements of the infantry divisions more accurately: June 30TH.-Moved (from Chambersburg) for Greenwood, where we camped at night, Pickett being left back at Chambersburg. July St.--oved out from Greenwood on the Gettysburg road, passing through Cashtown and New Salem; arrive within two miles of Gettysburg; during the day A. P. Hill's corps is sharply engaged; also Ewell on the left. The enemy is driven steadily back, and the lines occupied by R
Harrisburg, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
think he could easily have so manoeuvred as to force Meade to attack him. A position covering Fairfield would have given him the Valley to support himself himself on, and would have been so threatening to Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and Harrisburg that public clamor would have forced Meade to try and dislodge him. We had ammunition enough for one good fight, and in a victory would capture enough for the next. If Lee was to cross the Potomac at all, I don't think the crossing should neceered to lose no time in doing so, and he was expected to give notice as soon as Hooker crossed the Potomac. As no report had been made it was believed that Hooker was still in Virginia, and, under this impression, orders were issued to move on Harrisburg. Ewell, with two of his divisions, Johnson's and Rodes', had reached Carlisle June 27th. The other division, Early's, was moving towards York. On the same day Longstreet and Hill had marched through Chambersburg and halted at Fayetteville, s
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
ee could never have established his army in Pennsylvania with his communications open so as to get sthat our ordnance trains did not carry into Pennsylvania a reserve supply of more than 100 rounds permy of Northern Virginia in its invasion of Pennsylvania was more powerful than it had ever been beftions of-- , in relation to the invasion of Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, I will notice was materially impaired by the invasion of Pennsylvania. This is clearly shown by the subsequent m---'s opinions in regard to the invasion of Pennsylvania are erroneous. Many of the Northern writerhe establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was cumstances which dictated the movement into Pennsylvania. Shortly after the battle of Chancellorhe crossed the Potomac on his advance into Pennsylvania. He was sure of being able to supply his ay. While preparing for his campaign in Pennsylvania General Lee carefully considered every cont[2 more...]
Gaines Mill (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
egular army is influenced by locality or country. I have been taught to believe that quality to be derived from its commander. It was not discovered that Federal troops fought better at Boonesboroa, Sharpsburg and Gettysburg than they did at Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Could the French troops have fought better in France than they did at the Pyramids, Marengo or Austerlitz? or did the English display less valor in Spain or in the Crimea than they would have done in England under their favorite leaders? 3d. The way in which the fights of the second of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the second, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington. 5
Cashtown (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
at Chambersburg. July St.--oved out from Greenwood on the Gettysburg road, passing through Cashtown and New Salem; arrive within two miles of Gettysburg; during the day A. P. Hill's corps is sharusted. Preparations are apparant for a backward movement by the right. The wagons are sent to Cashtown. The movement begins at dark, A. P. Hill leading and our corps following him in the order-1st.ces east of the mountains. Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was moved over the mountain to Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, on the 29th. The next day Pender's division, of the same coreek, three miles of the town. The night of the 30th Hill, with two of his divisions, lay at Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettysburg, Buford's cavalry between his command and the town. At Emmett. Rodes left Heidlersburg and Early left Berlin, three miles further east, under orders for Cashtown; but Ewell, on getting Hill's report of the enemy being at Gettysburg, changed their destinatio
Fredericksburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
qualities of the enemy by drawing him on his own soil was not considered by General Lee when he was forming his plan of invasion. Neither from history nor experience have I been able to learn that the fighting of a regular army is influenced by locality or country. I have been taught to believe that quality to be derived from its commander. It was not discovered that Federal troops fought better at Boonesboroa, Sharpsburg and Gettysburg than they did at Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Could the French troops have fought better in France than they did at the Pyramids, Marengo or Austerlitz? or did the English display less valor in Spain or in the Crimea than they would have done in England under their favorite leaders? 3d. The way in which the fights of the second of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. 4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some s
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
tly inferred that the stimulant of our invasion was not needed to arouse the military spirit of the North. In regard to the Copperhead influence in the prosecution of the war, seems to adhere to the same fallacy that was entertained by many prominent Confederates at the commencement of hostilities, but which was speedily dissipated by subsequent events. The fruit of the first battle of Manassas was lost partly on account of the opinion that the capture of Washington and the invasion of Maryland would unite the political parties of the North and obliterate the hope of a speedy termination of the war; for it was soon demonstrated that the mortifying defeat of the Federal army at Manassas, July, 1861, as firmly united the political parties of the North as an invasion would have done. Again,---- seems oblivious of the fact that while there was a pecuniary diminution of one per cent. in the North there were ten in the South. ---- is mistaken in his opinion that the resisting power
W. P. Richardson (search for this): chapter 15
forming for the attack, I borrowed from General Pendleton, General Lee's chief of artillery, seven 12 pounder howitzers, belonging to the Third corps, under Major Richardson, which I put in reserve in a selected spot, intending them to accompany Pickett's infantry in the charge to have the advantage of fresh horses and men and fuention, as he had a long distance to traverse, that he should start not later than fifteen minutes after our fire opened. About this time, too, to be sure that Richardson with his seven 12-pounder howitzers should be promptly on hand, I sent for him to come up through the woods and be ready to move ahead of Pickett's division in above. I showed him the situation, and said I only feared I could not give Pickett the help I wanted to, my ammunition being very low, and the seven guns under Richardson having been taken off. General Longstreet spoke up promptly: Go and stop Pickett right where he is, and replenish your ammunition. I answered, that the ordnanc
Meade (search for this): chapter 15
an offensive battle, but to so manoeuvre that Meade would be forced to attack us. Remember, in thihe could easily have so manoeuvred as to force Meade to attack him. A position covering Fairfield warrisburg that public clamor would have forced Meade to try and dislodge him. We had ammunition eno offensive and taken the defensive, and forced Meade to assault us, and to have given him a crushinthat General Lee, although closely confronting Meade's army, detached Longstreet and sent him to Geht an offersive battle on the ground and where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeulace, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington. 5th. The of two Federal corps, and being aware that General Meade could not bring up all his forces before tus co-operation. On the morning of the second Meade's position on Cemetery Ridge was not fully occhis left wing west of the Emmettsburg road General Meade weakened his position by presenting a weak[1 more...]
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