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e made the presence of Confederates in it known to the enemy, and it may have been this knowledge that caused Sickles to advance his line so as to rest its right along the Emmettsburg pike. McLaws was opposite Sickles' right; the left of his corps rested at Round Top, a mile or more to our right, and near the left of the Union army, its right being to the east and north of Culps' Hill. McLaws advanced about 6 P. M., and while engaged in a close musketry fight with Sickles, two brigades of AndersOn's division, Wilcox's and Perry's, assailed him in flank and rear, breaking his line at once, and forcing it back with loss and in confusion. Further to the right he fared no better, and his entire corps was driven back to the Ridge in rear. He had been in the meantime heavily reinforced, but all were driven back. The Sixth corps came upon the field at the close of the battle; but one of its brigades became engaged. Longstreet's attack, as all must admit was made too late in the day. Had
G. Moxley Sorrel (search for this): chapter 15
ps at the Peach Orchard. McLaws' division was, during this, in the woods in our rear, our batteries firing from the edge next the Peach Orchard-my own probably 500 yards and Cabell's 700 yards distant. We were so engaged probably for an hour, when McLaws charged and carried the Peach Orchard, my batteries following him closely and going into action in and around the Orchard, and the firing was kept up thence till after dark. Note.-I have just found copy of a brief dairy kept by Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, Adjutant-General of Longstreet's corps, from which I copy the following entries, showing movements of the infantry divisions more accurately: June 30TH.-Moved (from Chambersburg) for Greenwood, where we camped at night, Pickett being left back at Chambersburg. July St.--oved out from Greenwood on the Gettysburg road, passing through Cashtown and New Salem; arrive within two miles of Gettysburg; during the day A. P. Hill's corps is sharply engaged; also Ewell on the left.
Herman H. Perry (search for this): chapter 15
es in it known to the enemy, and it may have been this knowledge that caused Sickles to advance his line so as to rest its right along the Emmettsburg pike. McLaws was opposite Sickles' right; the left of his corps rested at Round Top, a mile or more to our right, and near the left of the Union army, its right being to the east and north of Culps' Hill. McLaws advanced about 6 P. M., and while engaged in a close musketry fight with Sickles, two brigades of AndersOn's division, Wilcox's and Perry's, assailed him in flank and rear, breaking his line at once, and forcing it back with loss and in confusion. Further to the right he fared no better, and his entire corps was driven back to the Ridge in rear. He had been in the meantime heavily reinforced, but all were driven back. The Sixth corps came upon the field at the close of the battle; but one of its brigades became engaged. Longstreet's attack, as all must admit was made too late in the day. Had it taken place at any time befo
E. P. Alexander (search for this): chapter 15
est soldiers will be induced to tell what they know of the great battle. Letter from General E. P. Alexander, late Chief of artillery First corps, A. N. V. Montgomery, Ala., March 17th, 1877.t know when the moment offers. Respectfully, J. Longstreet, Lieut.-General. To Colonel E. P. Alexander, Artillery. This note at once suggested that there was some alternative to the attantirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost. Very respectfully, &c., E. P. Alexander, Colonel Artillery. To this note I soon received the following reply — the original stiin aiding the attack. Respectfully, J. Longstreet, Lieut.-General, Commanding. To Colonel Alexander. This letter again placed the responsibility upon me, and I felt it very deeply, for tes, and is at your service for that or any other purpose. Very respectfully, yours, E. P. Alexander. Letter from General C. M. Wilcox. Baltimore, Md., March 26th, 1877. Dear Sir:
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 15
orcibly put by---- . General Longstreet has also stated to me since (although during the campaign I do not remember a word or sign from him indicating any doubt in its success) that he urged similar considerations, very earnestly, upon General Lee, when the campaign was being discussed, and was only persuaded out of them by the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so manoeuvre that Meade would be forced to attack us. Remember, in this connection, one of Stonewall Jackson's last speeches: Our men sometimes fail to drive the enemy out of their positions, but they always fail to drive us. Such a confidence on General Lee's part would probably not have been misplaced, for he carried the best and largest army into Pennsylvania that he ever had in hand. The morale and spirit of the men was simply superb, as shown by the fight they made and the orderly and successful retreat after the battle. General Lee, in his report, has given the reasons which led him
e every where to give him opportunities to attack, if he desired, and that the concentration which was ordered at Gettysburg was intended as an offer of battle to him. In making this concentration Hill's corps unexpectedly came in collision with Reynolds' corps, and the thing began. Reynolds' corps was not expected there, and our information of the enemy's movements was incomplete on account of the absence of all of the cavalry, or nearly all, with General Stuart, who, instead of being between Reynolds' corps was not expected there, and our information of the enemy's movements was incomplete on account of the absence of all of the cavalry, or nearly all, with General Stuart, who, instead of being between us and the enemy, was on a raid around him. In this way the action began, and the first day's success stimulated the second day's effort. This effort should have been successful, and would have been, but for delays and faults of detail in its execution. These have been the subject of much crimination and recrimination among survivors as to the greater or less responsibility for them, but, to history, of course the general commanding is the responsible party. I will write frankly all that I k
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 15
the most gallant major-generals of the army-General Hood--in which he suggested all of the very grav infantry had been left behind at Chambersburg, Hood's and McLaws' divisions had marched before us, e upon the head of an column, which I think was Hood's division, standing halted in the road where iountermarch, and that it was about 4 P. M. when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right flathe lines occupied by Rodes' division. McLaws, Hood, and the artillery are now moving up and Picketrve artillery; 2d. Pickett; 3d. McLaws; 4th. Hood. The troops move all night and the next day (5)division, of Hill's corps, and Longstreet, with Hood's and McLaws' divisions, moved July 1st towardsorps, came up a little before dark; McLaws' and Hood's, of Longstreet's corps, after dark, and bivouere stacked, was informed they were McLaws' and Hood's divisions; continuing the march over undulatiition, opposite the enemy's left, about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved further to our right, and [1 more...]
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 15
, either of his own previously determined plans, or the orders of a superior, to whom he was devotedly attached, rarely equalled. Very respectfully and truly, C. M. Wilcox. Letter from General A. L. Long, military Secretary to General R. E. Lee. Charlottesville, Va., April, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., Secretary Southern Historical Society: The questions of-- , in relation to the invasion of Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, I will notice in the order in which A glance at a correct sketch of the Federal position on the third will sufficiently corroborate this remark, and had Pickett's division been promptly supported when it burst through Mleade's center, a more positive proof would have been given than the features of the country, for his right wing would have been overwhelmed before the left could have disengaged itself from the woods and mountains and come to its relief. Very respectfully, A. L. Long, Military Secretary to General R. E. Lee.
Patton Anderson (search for this): chapter 15
s division, of the same corps, followed, and one of Heth's brigades, ordered to Gettysburg to get supplies, finding the enemy there and not knowing his strength, returned. Report of this was made by General Hill to both Generals Lee and Ewell. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, and Longstreet, with Hood's and McLaws' divisions, moved July 1st towards Gettysburg. The Union cavalry, under General Buford, reached Gettysburg the forenoon of the 30th, passed through, crossed Seminary Ridge and on troops were driven back at 4 P. M., with serious losses in killed and wounded, and in much disorder, through the town, losing over 5,000 prisoners. The losses in the four Confederate divisions were heavy. Such was the first day's battle. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, reached the field after the fighting ceased, and halted on the ground held by Pender when the battle began. One brigade of this division, Wilcox's, and a battery were placed on picket one and a quarter miles below
W. W. White (search for this): chapter 15
June suggested to General Lee the advantage of a departure from a strictly defensive system, and of casting the defence of Richmond on a bold offensive campaign. Immediately on this decision the Army of Northern Virginia was put in motion for the invasion of the North. After this brief explanation I will return to the enquiries of .Small raiding parties always infested the line of the Potomac when not occupied in force by the Federal army. The raiding corps, under Colonels Mosby and White, were conspicuously known for their bold raids and dashing onslaughts upon trains and unsuspecting parties on both sides of the Potomac. Raiding parties of a more formidable character, under Stuart and others; were also projected across the lines, creating in the body politic of the North as little sensation as sticking pins in the hide of the rhinoceros. In continuation of the answer to the 2d question, I will repeat in substance the remarks of General Lee, when the invasion of the North
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