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lection is that nearly three hours were lost in that delay and countermarch, and that it was about 4 P. M. when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right flank, with Henry's batallion aiding him, while, with 18 guns of my own batallion and Cabell's 18, I attacked Hooker's corps at the Peach Orchard. McLaws' division was, during this, in the woods in our rear, our batteries firing from the edge next the Peach Orchard-my own probably 500 yards and Cabell's 700 yards distant. We were so engCabell's 700 yards distant. We were so engaged probably for an hour, when McLaws charged and carried the Peach Orchard, my batteries following him closely and going into action in and around the Orchard, and the firing was kept up thence till after dark. Note.-I have just found copy of a brief dairy kept by Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, Adjutant-General of Longstreet's corps, from which I copy the following entries, showing movements of the infantry divisions more accurately: June 30TH.-Moved (from Chambersburg) for Greenwood, whe
ur or more, speaking to Pickett's men as they came straggling back, and encouraging them to form again in the first cover they could find. While he was here Colonel Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, rode up, who afterwards wrote a very graphic account of the battle and of incidents occurring here, which was published in Blackwo that the enemy would ri poote, and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns where he could observe all the indications. Note.-In Fremantle's account he tells of General Lee's reproving an artillery officer for spurring his horse severely when it shied at the bursting of a shell. The officer was my on's horse cut up because it did not want to leave my horse, the two being together a great deal on the march and in the camp. General Lee then spoke to him, as Fremantle narrates; and the cheering turned out to be given to some general officer riding along the Federal line. In the above narrative I have given all the light I
oeuvre in Virginia inviting an attack, but in vain-at least he gave Hooker opportunities which were not availed of, and no disposition shown twhile, with 18 guns of my own batallion and Cabell's 18, I attacked Hooker's corps at the Peach Orchard. McLaws' division was, during this, i no time in doing so, and he was expected to give notice as soon as Hooker crossed the Potomac. As no report had been made it was believed that Hooker was still in Virginia, and, under this impression, orders were issued to move on Harrisburg. Ewell, with two of his divisions, Johnysburg pike. During the night of the 28th a scout reported that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was moving north and towards South mounoutheast of Gettysburg, bivouacked the First and Eleventh corps of Hooker's army; and an infantry division of the Federal army camped at Fairinvasion of the North was under consideration: Should we defeat General Hooker in a general engagement south of the Potomac any where in the v
l Hooker in a general engagement south of the Potomac any where in the vicinity of Washington, his shattered army would find refuge within the defences of that city, as two Federal armies have previously done, and the fruits of victory would again be lost. But should we draw him far away from the defenses of his capital, and defeat him on a field of our own choosing, his army would be irretrievably lost, and the victory would be attended with results of the utmost importance. Gettysburg and York were designated as points suitable for such a battle. With such prospects in the range of possibility, any commander might be willing to risk for a time his communications, especially when the theatre of operations abounds in supplies and the invading army is accompanied by a powerful cavalry. Such were the prospects of General Lee when he crossed the Potomac on his advance into Pennsylvania. He was sure of being able to supply his army should his communications be interrupted, and did no
woods, and moved forward to the attack about 6 P. M. General Longstreet in his report refers to his orders on this occasion, but is not definite as to time. Law's brigade was ordered forward to his division during the day, and joined it about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining I received instructions from the Commandimand that was up, around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left. Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. The order, it is seen, was given for him to move with the portion of his command that was up. He does not give the time the move was to begin, but when the order was given it was known to General Lee that his whole corps was not present. As soon after Law's arrival as we could make our preparations the movement was begun. Engineers sent out by the Commanding-General and myself guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move, and some delay
A. P. Hill (search for this): chapter 15
t to Cashtown. The movement begins at dark, A. P. Hill leading and our corps following him in the oetting up. About 11 A. M. the skirmishers in A. P. Hill's front got to fighting for a barn in betwee east of the mountains. Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was moved over the mountain to Cashtowngth, returned. Report of this was made by General Hill to both Generals Lee and Ewell. Anderson's corps moved from their camp at Emmettsburg. As Hill moved forward he met Buford's cavalry, drove thnder orders for Cashtown; but Ewell, on getting Hill's report of the enemy being at Gettysburg, chanfirst day's battle. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, reached the field after the fighting ciate battle. By the close of the day all of Hill's and Ewell's corps had come up, and Longstreet in rear. Having formed his plan of attack, Hill and Ewell were put at once in position, while Lrly as practicable on the second, and Ewell and Hill were to afford him vigorous co-operation. On t[8 more...]
P. Hill's corps is sharply engaged; also Ewell on the left. The enemy is driven steadily back, and the lines occupied by Rodes' division. McLaws, Hood, and the artillery are now moving up and Pickett is ordered from Chambersburg. July 2D and 3a, and, under this impression, orders were issued to move on Harrisburg. Ewell, with two of his divisions, Johnson's and Rodes', had reached Carlisle June 27th. The other division, Early's, was moving towards York. On the same day Longstreet and them back to within less than two miles of the town, when infantry came to their support, and a fierce battle ensued. Rodes left Heidlersburg and Early left Berlin, three miles further east, under orders for Cashtown; but Ewell, on getting Hill's report of the enemy being at Gettysburg, changed their destination for that place. Rodes came upon the field at 2:30 P. M. and attacked the enemy, now greatly reinforced. He was soon reinforced by Early, and after severe fighting the Union troop
was chiefly due to the unaided exertions of General Lee. While the army was in admirable condit opposing armies early in June suggested to General Lee the advantage of a departure from a strictl, I will repeat in substance the remarks of General Lee, when the invasion of the North was under cwerful cavalry. Such were the prospects of General Lee when he crossed the Potomac on his advanceg him on his own soil was not considered by General Lee when he was forming his plan of invasion. ancellorsville. 4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the second, but hat it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper publ preparing for his campaign in Pennsylvania General Lee carefully considered every contingency thatttsburg. As had been previously concerted, General Lee ordered a rapid concentration of his forcessignally defeated, and almost annihilated. General Lee arrived on the field near the close of the [1 more...]
J. William Jones (search for this): chapter 15
they know of the great battle. Letter from General E. P. Alexander, late Chief of artillery First corps, A. N. V. Montgomery, Ala., March 17th, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary: Dear Sir: I have your favor of the 27th ult., enclosing copy of letter from ---- , giving an outline of his views of the campaign and battle other purpose. Very respectfully, yours, E. P. Alexander. Letter from General C. M. Wilcox. Baltimore, Md., March 26th, 1877. Dear Sir: The Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, has favored me with a copy of your letter of January 21st, 1877, and at his request I give you such facts asfully and truly, C. M. Wilcox. Letter from General A. L. Long, military Secretary to General R. E. Lee. Charlottesville, Va., April, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., Secretary Southern Historical Society: The questions of-- , in relation to the invasion of Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, I will notice i
H. B. McClellan (search for this): chapter 15
r late war, or of the writers of biographies of officers, more or less distinguished on either side, have written with that laborious painstaking care indicative of intelligent or conscientious historians. To begin, you err in stating that the Army of Northern Virginia in its invasion of Pennsylvania was more powerful than it had ever been before. In numbers it was at its maximum in 1862, when contending with the Army of the Potomac, then commanded by your old chief and my friend, General McClellan, having at that time between 80,000 and 90,000 of all arms, while at Gettysburg it did not exceed 60,000. I may add that our invasion of the North in 1863 could scarcely be characterized as disastrous. It certainly was unfortunate in that we did not remain longer on Northern soil and detain the Army of the Potomac there, thus relieving Virginia of a great and too grievous burden. It was a question of the commissariat, to a very great extent, that carried the Army of Northern Vir
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