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Eylau (Russia) (search for this): chapter 4
into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. Spandau, said be in the 19th Bulletin, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had not even armed its batteries. The possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit. These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French generals, p
Bordeaux (France) (search for this): chapter 4
f Re; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, with Fort Penthievre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne; Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La Canchee, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its defensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval depots; and Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated, nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval depots and commercial seaports of France against the superior naval forces of her neighbor. Omitting for the present all discussion of seacoast defences, let us examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications on
Charleroi (Belgium) (search for this): chapter 4
a blockade and siege of nearly two months. Magdeburg, in the thirty years war, resisted the army of Wallenstein for seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for more than nine months. Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months. Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three months. Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of about thirty days. Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks. Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days. Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol and the heart of the Austrian monarchy. Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against all the efforts of the Archduke Charles. St. Jean d'acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days o
Portugal (Portugal) (search for this): chapter 4
the kingdom, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that which would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly waging war with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; at others, he delayed his advance till the place copower of Charles V., and saved France from destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'acre, in 1799, stopped the successful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg has often been the bulwark of the French against Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs
Department de Ville de Paris (France) (search for this): chapter 4
s his own. Had no other obstacle than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that France must have fallen. In the campaign od to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the operation. Again in 1815, Napol invasion. But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. If he had and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached. Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way l. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for twory III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this capital had been strongly fortified in
Napoleon (Ohio, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very differenll with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in 1796, offer the finest model for ims to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington. Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bearwhen the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak grasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the fortress of Genoan check the Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed in a state of military defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napolenemies our still invincible fortresses. History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile co
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
ted considerable notice in France, but has long since been discarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the military art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores of the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like building 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the Atlantic! In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and opposite the intervals. In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by Rogniat, the works are to be arranged
Toul (France) (search for this): chapter 4
r the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of the country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau, Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several passages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Befort form a second line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a grand central depot. The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. 1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of the country. 2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and-keep the whole frontier in continual alarm. 3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime att
Medoc (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
t St. Marguerite, St. Tropez, Brigancon, the forts of Point Man, of l'ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Chateau de Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon is the great naval depot for this frontier, and Marseilles the great commercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The Atlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave. Medoc, Pate, &c., on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of the Isle of Re; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, with Fort Penthievre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne; Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La Canchee, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its def
Braunschweig (Lower Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
and. this reason alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success. This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792, when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent to her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganizatiotriple line of good fortresses, although her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. The several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another, before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of Brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded i
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