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ey-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last. That Sickles did not occupy. the position assaulted by General Longstreet until late in the afternoon, is proved by the testimony of Hancock and others. On page 406, Hancock says: Every thing remained quiet, except artillery firing and engagements with pickets on our front, until about four o'clock that afternoon, when General Sick, les moved out to the front. After stating that he had made a reconnoissance to ascertain whether an attack could be made on our left, Warren on page 377, says: Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left. of our line, where Gen. Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. On page 332, Meade.says he arrived on the ground where Sickles was, a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon. That Round Top was unoccupied until after Longstreet's
when, and by whom the attack should be made, from 5 P. M. the day before until 11 A. M. of the. 2d, when Longstreet acknowledges the receipt of the order, then Longstreet's opinion that there is no doubt that General Lee during the crisis of that campaign lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions --that is, in plain English, that General Lee had lost his senses — has some foundation to rest on. All who know General Lee's mode of giving directions to his subordinates, can well understand how he indicated his purposes and wishes, without resorting to a technical order, and doubtless he indicated to General Longstreet in that way his desire for him to make the attack, and make it at the earliest practicable moment, and did not resort to the peremptory order until the time indicated by General Longstreet. To
unnecessary repetition. On page 332, in describing the attack on Sickles, Meade says: At the same time that they threw immense masses on SiSickles' corps, a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top Mountain, which was the key-point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in ing any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last. That Sickles did not occupy. the position assaulted by General Longstreet unti out with General Meade to examine the left. of our line, where Gen. Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. On page 332, Meade.says he arrived on the ground where Sickles was, a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon. That Round Top was unoccupied ttack from that flank-Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until ver, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountai
A. S. Pendleton (search for this): chapter 36
in that connection he says: It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateion whatever for the statement that I endorsed either General Pendleton's or anybody else's assertion that the order was give sunrise: Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton. and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sun part of the field to another, as the manner in which General Pendleton, by his ignorance, marred the plans of General Lee, Gal Longstreet has not disproved the assertion made by General Pendleton that an order was given for the attack at sunrise. That assertion made by General Pendleton, and not by myself, was contained in an address delivered by him one year after. minn an issue of veracity between General Longstreet and General Pendleton. The latter was General Lee's chief of artillery, whs to the staff-officers, whose statements are given. General Pendleton professes to have obtained the information as to the
ter I had so effectually exploded it in our controversy. My official report, as well as the very full statement contained in my Review, show that two of my brigades were placed, on the afternoon of the 1st, before General Lee came to our part of the line, on the York road, to guard against a flank movement apprehended in that direction. They never were in the line on the 2nd at all, but Gordon's brigade was sent for on the 2nd, Stuart's cavalry having arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery Hill. The repetition of this statement is simply ridiculous, and shows how hard. General Longstreet and his apologists are pressed. General Longstreet has not disproved the assertion made by General Pendleton that an order was given for the attack at sunrise. That assertion made by General Pendleton, and not by myself, was contained in an address delivered by him one year after. mine had been delivered. General Longstreet has merely show
necting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain. These arrangements were not made until the morning was considerably advanced. On page 331, Meade after stating his purpose to make an attack from his right says: Major-General Slocum, however, reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to making an attack; and the Sixth corps having so long a distance to march, and leaving at nine o'clock at night, did not reach the scene until about two o'clock in the afternoon. Under these circumstances I abandoned my intention to make an attack from my right, and as soon as the Sixth corps arrived, I directed the Fifth corps, then in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left. I
E. P. Alexander (search for this): chapter 36
he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark. Meade's testimony is not at all inconsistent with this statement of facts; but by wresting our short statement of Ewell's from the context and adding Meade's, the false impression is sought to be made that Johnson did not attack at all. General Longstreet complains of Ewell's inaction on the 2d. What must be thought of his inaction from daylight to 2 P. M. on the 3d? The statement by General Alexander, who was only a colonel of artillery at Gettysburg. that the responsibility of ordering Pickett when to begin the charge on the third day was devolved on him, with permission even to abstain from giving the order or advise, as it is called, while G-neral Logostreet himself shrank from the responsibility properly attached to him, has excited profound astonishment. That statement is now confirmed by Gen. Longstreet's own version of the matter, and it becomes abundantly apparent that th
e soldiers from North Carolina, especially, have taken exception to the remarks and statements of others, I will take occasion to say, that every infantry organization from that state belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to my departure from it on my Valley campaign, had at some time been under my command, and there was but a very brief interval when I did not have North Carolina soldiers under me. I can say in all sincerity, that there were no better troops from any state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost. There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors. J. A. Early.
e fire of Daniel's brigade at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at this time under no fire of consequence, their aim was accurate, and Generol Daniel thinks that he killed there, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting. Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about 1 P. M., to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me, also, and I sent Captain Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation; and General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark. Meade's testimony is not at all inconsistent with this statement of facts; but by wresting our short statement of Ewell's from the context and adding Meade's, the f
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 36
ment to General Early's Review.-reply to General Longstreet. [We had intended to have published ie at my hands. That article is not from General Longstreet's own pen, as is very apparent to those do I assert that General Lee had ordered General Longstreet to make the attack at sunrise, or at any the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack o Marshall, and of Gen- Long, as given by General Longstreet, that they knew nothing of an order to a. That Round Top was unoccupied until after Longstreet's attack began, is proved by the testimony operatively demanded, except to supersede General Longstreet with another commander of the First corp of sufficient rank have been fouud? General Longstreet, or his annalist, has copied from the Miorance, marred the plans of General Lee, General Longstreet is made to say: General Early broke up Groceeds: He (Colonel Taylor) says: General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as ear[83 more...]
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