hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in descending order. Sort in ascending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
George H. Thomas 1,422 6 Browse Search
William T. Sherman 1,342 2 Browse Search
John B. Hood 1,058 0 Browse Search
U. S. Grant 610 4 Browse Search
Missouri (Missouri, United States) 480 0 Browse Search
United States (United States) 412 0 Browse Search
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) 390 4 Browse Search
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) 242 0 Browse Search
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) 234 4 Browse Search
Frederick Dent Grant 229 1 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. Search the whole document.

Found 329 total hits in 65 results.

... 2 3 4 5 6 7
January (search for this): chapter 18
f the method he adopted to accomplish his purpose to supersede him. The action of Grant in this case well foreshadowed that which occurred when he was tendered the commission of lieutenant-general and the command of all the armies. Grant would not hold any commission or command without full authority to perform the duties belonging to it. In his Memoirs he modestly refrains from relating the most important part of that action, as he told it to me on the war-steamer Rhode Island the next January. Before accepting the commission from President Lincoln, as Grant describes, he said in substance that if it meant that he was to exercise actual command of all the armies, without any interference from the War Department, he was willing to accept it, otherwise he could not. To illustrate what he meant, Grant said to me that when he was coming East to accept that commission he determined that he would not be McClellanized. The personal observation, experience, and emotions of an indivi
February 9th, 1865 AD (search for this): chapter 18
d General Grant at Fort Monroe, and went with him on the war-steamer Rhode Island to Cape Fear River, where we met General Terry and Admiral Porter, discussed the military situation, and decided on the general plan of operations for the capture of the defenses of Cape Fear River and the city of Wilmington, and subsequent operations. On our return to Fort Monroe, I proceeded to Washington, and sailed with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, arriving at the mouth of Cape Fear River on February 9, 1865, where we joined General Terry, who with two divisions had already captured Fort Fisher. I was then assigned to command the new department of North Carolina. We turned the defenses of Cape Fear River by marching round the swamps, and occupied Wilmington with little loss; then we captured Kinston, after a pretty sharp fight of three days, and occupied Goldsboroa on March 21, within one day of the time indicated by Sherman, from Laurel Hill, N. C., March 8, for our junction at Goldsboro
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 18
terms of surrender political reconstruction Sherman's genius contrast between Grant and Sherman Halleck's characteristics his attempt to supplant Grant personal feeling in battle the Scars of War. upon the termination of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, General Grant ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, to the coast of North Carolina, via Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington, and the sea. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana, and the peI was also, on account of comparative youth, more teachable. At any rate, the two lessons from Halleck above referred to, and later experience, caused me to do a world of thinking; so that I was amazed beyond expression when, in the winter of 1863-64, just before Grant was made lieutenant-general, Halleck told me that his plan for the next campaign was to send west of the Mississippi River force enough to finish the war in all that region of country, and then return and clear up the States east
1865 AD (search for this): chapter 18
ir general ideas may be very good, but they have no knowledge of details, and hence make mistakes resulting in failure. As now seen, projected upon the dark background of the political history of the Southern States during the twelve years from 1865 to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in 1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous with political wisdom. Sherman needed only t1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous with political wisdom. Sherman needed only the aid of competent military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great statesman. But he looked almost with contempt upon a staff, and would doubtless have thought little better of a cabinet. The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible popular government in the South seem to show the necessity of general political educati
March 3rd, 1865 AD (search for this): chapter 18
rviews with the President and General Grant at City Point, his mind must have been absorbed with this one idea which was the sole reason of his visit. Terms of surrender and the policy to be pursued toward the conquered South must have been referred to very casually, and nothing approximating instructions on the subject can have been received or asked for by General Sherman. Else how is it possible that the very pointed and emphatic instructions of the President to General Grant, dated March 3, 1865, War Records, Vol. XLVI, part II, p. 802. were not made known to him or the spirit of them conveyed to him in conversation? The question of the abstract wisdom of the terms of the Sherman-Johnston memorandum has little to do with that of Sherman in agreeing to it. Any person at all acquainted with the politics of the dominant party at that time would have known that it was at least unwise to introduce political questions at all. Besides, he had the example of his superior, the ge
... 2 3 4 5 6 7