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Quebec (Canada) (search for this): chapter 7
ired in defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger the public safety. The closing of an avenue of approach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategic movement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified depot on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off all reinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would inevitably have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to the walls of Konigsberg, with the Austrians in his rear, and the whole power of Russia before him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand men from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all probability, says the best of military judges, Jomini, have struck a fatal blow to the operations of Napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly fortu
St. Louis (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities. These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military establishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand Nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and we were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided; and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would also have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict. We may now add to these remarks, that if our government had occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a well-organi
France (France) (search for this): chapter 7
ense of more than $18,000,000, out of a general budget of about $38,000,000. France, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a permanent establishf seventy or eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000. France has long supported a permanent military force of from one-hundredth to one hund could remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary France brought upon herself the armies of all Europe. Climate has also some influen to provide for its own protection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The rescattered fragments, and binding them together into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire. No people in the worin ordinary. carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. France has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extent of
Preussen (search for this): chapter 7
to 10. Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized peace establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 in active service,) and a reserve of 260,000, at an expense of $36,000,000, out of a general budget of $100,000,000. Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from 100,000 to 1.20,000 men in arms, with a reserve of 200,000, at an annual expense of more than $18,000,000, out of a general budget of about $38,000,000. France, with a population of near and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels, These numbers include all vessles of war, whether in commission, building, or in ordinary. carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. But f
Canada (Canada) (search for this): chapter 7
of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified depot on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off all reinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would inevitably have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to the walls of Konigsberg, with the Austriansmunitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. Such invasions must necessarily fail. Experience in the wars of the French revolution has demonstrated this; and even our own short history is not without its proof. In 1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some time before the declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army o
Mobile, Ala. (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
th its military results; the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg. But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have frequently failed to maintain. their ground when drawn up in the open field, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications. These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly use-less. In the open field militia cannot in general be manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified p
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ope,when the greatly genius of Napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them together into one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire. No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. And yet our army received, even at that time, but little support from irregular and militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of the world — so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of Washington, that it m
Sweden (Sweden) (search for this): chapter 7
extent of seacoas, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and navy, therefore, constitute her principal means of defence. Her army numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels, These numbers include all vessles of war, whether in commission, building, or in ordinary. carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support naval establishments of a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, and Austria not quite half that num
Camden, N. J. (New Jersey, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ion. Short enlistments, and. a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment. These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results; the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg. But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have frequently failed to maintain. their ground whe
Princeton, N. J. (New Jersey, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and. a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment. These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results; the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg. But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have frequently failed to m
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