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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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1807 AD (search for this): chapter 3
l positions or fields of battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples undeNapoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in Spain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that of Paris, and his operations previous to the battle of, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In 1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, agains
1688 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ntervention, in which one state interferes in favor of another. This intervention may either have respect to the internal or to the external affairs of a nation The interference of Russia in the affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and the allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and under the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King William against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head Most liberal publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of Europe. Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821. Wars of ind
1757 AD (search for this): chapter 3
on took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of Napoleon and Grouchy. Diverging lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in 1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's
1821 AD (search for this): chapter 3
Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head Most liberal publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of Europe. Wars of insurrection to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821. Wars of independence from foreign dictation and control, as the wars of Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish Peninsula against France, and of China and. India against England. The American war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some judicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, as distinguished from the war of the Revolution. Wars of opinion, like those whi
1800 AD (search for this): chapter 3
useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only be favorable to a movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this direction may be best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4.) In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the St. Bernard and Milan on the eecessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own
1799 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ring the operations of a war, either by a corps d'armee or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples under this head. Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. (Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line Dc perpendicular to the line Ab, the position of the enemy being at B. (Fig. 2.) Aj being equal to Bj, A will still cover every thing in rear of Dc. (Fig. 3.) If the Army A is obliged to cover the point a, the Army B will cover all the space without the
1706 AD (search for this): chapter 3
nd executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under Prince Eugene of Savoy. War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion. If only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the initiative in offensive movements. Offensive war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political influence. It is wage
1796 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ion of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importa of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bs pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by Bagration in 1812, were secondary liness enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small fet with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies under Jourdan and Moreau, puterior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their foive results. Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussiaosition to cover this siege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants, could [1 more...]
1795 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ting on single or double interior lines, take advantage of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our isolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and Servilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and Arrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned the position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of the operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles, from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph to Vienna. Converging lines of operation are preferable, under most circumstances, to diverging lines. Ca
1797 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ents, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant. 4th. When, by dispatching a detachmef the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, anf battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and SSuch a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and successive armies whicd our own forces be destroyed in detail, before they can. effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians, under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on thrrces, will lead to decisive results. Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and
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