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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. (search)
and sailors; it failed to attain its end because of the little genius of him who commanded it. A descent of altogether a similar nature to that of the King of Sweden, Charles X, was one of thirty Russian battalions crossing, in five columns, the Gulf of Bothnia upon the ice, with their artillery, in order to go to the conquest of the islands of Aland, and to spread terror even to the gates of Stockholm, whilst another division passed the gulf at Umeo, (March, 1809.) General Murray made, in 1813, a well combined descent near Tarragona to cut off Suchet from Valencia; however; after some successes, he was obliged to re-embark. The armament which England made in 1815 against Napoleon, returned from the island of Elba, was remarkable for the immense materiel which it debarked at Ostend and Antwerp. The troops amounted also to sixty thousand Anglo-Hanoverians; but the one came by land, and the others landed on the soil of a powerful ally, so that it was a successive and pacific desce
— an operation which had already been executed by Jordan. In the years 1758 to 1762, Frederick the Great was attacked by a Russian, Austrian, and German Imperial army. lie resisted those three armies by disposing his own exactly as shown in Fig. 7; he always transported the mass of his force to the most endangered point by means of the interior lines which he held, and defeated the different armies one after the other, and came victorious out of a war unequaled in history. In the years 1813 and 1814, Napoleon, in his defense also acted on interior lines. This short expos of strategy will be sufficient to give a general idea of this science, and to make the following example understood. Those who wish to obtain an entire knowledge of strategy, and the operations attached to it, may consult Jomini's Art of War, recently translated from the French by Captain Mendell and Lieutenant Craighill, U. S. Army. Example. War in the United States. if I choose the rebellious St
circumstances. If we are co-operating with another army, we should retreat in this direction, to make a junction with it and obtain a central position between the enemy's armies. We may also retreat directly into the heart of our country; or we may retreat parallel to the frontiers. In the first example we have already spoken of this last. The reasons for our retreat may be different, likewise. We may retreat after a lost battle, as did Jordan, for instance, in 1796, and Napoleon in 1813, when driven back from the Bohemian frontiers across the Rhine; or before a very superior enemy, as the Russians did in 1812 before Napoleon; or in consequence of a preconcerted strategical plan, as in the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796; or, in consequence of strategical movements of the enemy, to keep free our lines of communication — the retreat of Moreau in 1796 was such. We may also retreat to gain a favorable position for a battle, as did Napoleon before the battle of Austerli
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of mhe Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon'such as are taken up merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies in Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, arePassarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, ar the enemy — an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantagesirs sur la Guerre de 1812 Vaudoncourt. Sur la Campagne du Vice-roi en Italie, en 1813 et 1814 Vaudoncourt. Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814 Vaudoncourt. His
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
the thirty years war, resisted the army of Wallenstein for seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men, it for a long time resisted the overwBurgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches. St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches. Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months. Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months, This list migh1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months, This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more than a month. Thesented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not thdy been noticed. If these fortresses of France, after the disasters of 1812 and 1813, failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar feature
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
cases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle of Cannae, the English at Crecy and Azincourt, and the Austrians at Essling, in 1809. (Figure 22.) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. (Figure 23.) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of his troops. (Figure 24.) The echelon orde
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 7: sea-coast defences..—Brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on San Juan d'ulloa, and on St. Jean d'acre (search)
ained by negotiation. In 1808 a French land-battery of only three guns, near Fort Trinidad, drove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel. In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an English squadron of six ships, to 181167,007 Spencer,7418001809 to 1813124,186 Romulus,74--1810 to 181273,141 Albion,7418021810 to 1813102,295 Donegal,74--1812 to 1815101,367 Implacable,74--1813 to 181559,865 Illustrious,7418031813 to 181674,184 Northumberland,74--1814 to 181559,795 Kent,74--1814 to 181888,357 Sultan,7418071816 to 181861,518 Sterling 1813 to 181674,184 Northumberland,74--1814 to 181559,795 Kent,74--1814 to 181888,357 Sultan,7418071816 to 181861,518 Sterling Castle,74 1816 to 181865,280 This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of timber alone used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 8: our northern frontier defences.—Brief description of the fortifications on the frontier, and an analysis of our northern campaigns. (search)
ssing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side. The Lake Champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as early as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far as La Cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. The unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army of the North returned to winter-quarters. All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured Fort George and York, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the young officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. But nothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time when his opponents were daily increasing in
s: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses taken from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. These combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813 and 1814 their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rear-guards: they otes by a French general officer. Nachrichten und Betrachtungen über die Thaten und Schicksale der Reiterei, &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in the campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle of Lutzen in 1813. Examen du livret provisoire, &c. Marbot. Le Spectateur Militaire, contains many essays by cavalry officer on the various questions connected with the organization and use of this arm. Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 11: army organization.—Artillery.—Its history and organization, with a brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of Projectiles, &c. (search)
orable for the action of this arm. Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in general rules. Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. Such was the case with Napoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the — want of other arms. In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with that arm. The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry. To qualify
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