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frontier of the Confederacy that the United States had massed its armies, and hither had flocked the Southern youth who had sprung to arms at the first note of the conflict. But the centre, the line of Tennessee from Cumberland Gap to the Mississippi River, had been left temporarily to such protection as the neutrality of Kentucky afforded. A few camps of instruction, in which unarmed recruits were learning the goose-step, were magnified by the excited apprehensions of rustics into armies oftucky has issued his proclamation to that effect. The troops will not be withdrawn. It is not possible to withdraw them now from Columbus in the west and from Cumberland Ford in the east, without opening the frontiers of Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy; and this is regarded as essential to our present line of defense, as well as to any future operations. So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once.
case in regard to that all-important element of an army's success-field transportation. The troops under General Polk's command were chiefly the State troops transferred by Tennessee to the Confederate service — the equivalent of about ten regiments of all arms, with 3,000 muskets, and a brigade of Mississippians under Brigadier-General Charles Clark. Polk had taken command on July 13th, and, two weeks after, sent General Pillow with 6,000 men to New Madrid, on the right bank of the Mississippi. This point was important, because its occupation prevented any movement by the enemy on Pocahontas, by the way of Chalk Bluffs. While it was expected to make the campaign in Tennessee defensive, the intention was to carry on active operations in Missouri by a combined movement of the armies of Price, McCulloch, Hardee, and Pillow, aided by Jeff Thompson's irregular command. It has already been seen that this plan failed through want of cooperation. Both Generals Polk and Pillow felt
thority to receive into the service such troops as may be offered from the States of Missouri and Kentucky, and to call on the naval service for such assistance and material of war, including boats, as may be required for the defense of the Mississippi River. General Johnston was further directed by the President, by telegram of the 13th, to go by Nashville, confer with Governor Harris, and then decide upon the steps to be taken. Acting in exact conformity with these orders, he made requember 21, 1861. Sir: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that, under date of September 10, 1861, I was authorized by the President of the Confederate States to call upon the Governor of Tennessee for troops for the defense of the Mississippi River, and the States included in this military department. The defenseless condition of this department was patent, from the moment I arrived and had a hasty view of the field. The necessity for a strong and efficient army is present and
preventing any further efforts of the rebels either to reinforce Price or to interrupt Oglesby. He still, however, had no intention of remaining at Belmont, which was on low ground, and could not have been held an hour under the guns at Columbus. His idea was simply to destroy the camps, capture or disperse the enemy, and get himself away before the rebel garrison could be reinforced. Belmont was the inappropriate name given a settlement of three houses on the western bank of the Mississippi River, opposite Columbus. It was situated in a dreary, flat bottom-land, cut up with sloughs, heavily timbered, and approached from the river by two natural terraces or banks. On the upper bank, a clearing had been made in the forest of some 700 acres. In this clearing was the encampment of Colonel Tappan's Thirteenth Arkansas Regiment, and a light battery named Watson's, under Colonel Beltzhoover, placed there as an outpost of the stronghold at Columbus. General Polk had information t
s renewed with better success early in January. General Johnston was now confronted by Halleck in the West, and by Buell in Kentucky. With the exception of the army sent under Curtis against Price in Southwestern Missouri, about 12,000 strong, the whole resources of the Northwest, from Pennsylvania to the Plains, were turned against General Johnston's lines in Kentucky. Halleck, with armies at Cairo and Paducah, under Grant and C. F. Smith, threatened equally Columbus, the key of the Mississippi River, and the water-lines of the Cumberland and Tennessee, with their defenses at Forts Donelson and Henry. Buell's right wing also menaced Donelson and Henry, while his centre was directed against Bowling Green, and his left was advancing against Zollicoffer at Mill Spring on the Upper Cumberland. If this last-named position could be forced, the way seemed open to East Tennessee by either the Jacksboro or the Jamestown routes, on the one hand, and to Nashville on the other. At the northe
rior in number. It is not necessary here to enter upon a narrative of the defenses of the Mississippi River. Columbus was relied upon as the chief barrier against invasion; and was found sufficient twelve or fourteen miles, when it resumes its original direction and runs westward to the Mississippi River. Within a mile of the angle of this offset of Kentucky, about sixty miles above Paducah, y, find this to be the case, you are authorized to employ them to any extent necessary on the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers. For the present, do not move the regiment from Fort Henryn, in August, 1861, that his plan was to bisect the Confederacy by opening and holding the Mississippi River, and then to divide its eastern half diagonally. It was now evident that the bisection byGeneral Johnston in his letter of December 10th. The columns, moving by the west bank of the Mississippi, advanced later. But the blow struck against Zollicoffer at this very date had also been poi
s aside, at what one point could a defense of this line have been made? At Columbus? Then must the defense of Middle Tennessee have been abandoned without an effort to save it. At Henry and Donelson? The same result would have ensued, for there was nothing to prevent Buell's advance, except the interposition of the force at Bowling Green. But, last of all, if the barrier at Columbus had been abandoned to maintain Bowling Green, or for any other consideration whatever, it opened the Mississippi River to the invader; and, if either Henry or Donelson were given up, the rear of the armies at Bowling Green and Columbus would have been uncovered. Henry had no value, except as the gateway of the Tennessee River; nor Donelson, save as an outpost of Nashville. While it was unnecessary for the Federal armies to feel much concern about concentrating to meet any hypothetical concentration of the Confederates, inasmuch as they were sufficiently strong to repel any attack in position witho
lled to fall back from Corinth, his line would be from Fort Pillow with headquarters at Grand Junction, with a fixed determination at all hazards to hold the Mississippi River to Port Hudson, and keep the line of communication open between the armies east and west of that river. These are the facts. Sam Tate. Indeed, General diversion in your favor; or, if his strength cannot be made available in that way, you will best know how to employ it otherwise. I suppose the Tennessee or Mississippi River will be the object of the enemy's next campaign, and I trust you will be able to concentrate a force which will defeat either attempt. The fleet which you will soon have on the Mississippi River, if the enemy's gunboats ascend the Tennessee, may enable you to strike an effective blow at Cairo; but, to one so well informed and vigilant, I will not assume to offer suggestions as to when and how the ends you seek may be attained. With the confidence and regard of many years, I am very t
led to the satisfaction of both parties by the assignment of Major-General Earl Van Dorn to the command west of the Mississippi River. Van Dorn had been a captain in General Johnston's own regiment, the Second Cavalry, and was distinguished for ant's shortcomings. Halleck was now put in command of the whole West; Buell, Grant, and Pope, on the west bank of the Mississippi, and Curtis in Southwest Missouri, all moving under his supreme control. While the Confederate and Federal armies see he did neither. The truth is, he undervalued his adversary's celerity and daring. The water-shed between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, near the Great Bend, follows the general course of the latter stream, at the distance of some twepeat the grand tactics of Fort Donelson, by separating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and on the Mississippi River. We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a course woul
over-estimated. At Corinth, two great railway lines crossed — that running north and south from Mobile, on the Gulf, to Columbus, near the mouth of the Ohio; and that from Memphis to Chattanooga, running east and west, and connecting the Mississippi River with the railroad system of Georgia and East Tennessee. The Mississippi Central Railroad from New Orleans runs west of and nearly parallel with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, gradually approaching it, and forming a junction with it at JacksonIn the succeeding summer, 1862, he transferred the main body of his command to Chattanooga, and planned and executed the Kentucky campaign of that year, being at the same time in command of the department embracing the territory between the Mississippi River and the Alleghany range. Notwithstanding the unpopularity which assailed him after the evacuation of Kentucky, he was continued in command, and transferred his army in November, 1862, to Middle Tennessee, and December 31st of that year fou
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