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H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations. We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering upon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the war, and sel
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 5: Tactics.The twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.—Different Formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the Modes of bringing troops into action (search)
f attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turning manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. The manoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the Austrians at Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, and under Marmont at Salamanca. We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the line of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction. We shall begin with infantry, as the most important arm on the battle-field. There are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, as tirailleurs, or light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the central division
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 15: military Education—Military schools of France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, England, &c.—Washington's reasons for establishing the West point Academy.—Rules of appointment and Promotion in foreign Services.—Absurdity and injustice of our own system. (search)
Paris. Kleber was educated at the military school of Bavaria. Eugene Beauharnais was a pupil of St. Germain-en-Loye, and had for his military instructor the great captain of the age. His whole life was devoted to the military art. Berthier and Marmont were both sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they received military educations. Lecourbe had also the advantages of a military education before entering the army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils of the military school of tain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one. Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, chef-de-bataillon at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector-general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two. Bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 6. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), General C. M. Wilcox on the battle of Gettysburg. (search)
e, used by him, and in order to induce General Lee to accept this offensive-in-strategy and defensive-in-tactics campaign, he recalled to him Napoleon's advice to Marmont, when, putting him in command of an invading army: Select your ground and make your-enemy attack you. Very good advice to be given to an officer capable of comprntract, and General Lee having, in his opinion, disregarded it, he (Longstreet) was thereby absolved from all obligation to obey his orders. Napoleon's advice to Marmont was good or not, and to be followed or not, at the discretion of Marmont himself; and if he had failed to fight an offensive battle when a favorable opportunity oMarmont himself; and if he had failed to fight an offensive battle when a favorable opportunity offered, and plead as excuse that he had been advised by the Emperor to act on the defensive, the plea would hardly have availed to keep him in command or shield him, perhaps, from more severe punishment. When the Army of Northern Virginia marched towards the Potomac, Longstreet moved on the east of the Blue Ridge and held the pa
William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 6 (search)
minent a figure at the commencement of the contest; for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into account, estimating both what he accomplished and what he failed to accomplish, in the actual circumstances of his performance, I have endeavored in the critique of his campaigns to strike a just balance between McClellan and history. Of him it may be said, that if he does not belong to that foremost category of commanders made up of those who have always been successful, and including but a few illustrious names, neither does he rank with that numerous class who have ruined their armies without fighting. He ranges with that middle category of meritorious commanders, who, like Sertorius, Wallenstein, and William of Orange, generally unfortunate in war, yet were, in the words of Marmont, never destroyed nor discouraged, but were always able to oppose a menacing front, and make the enemy pay dear for what he gained.
William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 7 (search)
The cause of all this could not be concealed; it was the lack of confidence in General Burnside—a sentiment that was universal throughout the army. Troops who have by experience learned what war is, become severe critics. It is a mistake to suppose that soldiers, and especially such soldiers as composed the American army, are lavish of their lives; they are chary of their lives, and are never what newspaper jargon constantly represented them to be—eager for the fray. The soldier, says Marmont, acquires the faculty of discriminating how and when he will be able, by offering his life as a sacrifice, to make the best possible use of it. But when the time comes that he discovers in his commander that which will make this rich offering vain, from that moment begin to work those malign influences that disintegrate and destroy the morale of armies. General Burnside had brought his army to that unhappy pass that, with much regard for his person and character, it distrusted and feared
The Daily Dispatch: January 3, 1861., [Electronic resource], Speech of U. S. Senator Benjamin on the Crisis. (search)
pletely changed the face of affairs. It was a great exploit, worthy of any commander that ever lived, rivalled only by the march of the Consul Nero, when he left Hannibal in the lurch on the Vulturous, and fell upon and destroyed the recruits which his brother was bringing to his army. A flank march, in the face of an enemy in position, says Napoleon, is the most dangerous operation in war. Such a march brought on the rout of Frederick the Great at Kolin, of the Russians at Austerlitz, of Marmont at Salamanca. This operation, delicate as it is, Washington conducted with the most entire success, in the face of an enemy more than doubly as strong as he was, with raw, undisciplined troops in opposition to veterans that had never met their match in Europe, commanded by a man who had been specially selected for the service on account of the supposed superiority of his talents and enterprise. "I will bag my fox in the morning," said Cornwallis, in sportsman's phrase, when advised by Sir
a post, when the Mexicans did not try to take them? How could he lose a detachment, when the enemy was always on the trot? Upon the basis of this one campaign, old Scott is accustomed to class himself with the great captains of the world. His flatterers published in the newspapers that the Duke of Wellington pronounced him the greated Captain of the age. We doubt very much whether the Duke of Wellington ever spent a thought upon him, and his petty achievements. The Duke of Wellington had seen war in India, in the Peninsula, and in Flanders. He had commanded at Assy, at Vimeira, at Oporto, at Talavere, at Busaco, at Fuentes d'onoro, at Badajos, at San Sebastian, at Salamanes, at Vittoria, at Thoulouse, at Waterloo, He had defeated in the field, such men as Junot, as Victor, as Soult, as Massena, as Marmont, as Jourdan, as Ney, as Napoleon him self. It is not credible that such a man should have pronounced such a judgment upon the small potato doings of old Scott in Mexico.
The Daily Dispatch: March 13, 1862., [Electronic resource], One hundred and twenty-five Dollars reward. (search)
4, died 1820. Letebvre-Desnouettes — soldier 1752; Colonel 1804, General 1806, refugee in america, drowned in the Alblon. Macdonald — Born in Jancerre, France, 1765, Lieutenant in an Irish regiment 1784; General 1795, Marshal at Wagram 1809. Marcean — Born 1769, soldier 1784, Lieutenant Colonel 1792, was arrested by representing from the army; General 1793, killed in 1795. The Austrian army solicited an armistice to attend his funeral, so highly was he estimated by all. Marmont, from the military school — Lieutenant 1774, General 1793, Marchal 1809. Massena — Well known; surnamed "Enfant cheri de la victoire; " soldier 1790, General 1793, Marshal 1804, died 1817. Moncey, Marechal de France — Soldier 1773, Lieutenant 1778, General 1794; Marshal 1804. Morean, a lawyer — Major 1792, General 1794, exited conspirator 1804, killed 1813. Mortier, Marechal de France — Captain 1791, General 1793, Marshal 1804. Mouton-Duvernet — Soldier 1
tacks made in five months, and utterly destroyed the armies that made them. In 1814, in Champaigne, he repeated this series of manœuvres, and by means of an interior line was enabled with 70,000 men to keep at bay, and often defeat, armies numbering 400,000. In the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, he would have destroyed the whole of them, had he not made the march to the enemy's rear, and thus enabled him to march to Paris without opposition. It must be recollected that he depended on Marmont to defend Parish, while he attacked the Allies in the rear, and that that traitor gave up the city as soon as the enemy made his appearance. The Duke of Wellington's defence of Portugal depended on the same principle. His lines of operation were interior. His army was distributed in such a manner that it could all be rallied on any one point in sixty hours. The French, on the contrary, were distributed over a country four hundred miles square, and their line of operation was exterior
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