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chief army. It had extinguished the last hope of culling Lee north of the James, and of interposing that army between him and the Confederate capital. The failure to seize Petersburg when it would easily have fallen, and the repeated and costly failures to carry its defenses by assault, or even to flank them on the south — the luckless conclusion of Wilson's and Kautz's raid to Staunton river-Sheridan's failure to unite with Hunter in Lee's rear-Sturgis's disastrous defeat by Forrest near Guntown — Hunter's failure to carry Lynchburg, and eccentric line of retreat-Sherman's bloody repulse at Kenesaw, and the compelled slowness of his advance on Atlanta-Early's unresisted swoop down the Valley into Maryland, his defeat of Wallace at the Monocacy, and his unpunished demonstration against the defenses of Washington itself — the raids of his troopers up to the suburbs of Baltimore, on the Philadelphia Railroad, and even up into Pennsylvania; burning Chambersburg and alarming even Pittsb<
tant mounted expedition was dispatched Dec. 21. by Gen. Dana from Memphis, 3,500 strong, led by Gen. Grierson, south-eastward through north Alabama to Tupelo on the Mobile railroad, which was thoroughly broken up southward to Okolona; Col. Karge, by the way, surprising Dec. 25. a Rebel camp at Verona, dispersing the force holding it, capturing 32 cars, 8 warehouses filled with ordnance and supplies, which were being loaded for Hood's army on 200 wagons taken by Forrest from Sturgis at Guntown. All were destroyed. At Okolona, Grierson intercepted Dec. 27. dispatches from Dick Taylor, at Mobile, promising reenforcements, which deserters said would arrive at 11 A. M. next day. he decided, therefore, to attack at daylight, and did so: the Rebels being intrenched at a little station known as Egypt, with 4 guns on platform cars, and some 1,200 to 2,000 men. While the fight was in progress, two trains came up the road with reinforcements for the enemy; but Grierson interposed be
Harb., Tex., 322. Gettysburg, Pa., 373. Glendale (or White Oak Swamp Br.), Va., 161. Guntown, Miss., 621. Hanover C. H., Va., 141. Harper's Ferry, Va., 199. Hatcher's Run, Va., 595. Heleker's Cross-roads, 282; at Chickamauga, 417; his massacre at Fort Pillow, 619; routs Sturgis at Guntown, 621; assails Johnsonville, Tenn., 679. Fort De Russy, captured by A. J. Smith, 537. Fort Va., battle of, 183. gunboats, captured and destroyed by the enemy on Red river, 550. Guntown, Miss., Sturgis routed at, 621. H. Habeas Corpus, Vallandigham's case, 489; President LincoMiss., 305. Sturgis, Maj.-Gen. S. D., reenforces Pope, 179; at Alexandria, 179; is routed at Guntown, 621-2. Sullivan, Gen. J. C., at Iuka, 224; routs Forrest, 282. Sumner, Hon. Chas., on ho at Manassas Gap fight, 393. Waring, Col. Geo. E., defeats Marmaduke at Batesville, 447; at Guntown. Miss., 621. Warner, Gen., fights at Henderson's Hill, La., 537. Warren, Gen. Fitz Henry,
he portion at Grand Junction will follow as soon as relieved. . . . H. W. Halleck, Major-General. War Records, Vol. XVII., Part II., p. 56. Halleck's letter shows the condition of his mind. The following letter from General Pope shows the condition of his opponents:-- camp near Booneville, June 12, 1862. Major-General Halleck: A spy whom I sent some days ago to Okolona has just returned. The enemy is scattered along the whole road from Columbus to Tupelo, sixteen miles below Guntown. They are disorganized, mutinous, and starving. He reports the woods full of deserters belonging to the northern counties of Mississippi. Nearly the whole of the Tennessee, Arkansas, and Kentucky troops have left. A large rear guard has been strung along perpendicular to the road for twenty miles, driving the stragglers and all the cattle of every description before them. The spy reports that the whole army is utterly demoralized, and ready to throw down their arms; the Alabama troops
ackland to Baldwin. It did so, and arrived at the latter point on the following morning at four o'clock, finding the enemy gone. Lieut.-Col. Hatch was then ordered with a battalion each of the Second Michigan and Second Iowa, to proceed toward Guntown and feel the position of the enemy. He came upon his rear, one and a half miles from Guntown, and his bold advance forced the rebels out, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery; when, having fulfilled his mission, he returned to Baldwin. This wGuntown, and his bold advance forced the rebels out, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery; when, having fulfilled his mission, he returned to Baldwin. This was the last attempt made by any portion of our forces to follow up the retreating enemy. It was not only in the last days of the siege of Corinth, and during the pursuit, that the brigade made a reputation for boldness and power of endurance. From the very day they landed at Hamburgh, portions of it engaged almost daily in venturesome, successful outpost enterprises. The gallant charge of the brigade upon a rebel battery near Farmington, on the ninth ultimo, alone won for it the confidence
f the hour. At five o'clock on the morning of the second June, I entered Booneville, and during all of that day my cavalry was constantly skirmishing with the enemy on every road leading southward and westward from Booneville to Twenty-mile Creek. On the next day I made a reconnoissance in force towards Baldwin, driving the enemy across Twenty-mile Creek; and on the fourth another reconnaissance was made by Colonel Elliot, via Blacklands, with similar results. On the tenth, Baldwin and Guntown were occupied by my troops, which was as far as the pursuit has been carried. Booneville is twenty-four miles by the railroad from Corinth, and Twenty-mile Creek is eleven miles further. By the highway the distance from Corinth to Twenty-mile Creek is reckoned by the inhabitants at thirty-nine miles. The facts of the farmer's story are these. I met at Rienzi, on Sunday, the first June, the citizen whose house Beauregard occupied while there, and his statement to me was that Beaurega
No. 30. I. Captain Mauldin, commanding company cavalry at Bear Creek bridge, will hold his command in readiness to move at a moment's notice towards Baldwin or Guntown on the M. and O. R. R. He will, when orders to remove are received, thoroughly destroy all bridges, both of railroads and ordinary roads, on Bear Creek and its trd the crossing of said stream, and to effectually destroy the bridges and obstruct the road after the passage of the cavalry. 9. On arriving in the vicinity of Guntown, the best defensive position will be taken in rear of Twenty-mile Creek, due regard being had to a proper and sufficient supply of wood and water for the troops. front, in case of battle. George W. Brent, Acting Chief of Staff. Corinth, May 25, 1862. (F.) General B. Bragg, Corinth: General: From information received, Guntown, four miles and a half below Baldwin, is considered a better position for the defensive; hence we will go there. Please give the necessary orders. Small detai
e days. That portion of my cavalry which did not accompany General Armstrong, has been ordered forward to Booneville, and General Little is moving his division to Guntown and Baldwin. I hope that nothing will prevent you from coming forward without delay, with all your disposable troops. Be pleased to telegraph your determinations, and I hear that he is now at Iuka, and crossing his army at Eastport. I am, therefore, pushing my army slowly forward, and shall remove my own headquarters to Guntown on Sunday; I shall then determine by what route to advance. I shall keep you fully advised of my movements, so that we may co-operate or unite our forces, as mayy approach, and are retreating westward. I telegraphed you immediately, proposing a combined movement upon Corinth, and sent the despatch by special messenger to Guntown, with instructions to forward it to you immediately, and to await your reply. This has not been received yet. I hope that you will answer me at once, for General
als, might at any moment be destroyed by Confederate raiders. The necessity of guarding the Western and Atlantic Railroad was an ever-present concern with Sherman. Forrest and his cavalry force were in northern Mississippi waiting for him to get far enough on the way to Atlanta for them to pounce upon the iron way and tear it to ruins. To prevent this General Samuel D. Sturgis, with eight thousand troops, was sent from Memphis against Forrest. He met him on the 10th of June near Guntown, Mississippi, but was sadly beaten and driven back to Memphis, one hundred miles away. The affair, nevertheless, delayed Forrest in his operations against the railroad, and meanwhile General Smith's troops returned to Memphis from the Red River expedition, somewhat late according to the schedule but eager to join Sherman in the advance on Atlanta. Smith, however, was directed to Peach-tree creek, where Hood hit hard Counting these closely clustered Federal graves gives one an idea of the o
als, might at any moment be destroyed by Confederate raiders. The necessity of guarding the Western and Atlantic Railroad was an ever-present concern with Sherman. Forrest and his cavalry force were in northern Mississippi waiting for him to get far enough on the way to Atlanta for them to pounce upon the iron way and tear it to ruins. To prevent this General Samuel D. Sturgis, with eight thousand troops, was sent from Memphis against Forrest. He met him on the 10th of June near Guntown, Mississippi, but was sadly beaten and driven back to Memphis, one hundred miles away. The affair, nevertheless, delayed Forrest in his operations against the railroad, and meanwhile General Smith's troops returned to Memphis from the Red River expedition, somewhat late according to the schedule but eager to join Sherman in the advance on Atlanta. Smith, however, was directed to Peach-tree creek, where Hood hit hard Counting these closely clustered Federal graves gives one an idea of the o
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