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Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 492c (search)
BOI( KI/ONES,276 B and D, Shorey on Horace, Odes i.20.7 “datus in theatro cum tibi plausus,” and also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326. In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. v. (1910) pp. 220-221, Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748KAI\ TI/NA QUMO\N E)/XWN;Symp. 219 D 3TI/NA OI)/ESQE/ ME DIA/NOIAN E)/XEIN; Eurip.I.A. 1173TI/N' E)N DO/MOIS ME KARDI/AN E(/CEIN DOKEI=S; What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure
Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 504b (search)
believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer wayCf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic(Univ. of Chicago Studies in class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and
Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 505c (search)
s with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,There is no “the” in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) pp. 343-345. as if we understood their meaning when they utterFQE/GCWNTAI logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance. the word ‘good.'” “Most true,” he said. “Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusionLi
Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 505d (search)
re are many and violent disputesA)MFISBHTH/SEIS is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than E)RI/ZEIN in Protag. 337 A. about it?” “Of course.” “And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblanceMen may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi (1921) pp. 164-168. without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody
Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 506d (search)
well,” humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to “define” the conventional virtues than to explain the “sanction.” Cf. Symp. 189 A, Euthydem. 298 D-E, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 E. content me, my dear fellow,” I said, “but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.Excess of Zeal,PROQUMI/A, seemed laughable to the Greeks. Cf. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223. N
Plato, Republic, Book 6, section 508e (search)
tinction can be drawn between EI)=DOS and I)DE/A in Plato. But I)DE/A may be used o carry the notion of “apprehended aspect” which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 379 A, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347. of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.The meaning is clear. we really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. the position and case of GIGNWSKOME/NHS are
Plato, Republic, Book 7, section 514a (search)
intended meaning. there may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which are merely indispensable parts of the picture. The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, “The Origin of Plato's Cave” in Harvard Studies in Class. Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world to a cave, Diels i.3 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and
Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline (ed. John Selby Watson, Rev. John Selby Watson, M.A.), chapter 20 (search)
untry; but at length, the signification of the word being extended, it was applied to any governors of any country who were possessed of supreme authority, and yet were not acknowledged as kings by the Romans. See Hirt. Bell. Alex. c. 67: Deiotarus, at that time tetrarch of almost all Gallogræcia, a supremacy which the other tetrarchs would not allow to be granted him either by the laws or by custom, but indisputably acknowledged as king of Armenia Minor by the senate," etc. Dietsch. "Cicero, Phil. II., speaks of Reges Tetrarchas Dynastasque. And Lucan has (vii. 46) Tretrarchæ regesque tenent, magnique tyranni." Wasse. Horace also says, ---- Modo reges atque tetrarchas, Omnia magna loquens. I have, with Rose, rendered the word princes, as being the most eligible term. have constantly been their tributaries; nations and states have paid them taxes; but all the rest of us, however brave and worthy, whether noble or plebeian, have been regarded as a mere mob, without interest or authorit
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History (ed. John Bostock, M.D., F.R.S., H.T. Riley, Esq., B.A.), BOOK II. AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORLD AND THE ELEMENTS., CHAP. 1. (1.)—WHETHER THE WORLD BE FINITE, AND WHETHER THERE BE MORE THAN ONE WORLD. (search)
re, and itself constitutes natureThe philosophers of antiquity were divided in their opinions respecting the great question, whether the active properties of material bodies, which produce the phenomena of nature, are inherent in them, and necessarily attached to them, or whether they are bestowed upon them by some superior power or being. The Academics and Peripatetics generally adopted the latter opinion, the Stoics the former: Pliny adopts the doctrine of the Stoics; see Enfield's Hist. of Phil. i. 229, 283, 331.. It is madness to harass the mind, as some have done, with attempts to measure the world, and to publish these attempts; or, like others, to argue from what they have made out, that there are innumerable other worlds, and that we must believe there to be so many other natures, or that, if only one nature produced the whole, there will be so many suns and so many moons, and that each of them will have immense trains of other heavenly bodies. As if the same question would not
Pliny the Elder, The Natural History (ed. John Bostock, M.D., F.R.S., H.T. Riley, Esq., B.A.), BOOK II. AN ACCOUNT OF THE WORLD AND THE ELEMENTS., CHAP. 5. (7.)—OF GODIt is remarked by Enfield, Hist. of Phil. ii. 131, that "with respect to philosophical opinions, Pliny did not rigidly adhere to any sect.... He reprobates the Epicurean tenet of an infinity of worlds; favours the Pythagorean notion of the harmony of the spheres; speaks of the universe as God, after the manner of the Stoics, and sometimes seems to pass over into the field of the Sceptics. For the most part, however, he leans to the doctrine of Epicurus.". (search)
CHAP. 5. (7.)—OF GODIt is remarked by Enfield, Hist. of Phil. ii. 131, that "with respect to philosophical opinions, Pliny did not rigidly adhere to any sect.... He reprobates the Epicurean tenet of an infinity of worlds; favours the Pythagorean notion of the harmony of the spheres; speaks of the universe as God, after the manner of the Stoics, and sometimes seems to pass over into the field of the Sceptics. For the most part, however, he leans to the doctrine of Epicurus.". I consider it, therefore, an indication of human weakness to inquire into the figure and form of God. For whatever God be, if there be any other God"Si alius est Deus quam sol," Alexandre in Lem. i. 230. Or rather, if there be any God distinct from the world; for the latter part of the sentence can scarcely apply to the sun. Poinsinet and Ajasson, however, adopt the same opinion with M. Alexandre; they translate the passage, "s'il en est autre que le soleil," i. 17 and ii. 11., and wherever he exists, he is all s
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