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Truman Seymour (search for this): chapter 7.44
erymen, it was impossible to make then stand to their work. And that was just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done. I have examined the Official Records and found reports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries: General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain Easton, This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him. Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought four of the guns off the field. Of another battery he reports, No efforts could now repel the rush of a successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down, and guns lay immovable on the field. Captain J. H. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, reports, p. 410: The remain
G. A. H. Blake (search for this): chapter 7.44
th Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that the charge, more than any other thing, was instrumental in saving that part of the army on the north bank of the Chickahominy. You were the last general officer of General Porter's command on the field on the left, General Porter himself leaving before you did; you had, therefore, an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on. Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, June 16th, 1879: About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and I deployed the 5th and 1st Cavalry in two lines, and a little to the rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then disappeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery further to the left, where Rush's Lancers had been ordered. The 5th Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no mor
G. W. Morell (search for this): chapter 7.44
ing, it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed by the enemy's fire. Was General Porter prevented from bringing off all these guns by the cavalry charge? General Porter says, p. 322: Just preceding this break (in Morell's line) I saw cavalry, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left. All the evidence goes to disprove this very deliberate statement, and that all the infantry on the left had broken and was fast disappearing no earthly object, between two lines of fire — is seldom thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes the bounds of sanity. But it is emphasized by his map, which represents my cavalry as actually making a flank march between the lines of battle,--Morell's and Longstreet's. It seems necessary to add the statements of eye-witnesses, from different points of view,--men of well-known high character,--to corroborate my assertions and my corrections of the misrepresentations of the part played by t
Richard H. Rush (search for this): chapter 7.44
erefore, an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on. Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, June 16th, 1879: About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and I deployed the 5th and 1st Cavalry in two lines, and a little to the rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then disappeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery further to the left, where Rush's Lancers had been ordered. The 5th Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no more of them. You had ordered me to support them; there was a warm fire, and the smoke and dust made everything obscure. I saw none of the 5th, after it was broken, pass through the battery, which was very near. It was soon forced to retire, and was followed by the 1st in its rear. Finally, General William N. Grier, United States Army, wrote me, July 19th, 1879: The reserve was stationed on the hill, . . . in f
J. P. Martin (search for this): chapter 7.44
th them did not arrive at his destination, and was never heard of afterward. and the bridge on which it crossed, between 12 midnight on the 27th and 2 A. M. on the 28th of June, was, I think, rendered impassable by your order. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Martin, assistant adjutant-general United States Army, wrote me from Fort Leavenworth, April 30th, 1885 : The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front; the enemy was not driven from his front, but the charge of your cavalry dt was but natural, at that stage of our military experience, that he should hesitate and halt, to prepare for a new emergency. He did so; and that night the cavalry bivouacked as near the scene of these events as the enemy did. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me, March 24th, 1870: It is my opinion that but for the charge of the 5th Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that th
Stephen H. Weed (search for this): chapter 7.44
be partly relaid to enable it to do so. This regiment was posted on the extreme right flank of the army at the battle of Gaines's Mill, and was ordered to support Weed's battery. Weed was afterward reenforced by Tidball's battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) untWeed was afterward reenforced by Tidball's battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) until twilight of the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its position until Weed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon time regiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in thWeed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon time regiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in the Chickahominy Valley, on the road by which it retired from the field. When daylight came we expected orders to renew the engagement, and took up our march to return to the battle-field, about a mile land a half distant. It was then that some wounded were met, who informed us that all the army had crossed during the night. We t
John C. Tidball (search for this): chapter 7.44
lry was not the last to cross the river — even if they did leave at the time General Merritt states. The 4th United States Infantry was the last organization which crossed, and that regiment passed over about two hours after daylight on the morning of the 28th, and a bridge had to be partly relaid to enable it to do so. This regiment was posted on the extreme right flank of the army at the battle of Gaines's Mill, and was ordered to support Weed's battery. Weed was afterward reenforced by Tidball's battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) until twilight of the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its position until Weed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon time regiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in the Chickahominy Valley, on the road by which it retire
Hezekiah Easton (search for this): chapter 7.44
stand to their work. And that was just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done. I have examined the Official Records and found reports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries: General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain Easton, This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him. Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought four of the guns off the field. Of another battery he reports, No efforts could now repel the rush of a successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down, and guns lay immovable on the field. Captain J. H. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, reports, p. 410: The remaining infantry falling back, we were comp
of our center. The enemy advances rapidly. The fusillade and cannonade are so violent that the projectiles striking the ground raise a permanent cloud of dust. At that moment General Cooke charged at the head of his calvary; but that movement does not succeed, and his horsemen on their return only increase the disorder. He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a little courage, to stop the panic, but in vain. The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2d, 1877: . . . I was with De Hart's battery on the crest of the hill when you advanced on our left. . . . The sacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainly saved a part of our artillery; as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The main fact is, that with your cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout. General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d, 1877: I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacity
Wesley Merritt (search for this): chapter 7.44
ious statements and insinuation of the last sentence, I give here evidence of two witnesses who were present, and whose high character is known to all. Major-General Wesley Merritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, superintendent United States Military Academy, writes me, April 8th, 1885: The cavalry remained, with you in immediate coGaines's Mill; but in order to settle the question I desire to state that the cavalry was not the last to cross the river — even if they did leave at the time General Merritt states. The 4th United States Infantry was the last organization which crossed, and that regiment passed over about two hours after daylight on the morning oscale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The main fact is, that with your cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout. General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d, 1877: I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacity of its conduct at tha
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