hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
George H. Thomas 1,422 6 Browse Search
William T. Sherman 1,342 2 Browse Search
John B. Hood 1,058 0 Browse Search
U. S. Grant 610 4 Browse Search
Missouri (Missouri, United States) 480 0 Browse Search
United States (United States) 412 0 Browse Search
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) 390 4 Browse Search
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) 242 0 Browse Search
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) 234 4 Browse Search
Frederick Dent Grant 229 1 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. Search the whole document.

Found 1,141 total hits in 97 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...
Duck River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
ield before the enemy forced the crossing of Duck River. The remaining 2900 were not available for been sufficiently overcome, and the line of Duck River at least, if not that of the Tennessee, as Sn case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish you to keep some cavalry on the soutction might be effected on the north bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed Gen. After withdrawing to the north bank of Duck River I telegraphed on the morning of November 28:ill hoping for reinforcements on the line of Duck River, and thought I could stop Hood's advance by an withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and fall upon him with our whole force, or orcements? By holding on to the crossing of Duck River at Columbia until dark that night, and thus nemy either in the position then occupied on Duck River, or at some point on the road between that p at any point the enemy might select between Duck River and Spring Hill, as well as that of holding [20 more...]
Columbia, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches misled me somewhatoga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklimber 24, 1864. . . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can, and I think you wd. November 24, 1864. If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north bank ofain, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my action, as follows; also suggesting tion was far enough in the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain if ordersontoons and cross his artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a serious matt's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and take up your position at Franklin, leavinport the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the numerous places above Columbia. But,roops which were stationed on the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out of th[40 more...]
Rally Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
Columbia. We had not been able to hold even the crossings near us. The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed: If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here, and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the proposed point of concentration. And again, at 6 P. M.: The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing around in between him and me, and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place. In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by prisoners that the enemy had commenced t
Lawrenceburg (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
I am of the opinion that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn his designs, aLawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the other hand, a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works at this place could hold out against any force
Kingston (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
ntire brunt of battle until the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin. The following correspondence relating to the command of the army in the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command in person: Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M. Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. General Schofield is entitled to the command lover Stanley] by virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the rear, and
Tennessee River (United States) (search for this): chapter 11
l withdraw to the north bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise. It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboroa) which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough in the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain if orders were given in due time. I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that s
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
e at that time, to be found in the War Records, See Vols. XXXIX and XLV. fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches misled me somewhat as to what I might expect. Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose he had in view, The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 men. See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 33. Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the purpose of retrieving the
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
pped, was about 4800; that unmounted, about 6700. It is necessary to exclude from this statement of troops available for service in middle Tennessee those in Kentucky and East Tennessee, belonging to the Department of the Ohio, for the reason that just at that time unusual demand was made upon those troops for service in East olumbia, a raid by Hood's cavalry would probably have resulted in the destruction or capture of nearly everything in the rear, not only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, except perhaps Nashville and Chattanooga. It was only wise forethought which suggested that such might be the nature of Hood's plans, especially in view of theeral Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 33. Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from Chattanooga had b
Johnsonville, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
which had been received a few minutes before from General Thomas: The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike, and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill, about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnoissance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act according to your instructions received this morning. Please send orders to General Cooper, 1 Cooper commanded the brigade guarding the river below Columbia. via Johnsonville. It may be doubtful whether my messenger from here will reach him. The appendix to General Thomas's report says that I sent this despatch at 8:30 A. M. The appendix to my report says 8:20 A. M. This despatch was evidently in answer to those from General Thomas of 8 P. M. and 10:30 P. M., November 28, as indicated by my orders to Stanley and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to Wilson. Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade sent toward Huey's Mill s
Shoal Creek (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
hat place, were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable to the then existing situation: Pulaski, November 20, 1864. Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these objections as a point of concentration for our force
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...