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Browsing named entities in James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans).

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f speed. The first class, vessels of about two thousand tons, included the Lancaster, Hartford, Richmond, Brooklyn, and Pensacola. The second class, of which the Pawnee and Iroquois were the largest, were also serviceable vessels. Finally, in February, 1861, Congress had made appropriation for seven new screw-sloops, which were intended to be as efficient as their predecessors. But these measures, well-judged though they were, were only a first step in the general conversion of the naval which 313 were steamers. After the war was over, they were rapidly sold, at less than half their cost. The second measure adopted by the administration was the construction of sloops-of-war. Seven of these had been authorized by Congress in February, but the Department resolved to build eight, assigning two to each navy yard. Four of these vessels, the Oneida. Kearsarge, Wachusett, and Tuscarora, were reproductions of three of the sloops of 1858, which made the work of construction quicke
ore in the motive power of ships, so radical that all the constructions of an earlier date were completely superseded. In 1840 the navy was stronger for its day than in 1860; because in 1840 all its ships were ships of the period, while in 1860 only1840 all its ships were ships of the period, while in 1860 only half the fleet could be so regarded. The distance in time that separated the second Macedonian from the Powhatan was not much greater than that between the Powhatan and the Hartford; yet in the first case the change was a revolution, while in the s only a development. A captain that fought the Invincible Armada would have been more at home in the typical war-ship of 1840, than the average captain of 1840 could have been at that time in the advanced types of the Civil War. As a matter of fact1840 could have been at that time in the advanced types of the Civil War. As a matter of fact, it was no uncommon thing in 1861 to find officers in command of steamers who had never served in steamers before, and who were far more anxious about their boilers than about their enemy. As naval science had advanced more in the last twenty-five
though none of the allied vessels were destroyed by its agency, it none the less contributed appreciably to the protection of Russian harbors. But its great importance was not established until the Civil War, and then only in the second year. The Confederates took it up for the same reason that the Russians had adopted it in 1854, and the English had rejected it in 1805. Driven by the poverty of their naval resources to the use of every device that ingenuity could suggest, in the fall of 1862 they established a bureau at Richmond to elaborate and systematize torpedo warfare; and the destruction of the Housatonic, the Tecumseh, the Patapsco, and many smaller vessels, showed the tremendous power of the newly adopted weapon. From the fact that the navy at this period was concerned with an essentially living and growing science, it was important that its officers, above all in the senior grades, should be men of progressive minds and of energetic and rapid action. Especially was t
d line ahead took the place of the direct attack in line abreast, of the old galley tactics. The introduction of steam, by giving ships-of-war a motive power under their own control, independent of the action of the wind—an advantage similar to that which the triremes possessed in their banks of oars—revived the trireme's mode of attack, and made the ram once more an effective weapon. But in 1861 this phase of naval development had not been recognized, and the sinking of the Cumberland, in March of the next year, first revealed the addition that steam had made to the number and variety of implements of destruction. Torpedoes, though of more recent introduction than rams, were not wholly new weapons. The idea of the torpedo, first discovered by Bushnell, and developed by Fulton, was rejected by the English Government in 1805, because it was recognized as giving an advantage to a weak navy over a powerful one, and its adoption could only impair the maritime supremacy of Great Brit
pter 1: The preparations. The Naval War of 1861 was marked by two principal features. The first a new art to the officers that were called in 1861 into active service. The long period of profouloyment in naval warfare was so ancient that in 1861 it was really a new weapon. Its revival was a the ram once more an effective weapon. But in 1861 this phase of naval development had not been ret the outset will be lost. Unfortunately, in 1861, the arrangement of the navy list failed to mee of officers and seamen that took place between 1861 and 1865. It is from the merchant marine that so serviceable vessels. Finally, in February, 1861, Congress had made appropriation for seven new s a matter of fact, it was no uncommon thing in 1861 to find officers in command of steamers who hadelped to account for the want of preparation in 1861 was the supineness of the Navy Department durinor the period in which we live, than we were in 1861, when the feebleness of our enemy gave us eight[3 more...]
cal. Hence the greater necessity for the navy of a large body of trained officers; and hence, also, the greater importance of a partially-trained naval reserve. In materiel, the navy was by no means in a backward condition. The wise policy, begun before the establishment of the Navy Department, of building vessels which should be the best possible specimens of their class, had been steadily adhered to; and in war-ship construction the United States still held, and continued to hold until 1867, a place very near the highest. When the importance of steam as a motive power had become established, the early side-wheelers were built,—first the Mississippi and Missouri, and later the Powhatan, Susquehanna, and Saranac. The Powhatan and Susquehanna, at the time they were launched, in 1850, were the most efficient naval vessels afloat. Next came the six screw-frigates, which were built in 1855, and were regarded all the world over as the model men-of-war of the period. Of these the la
nlistment in the army, and transfers between the two services were not authorized by law. When the draft was established, mariners were subjected to it like other citizens, without any regard to the service which they would prefer, or for which they might be specially fitted. In assigning the quotas to each locality, no allowance was made to maritime communities for the seamen they had furnished; so that they were forced, in self-defence, to send their seafaring population into the army. In 1864, a law was passed correcting these evils; but meantime the navy suffered, and vessels were occasionally unable to go to sea for want of men. As the necessities of the service grew more pressing, the number of men in the navy increased. To obtain them, it was necessary to hold out extraordinary inducements; and in the last months, bounties as high as one thousand dollars were offered and paid for a single seaman. When the war ended, there were 51,500 men in the service. Nothing shows more
pleted. The others were notable ships in their day, but their day was past and gone forever. The list of frigates was headed by the Constitution and the United States, built originally in the last century, and rendered famous by the victories of 1812. Others had been built within a more recent period, but the type had not been materially altered. The frigates were useful as receiving and practice-ships; but as far as war–service was concerned, they had only a historic value. But little more. The best part of the fleet was scattered all over the world. In the matter of ordnance, as in ships, the navy had been making active progress. In the old sailing vessels, the 32 pounder, which was simply a development of the 18s and 24s of 1812, and the Viii-inch shell-gun were still the usual guns. Since 1850, the powerful Dahlgren smooth-bore shell-guns had been introduced, and the new steam-frigates and sloops were armed with them. The Ix-inch guns of this description were mounted i
and manned, and took part in the battle of Port Royal. From their rapid construction, they were commonly known as the ninety-day gunboats. Nine of them were in Farragut's fleet at the passage of the forts below New Orleans. They were an important addition to the navy, and were actively employed both in fighting and blockading drew-frigates of 1855, as they failed to show their usefulness, except perhaps at Port Royal and at Fort Fisher. The Colorado could not be got over the bar, when Farragut went up to New Orleans, and the Roanoke and Minnesota were helpless at Hampton Roads. In the latter half of the war, however, the Department undertook the constore could be said of the squadron at New Orleans, though the ironclad Mississippi, if accident and mismanagement had not delayed her commission, might have given Farragut's fleet some annoyance. At Mobile the Tennessee, under the gallant Buchanan, fought almost single-handed the whole fleet, only to be captured after a heroic def
rfare, where ships-of-war measured themselves against each other, the South was never able to accumulate a sufficient force. Old vessels were altered, new vessels were built at different points, and some of them were for a time successful, or at least did not yield without a hard struggle; but there was no possibility, except perhaps for a time on the Mississippi, of sustained or concerted action. The naval force that opposed Goldsborough in the Sounds was pitifully weak, as was that which Dupont found at Port Royal. Little more could be said of the squadron at New Orleans, though the ironclad Mississippi, if accident and mismanagement had not delayed her commission, might have given Farragut's fleet some annoyance. At Mobile the Tennessee, under the gallant Buchanan, fought almost single-handed the whole fleet, only to be captured after a heroic defence. At Savannah, the Atlanta was captured almost as soon as she appeared. Charleston was never able to make more than a raid or tw
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