hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Abraham Lincoln 1,301 9 Browse Search
Stephen A. Douglas 838 2 Browse Search
Lyman Trumbull 603 3 Browse Search
Kansas (Kansas, United States) 390 0 Browse Search
Illinois (Illinois, United States) 358 0 Browse Search
Fred Douglas 332 0 Browse Search
United States (United States) 308 0 Browse Search
Springfield (Illinois, United States) 214 4 Browse Search
S. A. Douglas 176 0 Browse Search
Henry Clay 164 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Abraham Lincoln, Stephen A. Douglas, Debates of Lincoln and Douglas: Carefully Prepared by the Reporters of Each Party at the times of their Delivery.. Search the whole document.

Found 72 total hits in 24 results.

1 2 3
same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, limits as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill ; I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approach
to the Constitution. Why mention a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about states. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States ; but why is mention of this lugged into this merely Territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a d
the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, limits as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill ; I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion, his exact language is, except in cases where the powe
Lyman Trumbull (search for this): chapter 1
ch, was passing through the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Missouri ; and both Nebraska bill and law suit, were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1554. The negro's name was Dred Scott, which name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to, and was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United States ; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits ; and the latter answers : That is. A question for the Supreme Court. The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement, such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand vo
e quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, limits as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill ; I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion, his exact language is, except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction. In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the same question, as to the restraint o
ile the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possibly this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, limits as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill ; I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more
Squatter Sovereignty (search for this): chapter 1
no third man shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in the language which follows : It being the true intent and meaning or this act not to legislate every into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom; but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of Squatter Sovereignty, and sacred right of self-government. But, said opposition members, let us amend the bill so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory may exclude slavery. Not we, said the friends of the measure ; and down they voted the amendment. While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a law case involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then into a Territory covered by the Congress
Dred Scott (search for this): chapter 1
rcuit Court for the District of Missouri ; and both Nebraska bill and law suit, were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1554. The negro's name was Dred Scott, which name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to, and was argued in, the Suprbe pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for awhile, and apparently indorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the logical conclusion that what Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in IllDred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State. Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or what is left of it, is to educate and mould public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are ; and partially, also, wh
Stephen A. Douglas (search for this): chapter 1
been named as their candidate for U. S. Senator. Mr. Douglas was not present. Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's care not policy, constitute the piece of machir own friends, and yet whisper us softly, that Senator Douglas is the aptest instrument there is with which to. But a living dog is better than a dead lion. Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work, is at least he public heart to care nothing about it. A leading Douglas democratic newspaper thinks Douglas's superior taleDouglas's superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive tDouglas believe an effort to revive that trade is approaching? He has not said so. Does he really think so? But if it is, how can he resist it? Fl be wholly without a ground of opposition. Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be wirence? Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do aught th
James Buchanan (search for this): chapter 1
sidential election, the law case came to, and was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United States ; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits ; and the latter answers : That is. A question for the Supreme Court. The election came. Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indorsement, such as it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indorsement, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. The outgoing President, in his last annual message, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the indorsement. The Supreme Court met again ; did not announce their decision, but order
1 2 3