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Round Top Ridge (Arizona, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
will be remembered, thinking that the whole or greater part of Lee's army had charged his position in the afternoon of the 2d. He says: The Third corps received the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second were sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third corps, and soon after the assault commenced. The Fifth corps most fortunately arrived and took position on the left of the Third, Major-General Sykes commanding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful. attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third corps, under Major-General. Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving t
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
general historian, had they relied upon these statements, instead of finding the true solution of this, the great problem of the war, would have had it involved in more profound obscurity. In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy; that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of oright flank was then held by a single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Green. Then the troops opposing my 13,000 men (two divisions of my corps) were as follows: Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Pennsylvania reserves, 4,500; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, 2,500; total, 44,442. The above figures are taken from the Congressional Report, page 428. To these figures must be added the detachments from the other corps enumerated by General Meade. As he i
Chambersburg, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
actics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy; that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of our cavalry, and our consequent ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts, we collided with st of May, 1863, was precisely 68,352. I learn from General Longstreet that when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning report showed 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms. This statement is certainly explicit, but thampaign, or even the leading points of it, must have known that the three corps of the army were never concentrated at Chambersburg at all; second, it is well known that any organization upon 67,000 bayonets would have involved an infantry force alone which need correction: The scout, upon whose information the head of our column was turned to the right, reported at Chambersburg on the night of the 28th of June. It is printed the 29th. Several orders that I issued on the 1st of July, and so da
Lexington, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
f he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.. Truly and respectfully yours, . H. Taylor, A. A. G. To General Longstreet. Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866. My dear General: Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. Can you not occupy your leisure time in
Cemetery Ridge (Oregon, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
and will stand as history that Meade's army was nearly double that of Lee. In my first article I claimed that my troops fought an extraordinary battle on the 2d. I asserted that my 13,000 men virtually charged against the whole Federal army, encountered nearly 65,000 of the enemy, and broke line after line of fresh troops, until at length, after three hours of the best fighting ever done, they found themselves in a single line of battle charging 50,000 Federals intrenched, massed on Cemetery Ridge. Then, when one-third of their number lay in their bloody track, dead or wounded, and they were exposed in front and flank to an overwhelming fire, and their supporting brigades had gone astray, and there was no sign of positive or strategic co-operation from their. comrades, I ordered them to withdraw to the peach orchard that they had wrested from the Third corps early in the engagement. This claim has been severely criticised. It can be established by the testimony of every honest
Washington, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.24
moral effect in our favor would have been tremendous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck, just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the 1st or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our first rencontre and our recrossing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg. It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject that Pi
Hood (search for this): chapter 3.24
of the reports of gallant officers belonging to his corps; and we have published letters from his division commander, General Hood, and his artillery commanders, General E. P. Alexander and Colonel J. B. Walton, besides his own narrative in the Phill's corps to cooperate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole o night several of my brigadiers came in and they all agreed in reporting the position very strong. At about midnight Generals Hood and Evans,%and possibly one or two others, came to my headquarters and made similar reports, expressing apprehensionsements. At about 3 P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the
Pettigrew (search for this): chapter 3.24
on the subject that Pickett's charge on the 3d was almost hopeless. We had tested the enemy's position thoroughly on the day before, and with a much larger force than was given to Pickett. We had every reason to believe that the position was much stronger on the 3d than it was on the 2d. The troops that had fought with me the day before were in no condition to support Pickett, and beside they were confronted by a force that required their utmost attention. The men of Generals Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble, however, received and executed their orders with cool and desperate courage. When the utmost measure of sacrifice demanded by honor was full they fell back, and the contest was ended. The charge was disastrous, and had the Federal army been thrown right upon the heels of Pickett's retreating column, the results might have been much more serious. General Wilcox, the volunteer witness on Gettysburg, attempts to controvert my criticism on his wild leadership during the battle
Perry (search for this): chapter 3.24
cox's division commander, says: A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left. This testimony is corroborated by General McLaws, the division commander on his right, and by General Humphries, the brigade commander on his right. It is a plain case. General Wilcox was given the directing brigade and ordered to cover McLaws' left flank. He failed to do this. There is no doubt that he and his. troops fought gallantly, as did those of Wright's and Perry's brigades. Their courage was splendid; but, misguided by the brigade of direction, under General Wilcox, their work was not as effective as it should have been. In this connection it may be noted that the Federal line in front of these troops was not broken so much by direct assault as by crushing in the lines on their left. General Humphreys was forced to change front partially two or three times to meet threatened flank movements against him, and he was in that way drawn off from imm
J. B. Walton (search for this): chapter 3.24
General Hood, and his artillery commanders, General E. P. Alexander and Colonel J. B. Walton, besides his own narrative in the Philadelphia Times. We now copy from t There is one point to which I call especial attention. The friends of Colonel J. B. Walton, Chief of Artillery of the First corps, think that in my first an inferential injustice was done to that gentleman. Colonel Walton was an officer of great worth, and at all times had the confidence of his commanding officers; and it is warrative there were sentences subject to the erroneous impression that Colonel Walton was not in full command of the artillery of the First corps at the battle of Geinstructions, quoted in another part of the narrative, were addressed to Colonel J. B. Walton as Chief of Artillery, and show conclusively that he was in command on the peach orchard, and under cover of which Pickett was to make his charge. Colonel Walton was a brave and capable officer, and I regret that my narrative was so cons
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