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Browsing named entities in Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4..

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William H. Seward (search for this): chapter 1.1
ies in case of need; but they were not needed. The approach of the monitors was slow and cautious. They dreaded the rope obstructions which were known to be connected with heavily charged torpedoes. In commenting on this passage Major John Johnson says in a letter to the editors: After the most thorough study of all the evidence, I am convinced that there were no torpedoes in connection with those rope obstructions until a later date. But the report afterward circulated,--to which Mr. Seward gave the weight of his official name,--that the rope obstructions in the channel fouled the screws of the iron-clads, was entirely erroneous. Not one of the iron-clads ever approached nearer than 600 yards to any of these obstructions, with the exception of the Keokuk, which dropped in to about 300 yards of them before being able to get under way again. The first shot was fired at 3 o'clock P. M. It came from Fort Moultrie, and was aimed at the Weehawken. No heed was taken of it. C
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1.1
nd for the further reason that there existed several avenues of approach, by any of which, it was thought, the ulterior object aimed at could be attained. That there was ample cause for apprehension on our part became apparent to me upon my first conference with General Pemberton, in which I learned that by his orders a complete abandonment had been made, not only of the system of coast defense devised by me as early as April, 1861, but also of the one said to have been projected by General R. E. Lee while in command of the same department from December, 1861, to March, 1862. For these had been substituted another and an interior system, rendering our lines vulnerable at various points, and necessitating more labor and a greater armament than we could command. The inspection made by me a few days later confirmed that opinion; for the works in and around Charleston, most of which had been badly located, were not in a state of completion, nor was their armament by any means adequat
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 1.1
land forces had not cooperated in this naval attack, would not rest upon his defeat, but would soon make another effort, with renewed vigor, and on a larger scale. I was therefore very much concerned when, scarcely a week afterward, the War Department compelled me to send Cooke's and Clingman's commands back to North Carolina, and, early in May, two other brigades [S. R. Gist's and W. H. T. Walker's], numbering five thousand men, with two batteries of light artillery, to reenforce General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mississippi. The fact is that, on the 10th of May, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, had even directed that still another force of five thousand men should be withdrawn from my department to be sent to Vicksburg to the assistance of General Pemberton. But my protest against so exhaustive a drain upon my command was fortunately heeded, and I was allowed to retain the reduced force I then had under me, amounting on the 1st of June, for the whole State of South Carolina,
June, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1.1
he assault, went even inside one of the salients of the work. It was saved by the skin of our teeth. General Benham's attack was, therefore, hardly a test of the possibility or impossibility of carrying the James Island works. The failure in June, 1862, was no good reason for not making the attempt over again in July, 1863--1. Because that point of the attack was the strongest instead of the weakest of the line, other parts of it, further west, being but feebly guarded and poorly armed. 2. Because the forces under me in July, 1863, were much less than those under General Pemberton in June, 1862. 3. Because in July, 1863, I had only 1184 infantry on the whole of James Island; whereas, in order to guard the defensive lines properly, I should have had a force of at least 8000 men there. General Gillmore says, p. 12: A land attack upon Charleston was not even discussed at any of the interviews to which I was invited, and was certainly never contemplated by me. His reasons fo
f light artillery, to reenforce General Joseph E. Johnston at Jackson, Mississippi. The fact is that, on the 10th of May, Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War, had even directed that still another force of five thousand men should be withdrawn from my department to be sent to Vicksburg to the assistance of General Pemberton. But my protest against so exhaustive a drain upon my command was fortunately heeded, and I was allowed to retain the reduced force I then had under me, amounting on the 1st of June, for the whole State of South Carolina, to not more than ten thousand men. With these, it was evident, I could not protect every vulnerable point at the same time; and thereafter, whenever the occasion arose, I had to withdraw troops from one quarter of the department to reenforce another. The fact that a new commander of high engineering repute, General Gillmore, had been sent to supersede General Hunter General Hunter was transferred from the Department of Kansas to the command of
hat an attack upon Sumter might be attempted at night. One or two monitors, I thought, during a dark night could approach the fort within easy range, and open fire upon its weakest face with almost certain impunity. Sumter, even at night, could be sufficiently seen by the monitors to be seriously damaged by their fire; whereas the monitors, being very low in the water, could only be visible from the fort by the flash of their guns. To guard against such an attempt of the enemy, on. the 1st of March I wrote to Commodore Ingraham: I must therefore request that the Confederate steamer Stono should take her position as a guard-boat, in advance of the forts as far as practicable, to-night, and thereafter every night for the present. I also caused a train of cars to be held in readiness at the Pocotaligo Station, to bring such reenforcements as might be drawn from the military district [lying between the Ashepoo and Savannah rivers] commanded by General W. S. Walker. On the 28t
April, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 1.1
e for apprehension on our part became apparent to me upon my first conference with General Pemberton, in which I learned that by his orders a complete abandonment had been made, not only of the system of coast defense devised by me as early as April, 1861, but also of the one said to have been projected by General R. E. Lee while in command of the same department from December, 1861, to March, 1862. For these had been substituted another and an interior system, rendering our lines vulnerable a results accomplished at a subsequent date by torpedo-boats in our own war and in naval encounters between foreign nations, notably during the late Franco-Chinese war. It is but simple justice to add that from the first experiments made, in April, 1861, against Fort Sumter with an iron-clad floating battery and an iron-clad land battery, the respective inventions of Captain John Randolph Hamilton, formerly of the U. S. N., and of Mr. C. H. Stevens, afterward brigadier-general in the Confeder
April, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1.1
oughly understood and entered into my views. It is an error to state, as I am informed one or two writers have done, even in South Carolina, that the erection of batteries along the shores of the inner harbor, and in the city of Charleston itself, was due to what has been termed the untiring zeal, forethought, and engineering ability of General Ripley. My letters of instruction and my official orders to General Ripley, from his arrival in my department up to the time of my leaving it in April, 1864, conclusively show that those batteries were all planned and located by me, and that I passed upon all questions relative not only to their armament, but even to the caliber of the guns that were to be placed in them. My fear was that an attack upon Sumter might be attempted at night. One or two monitors, I thought, during a dark night could approach the fort within easy range, and open fire upon its weakest face with almost certain impunity. Sumter, even at night, could be sufficien
G. T. Beauregard (search for this): chapter 1.1
ticles in Vol. I., pp. 40-83, on the operations in Charleston harbor in 1861.--editors. by G. T. Beauregard, General, C. S. A. On the Union picket line — relieving pickets. A Telegram from , It was to Bladon Springs, 75 miles north of Mobile, that, on the 17th of June, 1862, General Beauregard had gone from Tupelo for his health, on a certificate of his physicians, leaving General B the Western Department and of the army which had been withdrawn from Corinth before Halleck. Beauregard having reported this action to the War Department, Bragg's assignment was made permanent by Mr. Davis on the 20th of June. On the 25th of August General Beauregard officially reported for duty in the field.--editors. and contained the information that, by special orders issued August 29th, I and report, which is given, in extenso, in the second volume of the Military operations of General Beauregard (Harper & Brothers: pp. 102 et seq.) It only remains, therefore, to comment briefly upon c
tember 10th, 1862, reached me on that day in Mobile, It was to Bladon Springs, 75 miles north of Mobile, that, on the 17th of June, 1862, General Beauregard had gone from Tupelo for his health, on a certificate of his physicians, leaving General Bragg in temporary command of the Western Department and of the army which had been withdrawn from Corinth before Halleck. Beauregard having reported this action to the War Department, Bragg's assignment was made permanent by Mr. Davis on the 20th of June. On the 25th of August General Beauregard officially reported for duty in the field.--editors. and contained the information that, by special orders issued August 29th, I had been assigned to the command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, with headquarters at Charleston. The next day I left for my new scene of action, where I arrived on the 15th of September, relieving General J. C. Pemberton. The work before me was serious; all the more so that it had to be executed wi
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