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Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
is next line of section might be Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Savannah, or Chattanooga, Atlanta, MontgAtlanta, Montgomery, and Mobile. But with the disappearance of Hood's army from that theater of operations, all if he chose, to remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three corps, while hene Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops he had sent to Tennessee, aactually began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina, crossing the Sav to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much largerthan, Hood's, could and did remain quietly at Atlanta while one of his subordinates disposed of Hoos last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta,—the only one which had even the general appeIf the object of that campaign was to capture Atlanta on the one side, and to defend it on the othet the contest finally resulted in the fall of Atlanta, the rebellion in that part of the South woul
Weldon, N. C. (North Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
nt was ready with his plan, first to seize and hold the Southern railroads by which supplies could reach Lee, and second, for Sherman and the most of his army to come to Virginia by sea, to which Sherman responded with all the loyalty of his most loyal nature, only mentioning incidentally his own plan. Thereupon, when Grant gave him an invitation to speak freely, he replied as above quoted, and explained in detail his plans for the northward march, to be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country. But Sherman's busy brain had provided in advance even for the worst possible contingency—that after all his long march, however long it might prove to be, that march might have to stand alone—he might not actually take part in the capture of either of the Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his m
Columbia (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
the operations of a larger force in Tennessee had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops he had sent to Tennessee, and thus marched toward Virginia with eighty-five or ninety or even one hundred thousand men, instead of sixty thousand. All this could have surely been accomplished by the middle of January, or before the time when Sherman actually began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina, crossing the Savannah River at or above Augusta, is an easier march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have taken the much shorter Piedmont route to Charlotte, North Carolina, and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of retaining the dominant attitude of master, Sherman lost it the moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior force to cope with his enemy; and
Piedmont, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
rginia with eighty-five or ninety or even one hundred thousand men, instead of sixty thousand. All this could have surely been accomplished by the middle of January, or before the time when Sherman actually began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina, crossing the Savannah River at or above Augusta, is an easier march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have taken the much shorter Piedmont route to Charlotte, North Carolina, and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of retaining the dominant attitude of master, Sherman lost it the moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated in Tennessee. I have referred to the possibilities of a direct mar
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
n to any possible resistance it could meet in Georgia. But when he should start northward from Savmself, with the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary military object of roclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect that State from any further invative plan of operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely opened up two other alorder to spend the winter, besides destroying Georgia en route. Of course it is much easier to sto cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and the capture of Savannah did not by any mete chief that Sherman should be driven out of Georgia. The fact that Sherman personally, with an awould have been unrealized—namely, to destroy Georgia. But even that could have been, at least in ld. Yet, strangely enough, the march through Georgia, which was in fact the simplest thing possiblite to enable him to reach the same result in Georgia. Sherman's tactical operations during the
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
ity as a strategist. the actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had any good siderable damage, to drive the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and energy as be the result of operations against Hood in Tennessee, it was a difficult and delicate question toould have been no risk of serious results in Tennessee. In connection with Sherman's operations esult of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee had been as decisive as they actually were w to Atlanta all of the troops he had sent to Tennessee, and thus marched toward Virginia with eightrestored until Hood was actually defeated in Tennessee. I have referred to the possibilities of ally broken up, by Sherman's subordinates in Tennessee, slows clearly enough what kind of modificatcredit for the breaking up of Hood's army in Tennessee, while he was marching to Savannah, as a legose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to serve as a decoy to Hood, I must say
South Carolina (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward by the upland route instead of through the swamps of South Carolina. But, as it was, Sherman was, as he thought, compelled to go to Savannah first, capture that place himself, and make that the base for his northward march. Hence there was no need to say anything to anybody about what further was to be doneack by operations in his rear. Only one part of Sherman's earnest desires would have been unrealized—namely, to destroy Georgia. But even that could have been, at least in a great measure, compensated for by the more complete destruction of South Carolina, the cradle of secession and rebellion. The more carefully Sherman's great operations are examined, the more clearly it will appear that while his plans were magnificent, their execution was not perfect. And this is the legitimate aim of
North Carolina (North Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
strategy and his skill in marching an army. Although, as fate would have it, he did not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf States, whereby the fragments of that broken and dispirited army, as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under their old, able commander, General Johnston, and appeared in Sherman's front to oppose his northward march, and finally to capitulate to him at Bennett's House in North Carolina. The remnant of that army which Sherman had disdained to pursue into Alabama or Mississippi had traveled a thousand miles to surrender to him! No story of fiction could be more romantic than that fact of real war history. It was not necessary for Sherman to produce his letter of November 6, 1864; but I have quoted from it here very largely to show that there was no possible contingency which his far-reaching mind had not foreseen and provided for. Sherman's plan was so firmly fix
Augusta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
he troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward by thehan either of the others, he said: Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforirst thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement leaving open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta, as embodied in his despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity thusfter Hood got out of his way, Sherman might as well, and I think better, have marched direct to Augusta, and thence northward, wholly ignoring Savannah as well as Charleston, except that he would havom Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina, crossing the Savannah River at or above Augusta, is an easier march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not cared about pay
Macon (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 17
s approval of Sherman's march, he disclosed to Grant the ulterior object he had in view. In discussing the reasons for selecting the route to Savannah rather than either of the others, he said: Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforce our armies in Virginia. Of course Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly the full significance of Sherman's changn against Lee does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after Sherman started. The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement leaving open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta, as embodied in his despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had g
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