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Fredericktown (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
ral Stuart dated June 23, a part of which I ,will quote: headquarters, army of Northern Virginia, June 23, 1863, 3:30 P. M. Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry: General, * * * If General Hooker's army remains inactive you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mo
Westminster (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
eem to have been of that opinion, for he had only gone as far as Westminster by the evening of the 29th. Now Westminster is about 50 miles oWestminster is about 50 miles or less from Seneca ford, where he had crossed. Had he pressed on the morning of the 28th, he could easily have reported to General Early at 1. But for the delay thus occasioned he might have marched from Westminster to Gettysburg by Littletown, as apparently he hoped to do. for he could have reached Westminster certainly by the morning of the 29th, instead of at sundown (for that place is only 45 or 50 miles from Senevalry on that road. In his report Gen. Stuart says he reached Westminster at 5 P. M. and camped at Union Mills, midway between WestminsterWestminster and Littletown, on the Gettysburg road (p. 695). Scouts reported that the Federal cavalry had reached Littletown during the night. But for s of the Federal army was only one day behind Stuart's column at Westminster, though when he began his movement that corps was in Virginia.
McAllister (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
statement of General Stuart himself in his report in more than one place. Thus, on p. 695, Rebellion Records, Vol. XVII, he says, speaking of the engagement at Hanover: If my command had been well closed now, this column would have been at our mercy; but, owing to the great elongation of the column, by reason of the 200 wagoned that the Federal cavalry had reached Littletown during the night. But for this it would appear Stuart would have marched to Gettysburg. Instead he marched to Hanover. Gen. Kilpatrick in his report says Stuart was making for Littletown. Gen. E. P. Alexander, in his important work, p. 375, says that had Gen. Stuart's column ached Gettysburg by the early morning of the 30th. That cavalry reached Littletown during the night of 29th. And 2d. Had he decided instead to press on through Hanover to York he would have been able to effect a junction with General Early at York by the evening of the 29th, or the early morning of the 30th, and his superb leade
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
eneral Stuart himself Lee wrote on June 22nd, You can move with the other three (Brigades) into Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard hisuntains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. The Commanding General wrote me authorizing this move d to which he understood General Lee agreed, was, to use the words of his report, to cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. He gives no intimation that he understood that he was iew the main object of his expedition, which was to co-operate with Ewell in his march from the Maryland line to Harrisburg. This, the first and principal duty imposed upon the Chief of Cavalry by thf General Longstreet's scout about midnight of the 28th, with news that Hooker had crossed into Maryland, and that he had been superseded. Now General Lee's Report does reflect on General Stuart,
York, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
n Elliott Johnson from riding from Carlisle to York, a distance of 36 miles, as Col. Mosby points oransmit General Lee's order to General Early at York. Then finally there is the improbability that rected to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the com It is about 75 or 80 miles from Seneca ford to York, which could readily have been covered by Stuar could easily have reported to General Early at York (30 miles farther), before nightfall of the 29t decided instead to press on through Hanover to York he would have been able to effect a junction with General Early at York by the evening of the 29th, or the early morning of the 30th, and his superould then have been available in the march from York to Cashtown on the 30th, and in the operations s, p. 191, if Stuart had arrived on the 30th at York he could not have communicated with Lee. No, bhe rash advance of General Hill. Marching from York to Cashtown on the 30th, by way of Heidlersburg[1 more...]
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 1.17
ee at the crisis of the campaign. P. 156. Balancing what might be gained against what was certain to be lost for the invading army by the absence of the best half of the Cavalry with its distinguished Chief, the same judgment must be made as Jackson pronounced on Stoneman's raid six weeks earlier. P. 158. Having acquired this knowledge (that the Federal army was marching north), Stuart would certainly have done well to have marched up the right bank of the Potomac and so made sure of rejoining the army, but his character was not one to lightly abandon an enterprize which he had once undertaken. P. 160. Col. Henderson, the distinguished author of the Life of Stonewall Jackson, is of the same opinion. He says: Stuart forgot for once that to cover the march of the army and to send in timely information are services of far greater importance than cutting the enemy's communications and harrassing his rear. The Science of War. P. 303. It must also be acknowledged, I thin
Waiter Taylor (search for this): chapter 1.17
o move your forces to this point. Col. Mosby declares that this letter refutes every word of the statements of Gen. Longstreet, Col. Marshall, Gen. Long, Col. Waiter Taylor, Gen. Fitz Lee and Gen. Lee's own report in regard to the compaign in the particulars above named. He further says that Gen. Well's and Gen. Early's reportefore he sent his staff officer to transmit General Lee's order to General Early at York. Then finally there is the improbability that General Longstreet and Colonel Taylor and Colonel Marshall and General Long and General Lee himself, should all have believed and stated that the news of the proximity of Hooker should have been bnable in writing the letter from memory made a mistake in dating it the 28th, or General Lee and General Longstreet, and General Long and Colonel Marshall and Colonel Taylor were all mistaken in the belief that the change in the plans of the campaign was due to the arrival of a scout on the night of the 28th. Which is the more li
Edward Johnson (search for this): chapter 1.17
S. Mosby. By Randolph Harrison McKIM, late First Lieutenant and A. D. C. Third Brigade, General Edward Johnson's Division, Army of Northern Virginia. Col. John S. Mosby, the brave and able command was written on the 27th, and received by Ewell early on the morning of the 28th, why did Gen. Edward Johnson's division not receive orders to march back southward from Carlisle till 9 A. M., on the 29th, as my diary proves? (I was a staff officer in Johnson's division and kept a careful diary of the campaign). But, if it was written on the 28th, dispatched at midnight, and received by Ewell by 6 or 7 A. M., of the 29th, orders to Gen. Edward Johnson and to Gen. Rodes might well have been issued as early as 9 A. M. Again, if Ewell received the order on the morning of the 29th, it exactlthe General Commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown. Again, it appears that Johnson's reserve artillery and trains were passing through Chambersburg after midnight of the 29th. Mr
at Lee would have waited till the 30th to order Hill and Longstreet to march to Cashtown. There is sburg, Colonel Mosby points to the fact that A. P. Hill's corps was turned eastward on its arrival aconclusive against any such intention. But General Hill in his report says: (Rebellion Records, Vol against Harrisburg. Thus General Early, General Hill and General Ewell all testify that they hadbetween the enemy and the infantry of Early and Hill, and would thus probably have prevented the battle from being precipitated by Hill on the morning of July 1st. Since writing the above, I find thaavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia. General A. P. Hill, General Ewell, General Longstreet—especprecipitated by the unauthorized advance of General Hill on July 1st. I think also that Col. Mosby bability have prevented the rash advance of General Hill. Marching from York to Cashtown on the 30tfrained from reproaching his three Lieutenants, Hill and Ewell and Longstreet, with their share in t[3 more...]
ell: I wrote you last night stating that Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac anwith the scout who brought the intelligence of Hooker's movements. Even if the dispatch was not send and stated that the news of the proximity of Hooker should have been brought by a scout on the 28tgranted that Lee knew on the 27th of June that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, this fact would not aommanding Cavalry: General, * * * If General Hooker's army remains inactive you can leave two oss east of the Blue Ridge and pass in rear of Hooker's army, it was evidently the intention that heecondary and incidental object of damaging General Hooker's communications and making a raid around rches if that was his objective. He knew that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was marching north's trains, or to damage the canal, or to break Hooker's communication with Washington, or to burn th that on June 28th, General Lee still believed Hooker had not crossed the Potomac; that he issued or[14 more...]
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