hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
United States (United States) 26 0 Browse Search
Mexico (Mexico, Mexico) 22 0 Browse Search
Lincoln 18 6 Browse Search
France (France) 16 0 Browse Search
Marie 14 0 Browse Search
Stefing Price 13 1 Browse Search
Harper's Ferry (West Virginia, United States) 12 0 Browse Search
Missouri (Missouri, United States) 12 0 Browse Search
Beauregard 12 0 Browse Search
McClellan 11 7 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Daily Dispatch: October 21, 1861., [Electronic resource]. Search the whole document.

Found 44 total hits in 19 results.

1 2
Stuart (search for this): article 22
to the Lincoln Government. It will be seen, then, that it becomes necessary to act with the greatest caution, to withhold for a time all important movements, and to keep the secrets of the campaign from all, except the commanding Generals. If the people have confidence in their Generals, they will be perfectly willing to submit to anything that the good of the country requires — and who is there that does not have confidence in such men as Johnston, Beauregard, Smith, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Stuart, and their confreres? Some time ago, while speaking of the occupation of Munson's hill, I remarked that it, together with the neighboring eminences, could be made, by the erection of field fortifications, a good line for defensive operations, and that counter works could be made opposite those of the enemy that would be valuable to check his advance. The whole chain of hills from Lewinsville to Springfield would make an admirable base for defensive operations, but would be of little va
McClellan (search for this): article 22
ssful operations. It will be remembered, also, that we are fighting a subjugating army. Munson's hill was evacuated, and we fell back to Fairfax for a time, where a better field for a fair fight offered itself. This was a direct challenge to McClellan, which he refused to accept, and for a month every opportunity was offered, with the advantage of position and point of attack decidedly in his favor. For two weeks our force kept the "grand army" within good running distance of their fortifice topographical maps and drawings of every hill, wood, and valley, as well as the course and condition of every road and bye-way. If, then, they offer battle here, it will be with as good knowledge of the country as we have ourselves. Whether McClellan will accept this as the battle ground, or will choose some other, makes no difference; there is none, probably, that would offer his army of occupation better opportunities. These of course are mere speculations in regard to a movement, th
Napoleon (search for this): article 22
under the enemy's batteries, and within range of his cannon, it would be necessary to have fortifications, and that the construction of them would cost our men many months' of manual labor and of tedious garrison duty. Volunteers are of little value to garrison a fort, and soon get demoralized it kept inactive in camps. Hence we find a reason for old Scott's dislike for them as his system of tactics is based upon a fortification of the country over which his army advances. The system of Napoleon or of Mariborough is best suited to a volunteer army — long and rapid marches, frequent battles, and decisive movements. Although we have thus far stood entirely on the defensive, the time may come when it will be advisable to act on the offensive, and therefore a field suitable for both is what is needed for successful operations. It will be remembered, also, that we are fighting a subjugating army. Munson's hill was evacuated, and we fell back to Fairfax for a time, where a better fiel
Scott (search for this): article 22
but at the same time they grumbled at the inactivity or delay of the army. They did not seem to consider that to hold a position immediately under the enemy's batteries, and within range of his cannon, it would be necessary to have fortifications, and that the construction of them would cost our men many months' of manual labor and of tedious garrison duty. Volunteers are of little value to garrison a fort, and soon get demoralized it kept inactive in camps. Hence we find a reason for old Scott's dislike for them as his system of tactics is based upon a fortification of the country over which his army advances. The system of Napoleon or of Mariborough is best suited to a volunteer army — long and rapid marches, frequent battles, and decisive movements. Although we have thus far stood entirely on the defensive, the time may come when it will be advisable to act on the offensive, and therefore a field suitable for both is what is needed for successful operations. It will be rememb
Beauregard (search for this): article 22
done? and to this I can only reply that our Generals, who have thus far conducted the campaign with entire success, deemed it expedient to do so. When we remember that our army is commanded by Johnston, the greatest General of the age, and by Beauregard, the most skillful engineer, and by Smith, a man of great ability and thorough training, we can well afford to accept expediency as a reason for any movement that may seem singular and uncalled for, by those who know nothing of the designs of tcept the commanding Generals. If the people have confidence in their Generals, they will be perfectly willing to submit to anything that the good of the country requires — and who is there that does not have confidence in such men as Johnston, Beauregard, Smith, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Stuart, and their confreres? Some time ago, while speaking of the occupation of Munson's hill, I remarked that it, together with the neighboring eminences, could be made, by the erection of field fortification
Longstreet (search for this): article 22
then communicate it to the Lincoln Government. It will be seen, then, that it becomes necessary to act with the greatest caution, to withhold for a time all important movements, and to keep the secrets of the campaign from all, except the commanding Generals. If the people have confidence in their Generals, they will be perfectly willing to submit to anything that the good of the country requires — and who is there that does not have confidence in such men as Johnston, Beauregard, Smith, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Stuart, and their confreres? Some time ago, while speaking of the occupation of Munson's hill, I remarked that it, together with the neighboring eminences, could be made, by the erection of field fortifications, a good line for defensive operations, and that counter works could be made opposite those of the enemy that would be valuable to check his advance. The whole chain of hills from Lewinsville to Springfield would make an admirable base for defensive operations, but w
A. S. Johnston (search for this): article 22
e first question that everybody asks is, why it was done? and to this I can only reply that our Generals, who have thus far conducted the campaign with entire success, deemed it expedient to do so. When we remember that our army is commanded by Johnston, the greatest General of the age, and by Beauregard, the most skillful engineer, and by Smith, a man of great ability and thorough training, we can well afford to accept expediency as a reason for any movement that may seem singular and uncalledrom all, except the commanding Generals. If the people have confidence in their Generals, they will be perfectly willing to submit to anything that the good of the country requires — and who is there that does not have confidence in such men as Johnston, Beauregard, Smith, Longstreet, Van Dorn, Stuart, and their confreres? Some time ago, while speaking of the occupation of Munson's hill, I remarked that it, together with the neighboring eminences, could be made, by the erection of field fo
Essex (search for this): article 22
cularized. With feelings of intense sorrow and pain I rode by these unfortunate families, driven from their happy homes to seek shelter behind the line of our army. Leaning on the arm of an aged man the form of a sick girl, whose patient, pensive face comes to me more often than it ought, passed in the singular cortege. The sight was one that brought tears into eyes long unused to weeping. It was then I fully realized the sentiment of Queen Elizabeth's favorite, the chivalric and unhappy Essex, who said, "Not for myself I smart, but I wolde I had in my hart the sorrow of all my friends." Many and many a band of exiles, footsore and weary, paced the tedious miles, tarrying occasionally to rest in the shadow of the dark pines, or in the forest where the moonlight fell through the foliage, laying out the greenwood in little plots as beautiful as the famous gardens of Stamboull Houseless, homeless, on they went, while I, with a heart to offer assistance, were it in my power, was force
October 18th, 1861 AD (search for this): article 22
Army of the Potomac. [our own correspondent.] Centreville, Oct. 18, 1861. As I informed you by telegraph, our army fell back from Fairfax on Tuesday night, between the hours of 12 and morning. Of course the first question that everybody asks is, why it was done? and to this I can only reply that our Generals, who have thus far conducted the campaign with entire success, deemed it expedient to do so. When we remember that our army is commanded by Johnston, the greatest General of the age, and by Beauregard, the most skillful engineer, and by Smith, a man of great ability and thorough training, we can well afford to accept expediency as a reason for any movement that may seem singular and uncalled for, by those who know nothing of the designs of the enemy. In saying this, I do not wish to be understood to say that the people should submit to be led blindly by these men, however skillful and great they may be, without having the privilege of criticising or discussing their
1 2