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Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
at to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg shall rest on my shoulders. The spirit oary, 1864: Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how dince. In the last paper on The mistakes of Gettysburg, published in the Philadelphia Times of the Meade's headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a diviceived, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the grouns to the propriety of the attack on Meade at Gettysburg, and hence it is given with a damnable iterat to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, son and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the bach really presented itself to General Lee at Gettysburg was, whether he should attack the enemy in t war record, or submit his own operations at Gettysburg to a crucial test. But when his overweening[2 more...]
Hagerstown (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
nably, have ensued. There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be cou
Washington, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington aWashington and marched over so. much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully-chosen positigstreet's idea, to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a: strong position, and force the enemy to attaccided. 2nd. Because, to get between Meade's army and Washington, we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, ha000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of Preavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster. Loon we may have taken to threaten his communications with Washington, is shown by his own declared purpose in this telegram.
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 3.25
nce that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington and marched over so. much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully-chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person this objection is really too insignificant to discuss. In the second article there is this passage: In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy. I have italicized the ut to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the
Prior (search for this): chapter 3.25
which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The Commanding General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his' different positions as rapidly as he took them. The claims here made are exorbitant enough in all conscience, but there is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse of the enemy from their front, and that it was not all the work of Longstreet's two batteries, and that they also took some part
Fitz John Porter (search for this): chapter 3.25
e attack, but Longstreet insisted on taking time to make a reconnoissance, which was delayed for a time by a report of an advance on his right, and the reconnoissance was not made until about nightfall. This is according to his own showing, and in the meantime General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed seven different attacks in heavy force during the afternoon. So little evidence had General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops,
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.25
ature, in the New Orleans Republican of the 27th of February, 1876, General Longstreet, referring to his letter to his uncle, said: His [Longstreet's] letter was published owing to its corroborative and sympathetic relations to one of General R. E. Lee written two weeks later. The publication was made following the publication of General R. E. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one. The letter of General Lee hGeneral R. E. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one. The letter of General Lee here referred to is the one to the President from which the foregoing extract is made, and the only part of it to which Longstreet's could bear the remotest corroborative and sympathetic relations is the passage given — that is, Longstreet's letter was corroborative of the opinion that a younger and abler leader for the army could have been obtained, and sympathetic with it in pointing out who that leader should have been — to wit: General James Longstreet. Accompanying the publication of the
R. E. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.25
mitted, without question, to pronounce that General Lee's strategy in the Gettysburg campaign was very defective; that General Lee had lost his mind when he determined to deliver battle at Gettysbur regard to the demerits and deficiencies of General Lee, and his own superior claims to the leadersour carefully-chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the persmade public for the purpose of showing that General Lee made an inexcusable blunder in framing his he very severe criticisms of that writer on General Lee's conduct of the Gettysburg campaign; and when General Lee's letter to President Davis, written a short time after the close of that campaign,he above-mentioned letter to his uncle. In General Lee's very self-abnegating letter to the Presidck or defence of any one. The letter of General Lee here referred to is the one to the Presidenfollowing extract from a letter to him from General Lee, dated, as alleged, in January, 1864: [1 more...]
Walter H. Taylor (search for this): chapter 3.25
turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit. After giving his statement of the operations at Second Manassas, to show the official relations between. General Lee and himself, General Longstreet gives two letters, one from Colonel Taylor and the other from General Lee, to show the kindly personal relations that existed between himself and General Lee and his staff, a matter which no one will pretend to controvert, but which all will say ought to have prevented General Longstreet's insidious efforts to undermine the military fame of one who had been so kind, so indulgent, so magnanimous to him under all circumstances. It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, wr
William N. Pendleton (search for this): chapter 3.25
Republican, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communication contained a bitter tirade of denunciation against General Fitz Lee, General William N. Pendleton, the Rev. J. William Jones, and myself, the greater part of it being directed against me. Thus originated the tom-tom warfare, in which the leading parwhich he states, and which I have shown to be entirely unsatisfactory. This is his whole proof on the question as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee trances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstre
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