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Ewell's and Hill's corps, on the morning of the 2nd, at 26,000 men. Upon the Federal side there hadf that night and until two o'clock P. M. on the 2nd, before it reached the field. It has been stss formidable antagonist than we found it on the 2d, from Culps' Hill to Round Top. The Confederatespeaking of the operations of the morning of the 2nd, General Longstreet was to attack the left flanten his march; and, that, on the morning of the 2nd, General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance osion during the day and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining [the italics are mine] urg shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 2d, and that his troops soon filed into an open fieeral Meade arrived, in person, at 1 A. M. on the 2d, and was engaged in getting his army up until af together about 28,000 men on the morning of the 2d, and Longstreet says he had, without Pickett, som to attack from his right on the morning of the 2d, what hour would he have attacked Meade's key-po[1 more...]
d in the campaign, yet grateful for what has been accomplished, and for the still increasing strength with which we are enabled to wield this great arm of defence, I have the honor to be General, Respectfully, your obedient servant, W. N. Pendleton, Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery. General R. E. Lee, Commanding. Letter from General E. P. Alexander. Montgomery, Ala., February 23, 1878. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary: Dear sir: The letter of Colonel J. B. Walton, in the February No. of the Southern Historical Society Papers, compels me, very reluctantly, to intrude upon your readers with a brief personal explanation. It might not be necessary were your readers confined to those who have any personal knowledge of the subject, but I trust that even these will excuse me when they remember that your pages have a very wide circulation, and will be referred to for many years to come. I cannot, therefore, consent to be represented in them as having falsely claimed for m
July, 1876 AD (search for this): chapter 2.11
estimate of Robertson's and Jones' brigade,) and putting White's battalion at 200, the result is a cavalry force of 6,300 doing duty for the main army, and greater in numerical strength than the three brigades Stuart carried with him, which at Gettysburg numbered less than 4,000. Whilst not endorsing Stuart's march as the best movement under the circumstances, I assert that he had the Commanding-General's pcrmssion to make it; (General Lee's report, Southern Historical Society Papers for July, 1876, page 43;) that it involved a loss of material and men to the enemy and drew Kilpatrick's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry from their aggressive attitude on Mead's flank and front, leaving only Buford's to watch for the advance of our troops, and hence we find only his two brigades in the Federal front on the first of July; that it kept the Sixth Federal corps, some 15,000 men, from reaching Gettysburg until after 3 P. M. on the 2nd of July; that it caused General Meade to send General Fre
July, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 2.11
of the battle are pointedly placed upon his shoulders by one of his subordinates, in a paper prepared for the Philadelphia Times. To whom, therefore, it may be asked, can the loss of the battle of Gettysburg be properly attributed — to Stuart, or Well, or Longstreet, or to General Lee? Very many of us who are deeply interested in the subject may honorably differ as to that, but upon the splendid courage displayed by the rank and file of the Confederate army upon those three first days in July, 1863, wherever tested, the world unites in perfect harmony. We were indeed within a stone's throw of peace at Gettysburg-and although in numbers as 62,000 Walter Taylor.-The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers. is to 105,000, before any portion of either army had become engaged-yet the advantages were so manifestly on General Lee's side in conseque
is Walter Taylor's estimate, page 113, Four years with General Lee,) and prevented that body of troops from being made use of in other ways — which force, Butterfield says, Hooker (before being relieved) contemplated throwing, with Slocum's corps, in General Lee's rear; and finally, that there was inflicted a loss upon the enemy's cavalry of confessedly near 5,000. (Stuart's report, p. 76, August No., 1876, Southern Historical Society Papers.) The Federal army crossed the Potomac upon the 26th June. General Lee heard it on the night of the 28th, from a scout, and not from his cavalry commander. Stuart crossed between the Federal army and Washington on the night of the 27th, and necessarily, from his position, could not communicate with General Lee. He sent information about the march of Hancock towards the river, and after that was not in position to do more. The boldness of General Lee's offensive strategy, in throwing his army upon one side of the Potomac whilst leaving his adve
July 2nd, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 2.11
wide-spread impression that had the plans of the Southern chieftain been fully endorsed, entered into, and carried out by his corps commanders, the historic rebel yell of triumph would have resounded along Cemetery Ridge upon that celebrated 2d July, 1863, and re-echoing from the heights of Round Top, might have been heard and heeded around the walls of Washingtoi, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. There is a ghastliness about that picture of the struggle at Gettysburg, that the blood of the heroescorps already in position, while the force in rear would be used to attack at the most vulnerable and available point. That such was General Lee's intention I think can be as clearly established as that General Longstreet did not, upon the 2nd of July, 1863, use due dilligence in carrying out the wishes of his chief. General Early, a division-commander in Ewell's corps, in a recent paper on Gettysburg, gives a detailed narrative of a conference which General Lee held on the evening of the 1s
ents of the Federal army. Stuart, with his experience, activity, and known ability for such work, should have kept interposed always between the Federal army and his own, and whilst working close on Meade's lines, have been in direct communication with his own army commander. It is well known that General Lee loitered, after crossing the Potomac, because he was ignorant of the movements and position of his antagonist. For the same reason he grope(l in the dark at Gettysburg. From the 25th of June to July 2d, General Lee deplored Stuart's absence, and almost hourly wished for him,and yet it was by his permission his daring chief of cavalry was away. General Stuart cannot, therefore, be charged with the responsibility of the failure at Gettysburg. Did such failure arise from Ewell and Hill not pushing their success on the 1st of July? I have always been one of those who regarded it a great misfortune that these two corps commanders did not continue to force the fighting upon that
July 1st, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 2.11
, and letters of Lee, page 156, we find that General Lee, in speaking (to Professor White, of Washington and Lee University,) of the irreparable loss the South had sustained in the death of Jackson, said with emphasis: If I had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, we should have won a great victory. How, by General Lee's or General Longstreet's plan? Tell me, you who knew Jackson best, if he had been in command of troops, say four miles in rear of the battle-field on the night of the 1st of July, 1863, and General Lee had suggested to him to attack from his right on the morning of the 2d, what hour would he have attacked Meade's key-point on Round Top? Would the hour have approached nearer to 4 A. M. or 4 P. M.? For General Lee has said, I had such implicit confidence in Jackson's skill and energy that I never troubled myself to give him detailed instructions — the most general instructions were all that he needed. But as bearing upon this point stronger, if possible, than Lee's wi
rtillery, and several colors, (General Lee's report), marched into Loudoun county upon the right flank of the army, and was engaged in a series of conflicts, terminating with Pleasonton's cavalry corps and Barnes' division of infantry, upon the 21st June, which caused him to retire to the vicinity of Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, our infantry being upon the western side of the mountains. 165 Leaving the brigade before mentioned to hold the position, Stuart then, in the exercise of a discretital. Thus, it will be seen, including the brigade and battalion of cavalry which composed the vanguard of the army, that over one-half of the cavalry was left in position to be used by General Lee. Hooker, in his dispatch to his President, June 21st, (Report on the Conduct of the War, volume 1, page 279,) referring to Stuart's command, says: This cavalry force has hitherto prevented me from obtaining satisfactory information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; they had masked all their mov
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