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Freemantle (search for this): chapter 3.24
co-operation that he failed to give in the afternoon when the attack really did come off. His orders, given in the morning after it was decided that I should lead the attack, were to remain in line of battle, ready to co-operate with my attack whenever it should be made. If he was not ready in the afternoon, it is folly to say that he would have been ready at sunrise. My opinion of the cause of the failure of the battle of the 2d, as given at the time, is very succinctly stated by Colonel Freemantle, on page 138 of his Three months in the South. He says, quoting me: He said the mistake they made was in not concentrating the army more and making the attack on the 2d with 30,000 men instead of 15,000. It seems from recent publications that my column of attack on the 2d was only about 12,000. It was given me as 15,000 men at the time.--F-E I doubt now if 30,000 men could have made a successful attack, if Colonel Taylor is correct in his idea as to the manner in which General Lee
Swinton (search for this): chapter 3.24
disagrees with it quite widely. The main point that he makes is to quote from Swinton's Army of the Potomac the following paragraph (page 310): The number of infanorce alone of over 70,000, and thus have left no margin in the estimate that Mr. Swinton ascribes to me for the other arms of the service. If General Dawes had followed Swinton's narrative closely he must have discovered that (page 365) he says: General Lee's aggregate force present for duty on the 31st of May, 1863, was 68,3 June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at 52,000 bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me upon the subject he received this, for it wch I shall refer in this connection. It is in regard to a statement made by Mr. Swinton. In his Ultimo Suspiro he gives the history of a meeting which he says took of officers on the 7th I never attended, and of course did not join in the advice it gave to General Lee. Mr. Swinton has been clearly misinformed upon this point.
Field (search for this): chapter 3.24
his advice. The truth of the matter is, I never attended any such meeting. I had no time to have done so. I was kept incessantly busy in the field during the days preceding the surrender at Appomattox. All night long of the 1st we marched with Field's division from Richmond to Petersburg, reaching that point at early dawn on the 2d. I at once went to General Lee's headquarters. I found him in bed in his tent. While I was sitting upon the side of his couch, discussing my line of march and rwhelming odds on all sides. It was one constant fight for days and days, the nights even giving us no rest. When at length the order came to surrender, on the 9th, I ordered my men to stack their arms, and surrendered four thousand bayonets of Field's division-the only troops that General Lee had left me. I also turned over to General Grant 1,300 prisoners taken by the cavalry and by my troops while on the retreat. As to the conference of officers on the 7th I never attended, and of course
Winfield Hancock (search for this): chapter 3.24
had charged his position in the afternoon of the 2d. He says: The Third corps received the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second were sent by Major-General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third corps, and soon after the assault commenced. The Fifth corps most fortunately arrived and took position on the left briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupyPickett's division was 4,500 bayonets. It was printed at 5,500. In the paragraph where I stated that General Meade anticipated my attack of the 3d, and told General Hancock that he intended to throw the Fifth and Sixth corps against its flanks when it was made, it is printed that he gave this information in the evening, when, of
Ewell (search for this): chapter 3.24
e directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's corps to cooperate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early,o attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thuso have won the day. The only amendment that would have ensued, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy's right when it was guarded by a single brigade, run over theidvanced to battle, or made to even threaten battle. The work was left entirely with my men. General Ewell dates his co-operative move at dusk. General Meade says it was at 8 o'clock. In any event, different battle. It is equally out of sense to say that if my attack had been made at'sunrise, Ewell would have given me the co-operation that he failed to give in the afternoon when the attack rea
H. Taylor (search for this): chapter 3.24
that he has written to the President to know if he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.. Truly and respectfully yours, . H. Taylor, A. A. G. To General Longstreet. Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866. My dear General: Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to col
Green (search for this): chapter 3.24
Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. To make this specific and positive proof still more conclusive, I may add the testimony of General Meade, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which he says (speaking of this battle of the 2d): My extreme right flank was then held by a single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Green. Then the troops opposing my 13,000 men (two divisions of my corps) were as follows: Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Pennsylvania reserves, 4,500; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, 2,500; total, 44,442. The above figures are taken from the Congressional Report, page 428. To these figures must be added the detachments from the other corps enumerated by General Meade. As he is not minute in his statements, I have no accurate data by which I can tell precisely w
Jenkins (search for this): chapter 3.24
o be, including the detachments that would join him on the march, a trifle over 70,000. On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at 52,000 bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me upon the subject he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left in Virginia, or some other detachments made during the march. If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them. I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article. As to the strength of General Meade's army, I take his own statement for that. In his evidence taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 337 of their report) he says: My strength was a litt
Pickett (search for this): chapter 3.24
Federals into attacking us; eighth, the assault by Pickett, on the 3d, should never have been made, as it coulneral Lee included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left ist, if not quite, all authority on the subject that Pickett's charge on the 3d was almost hopeless. We had tesore, and with a much larger force than was given to Pickett. We had every reason to believe that the position h me the day before were in no condition to support Pickett, and beside they were confronted by a force that required their utmost attention. The men of Generals Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble, however, received and exhe Federal army been thrown right upon the heels of Pickett's retreating column, the results might have been mussed at the peach orchard, and under cover of which Pickett was to make his charge. Colonel Walton was a braver under the date of the 18th. The real strength of Pickett's division was 4,500 bayonets. It was printed at 5
Wright (search for this): chapter 3.24
2d. I much prefer the evidence that I used in my first article, and think it will be generally accepted as much better authority than the maps. I quoted from General Lee's report as follows: But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines, etc. But having become separated from McLaws, etc., were compelled to retire. This is certainly sufficient authority; but I quote further. General Anderson, General Wilcox's the brigade commander on his right. It is a plain case. General Wilcox was given the directing brigade and ordered to cover McLaws' left flank. He failed to do this. There is no doubt that he and his. troops fought gallantly, as did those of Wright's and Perry's brigades. Their courage was splendid; but, misguided by the brigade of direction, under General Wilcox, their work was not as effective as it should have been. In this connection it may be noted that the Federal line in front of
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