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men), which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and continued to mass ons which came under my observation cannot be too greatly praised. Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which cGeneral Couch's division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and 200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cu
W. L. McMillen (search for this): chapter 14
the following: About 3 P. M. (December 16) General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th Ohio Infantry, commanding) to storm the hill on which was the left of the enemy's line, etc. This statement, which appears to be nowhere dissented from, seems to show very nearly the hour of the day—not very long after 3 P. A.—when was initiated by General McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made in pursuance of any orders or directions from General Thomas, but, on the contrary, during a pe
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 14
orps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was ning the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations agains and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could defeat and seriously cripple, if not destvade Kentucky, as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country of his own friends were also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but overestimated his strength bect be compared. This formidable army was now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the impors strongly guarded. It had become too late for Hood even to attempt a raid into Kentucky. Thomas wm. As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being at least equal to his own, as at least equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact strength is a matter oft, he must, it would seem, have felt so sure of Hood's retreat in the night that he did not think it[17 more...]
J. H. Wilson (search for this): chapter 14
Thomas that night; the order in writing from General Thomas to General Wilson, December 15; and the despatch from General Wilson to myself, dGeneral Wilson to myself, dated December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follow: headquarters Fourth Army Corps, near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. Mt of the Cumberland, Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864. Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the MissiI shall push out as directed last night. Very respectfully, J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General. (Indorsement.) Respectfully forwarded Schofield, Major-General. This last, while showing that General Wilson had not received at 10:10 A. M. on the 16th any orders from Genal Thomas had requested General Smith to delay the movement. General Wilson's report, dated December 21, says: About 4:30 P. M. the enemy, attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy on that and
John McArthur (search for this): chapter 14
General Thomas had at any time so ordered. In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs the following: About 3 P. M. (December 16) General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major-General Thomas being present, the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th Ohio Infantry, commanding) to st. This statement, which appears to be nowhere dissented from, seems to show very nearly the hour of the day—not very long after 3 P. A.—when was initiated by General McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made in pursuance of any orders or direct
Nathan Kimball (search for this): chapter 14
h Army Corps for to-morrow, December 16, 1864: If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats tonight, we will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division, will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank. General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow. Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division. By order of Brigadier-General Wood: J. S. Fullerton, Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General. headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864. Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi. General: I
en general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in holding the line of Duck River. It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry—an opportunity
Samuel Beatty (search for this): chapter 14
ber 16, 1864: If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats tonight, we will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division, will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank. General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow. Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division. By order of Brigadier-General Wood: J. S. Fullerton, Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General. headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864. Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi. General: I am directed by the major general c
November 30th (search for this): chapter 14
ers statements in the reports of the Corps commanders explanation of the absence of orders the Phraseology of General Thomas's report. the official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater than min
December 16th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 14
h from General Wilson to myself, dated December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follow: headquarters Fourth Army Corps, near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M. Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December 16, 1864: If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats tonight, we will follow them. General Elliott, commandin Fourth Corps in either case, while the latter directs what shall be done in case the enemy retreats, but says nothing about what shall be done if he does not retreat. Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. Of the Mississippi, in the field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This is probably Chalmers's division.
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