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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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Portugal (Portugal) (search for this): chapter 3
Conquetes. Beauvais. Campagnes de Suwarrow. Laverne. Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule. Foy. Precis des Evenements Militaires. Mathieu Dumas. Histoire de Napoleon et de la Grande Armee en 1812. Segur Memoirs sur la Guerre de 1809, Pelet. La Campagne de 1814. Koch. Vom Kriege — Die Feldzugge, &c. Clausewitz. La Revolution, le Consulat et l'empire. Thiers. Memoirs sur la Guerre de 1812 Vaudoncourt. Sur la Campagne du Vice-roi en Italie, en 1813 et 1814 Vaudoncourt. Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814 Vaudoncourt. Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France. Vaudoncourt. Essai sur l'art Militaire, &c. Carion-Nisas. Histoire de l'expedition en Russie en 1812. Chambray. War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France. John Jones. Peninsular war. Napier. Notices of the war of 1812. Armstrong. All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with their splendid diagrams and maps.
Montreal (Canada) (search for this): chapter 3
y Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both tobordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine theMontreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and milit
Pyrenees (search for this): chapter 3
ussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would form the first base, the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth. A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the Sierra d'estellas bens of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes; the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places; the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier — are all permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champ
Krasnoi (Moldova) (search for this): chapter 3
llel; but we are not often at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually determine the selection. In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on the Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan of operations in the Seven Years War. The Russians, in 1812, based perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's on the Elbe. An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's li
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): chapter 3
rne and Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a most decided advantage over the enemy — an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm and the Rosbach. For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army; grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this o
Silesia (search for this): chapter 3
battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples under this head. Before proare those which an army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For example, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of Silesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior. Concentric lines are such as starear, and an Austrian force of 40,000 before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him to detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still to continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel him to
Massena (New York, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
of operation. Strategic positions are such as are taken up during the operations of a war, either by a corps d'armee or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples under this head. Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. (Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line Dc perpendicular to the line Ab, the position of the enemy being at B. (Fig. 2.) Aj being equal to Bj, A will still cover every thing in rear of Dc. (Fig. 3.) If the Army A is obliged to
Turin (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
other belligerent powers. In a war between this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of Cannae, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of Washington, in 1814, had little or no
Verona (Italy) (search for this): chapter 3
, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of temporary lines of defence. It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not necessarily bases of operation. Strategic positions are such as are taken up during the operations of a war, either by a corps d'armee or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples under this head. Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. (Fig. 1.) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line Dc perpendicular to th
Dresden, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 3
Rivoli was eminently successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a strategic movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a corresponding tactical movement. By the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under Prince Eugene of Savoy. War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of invasion. If only a province, or
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