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Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3. 4 0 Browse Search
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman . 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 22. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
Wendell Phillips, Theodore C. Pease, Speeches, Lectures and Letters of Wendell Phillips: Volume 2 4 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Poetry and Incidents., Volume 7. (ed. Frank Moore) 4 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 4 0 Browse Search
Robert Stiles, Four years under Marse Robert 4 0 Browse Search
General Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant 4 0 Browse Search
Margaret Fuller, Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli (ed. W. H. Channing) 4 0 Browse Search
James Parton, The life of Horace Greeley 4 0 Browse Search
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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
ould then be the enemy who would be found to have applied the principle, and not he who might have taken the interior line. Moreover, the campaign which followed that of Leipzig, soon came to demonstrate the correctness of the contested maxims; Napoleon's defensive in Champagne, from the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, proved to a demonstration all that I could have said in favor of central masses. However, the experience of those two celebrated campaigns has given birth to a strategical and front of operations, should all present the flank to the enemy in the whole course of an enterprise. Such was the famous project of marching upon Leipzig, without being disquieted about Dresden and the two hundred and fifty thousand men of Napoleon, a project which, resolved upon at Trachenberg in the month of August, 1813, would probably have been fatal to the allied armies, if my soliditations made at Jungferteinitz, had not caused it to be modified. The second case is when we should ha
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
Even in unexpected rencounters the same thing would happen, which will demonstrate, I hope, that this classification of the various systems or orders of battle is neither chimerical nor useless. Indeed there is nothing even in the battles of Napoleon which does not prove this assertion, although they are less than all others susceptible of being figured by lines traced with the compass; we see, for example, that at Rivoli, Austerlitz, Ratisbon, he concentrated his forces upon the centre in oame General Weyrother, who had wished to surround Napoleon at Rivoli, designed to do the same at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson. which he had received without profit to him. It is known how the left of the Allies, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, in order to cut him off from the road to Vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of about two leagues, left an opening of half a league in its line, from which Napoleon profited by falling upon the isolated c
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Strategy. (search)
ted, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them in the direction of the Baltic Sea. In Fig. 1 we have but to replace a c by theMoreau, near Basel, was to act against Kray; and the reserve army, disposed on the Swiss frontier, was to act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine an Schaffhausen, to cut (ray from his communications, St. Bernard Simplon, St. Gothard, and Spluegen, and arrived in the rear of Melas. Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan; he crossed the Rhine near Basel, where he was already in possession of a tete-de-pont, and therefore the campaigh the latter obtained the western portion of Italy as far as the Mincio. The battle of Marengo, and even the whole of Napoleon's manoeuvre, took place only after he had received a reinforcement of 15,000 men from Moreau. Defensive operations.
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of battle with center and one wing reinforced: battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809. (search)
ttle with center and one wing reinforced: battle of Wagram, July 6, 1809. The army of Napoleon amounted to 150,000 combatants, that of the Archduke Charles to 120,000. On the nights of the 4th and 5th of July the French crossed the Danube, and took on the 5th the position F F ; on the 6th they advanced in the position F‘ F‘ F‘. In consequence of this, the Austrians proceeded to the attack by taking the position A A. Their right wing, consisting of 50,000 men, advanced to the attack of Napoleon's left wing, which he had refused; this consisted of one division, commanded by General Boudet. This left for the Austrian center and left wing but 70,000 men, against which Napoleon had concentrated nearly twice that number. The length of his front for center and left wing was about 11,000 yards, the accumulation of forces amounting, therefore, to from 11 to 12 men for every yard. Massenas's corps, with Bernadotte's, is opposite to Aderklaa. Oudinot's corps, with Lannes's, is oppos<
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Example of a battle of the offensive defense: battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805. (search)
the right and left, and attack the enemy's wings in their flank. The allies advance with more than 50,000 men against Napoleon's right wing, composed only of about 5000 men, but afterward reinforced to 12,000 men. The advance of those 50,000 men orm; he defeated them before they could deploy in order of battle; the main column of Alvinzi was defeated in its turn by Napoleon's entire force; and the fourth column, which had arrived in his rear, was arrested for some time by a few battalions, anlucher and Wellington, who, with their armies, amounting to 220,000 men, had taken up their quarters in Belgium. It was Napoleon's intention to act speedily, and thereby surprise and defeat them separately. With astonishing rapidity he concentratedattle, the English had to contend with 55 of the French battalions, and the Prussians with 42; these last, however, were Napoleon's best troops, consisting of nearly all the Guard and of the 6th corps, which had not been present, and consequently had
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Mixed operations. (search)
2 before Napoleon; or in consequence of a preconcerted strategical plan, as in the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796; or, in consequence of strategical movements of the enemy, to keep free our lines of communication — the retreat of Moreau in 1796 was such. We may also retreat to gain a favorable position for a battle, as did Napoleon before the battle of Austerlitz; and, finally, to approach nearer our depots and magazines, if we are in a devastated country — such was the reason of Napoleon's retreat in the Russian campaign. The arrangements for a retreating army belong more to logistics than to tactics; and to well understand them, it is necessary first to read the chapter on logistics. I will only give the principal moments, and the rest will be found in the next chapter. So long as a retreating army is not pursued, its march offers nothing particular; but from the moment the enemy is in pursuit, the question changes entirely; and it becomes most difficult after a los
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army., Logistics. (search)
s: march and Manoeuvres of Napoleon near Jena, 1806. the operations near Jena were the following:-- The Prussian army, numbering 120,000 men, was thus disposed: 20,000 near Eisenach, 50,000 near Erfurth, and 50,000 men near Blankenhain. Napoleon's army was near Bamberg, and amounted to from 170,000 to 180,000 men. Napoleon determined to cut the Prussians entirely from their base of operation. For this, he advanced in three columns--one in the direction from Coburg to Sahlfeld, anotht of these marches and manoeuvres was the total loss of the Prussian army. March and manoeuvre of Napoleon near Ulm, 1805. The Austrian general, Mack, with from 70,000 to 80,000 men, advanced from the Austrian frontier as far as Ulm. Napoleon's army, arriving from Wurzburg, Mayence, Spire, and Kehl, numbered 180,000 men. This army was not directed against Ulm, but against the lower towns on the Danube. The arrangement of the columns is similar to that on a flank march. Ney formed
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
c movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards chaachments, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish exa, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's position in Spain will serve as an illustrauch as are taken up merely for the campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of thtered Germany in 1796, were double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, althon be brought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations in 1814, between the Marate forces, will lead to decisive results. Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and oftended with important results. It was one of Napoleon's maxims, that a line of operations, when oncotally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the g[1 more...]
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very differenll with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in 1796, offer the finest model for ims to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington. Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bearwhen the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak grasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the fortress of Genoan check the Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed in a state of military defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napolenemies our still invincible fortresses. History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile co
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 4: Logistics.—Subsistence.—Forage.—Marches.—Convoys.—Castrametation (search)
w examples of the rapidity of their movements may not be without interest. In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought the battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, thensians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day. In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of wihe battle of Salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four ho0 dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer. In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a general rule, but in certain countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not decisive of the question: Tents, says
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