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J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 3.24
e the Federals to attack us; speond, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpeper Courthouse, when we could have caught Hooker in detail and probably have crushed his army; third, that Stuart should never have been permitted to leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal ald involve. General Lee was not satisfied, however, but seemed disposed to insist upon an attack. He began to suggest moves by which an advantageous assault might be made. Before the question was at all decided a dispatch was received from General Stuart, giving us notice that a very strong column was moving up against my right. General Lee ordered me at once to reinforce that part of my line and be ready to repel the attack. I ordered the reinforcing column to the march and rode out rapidl
Walter H. Taylor (search for this): chapter 3.24
nwhile I received a note from General Lee. He had heard my guns, and at once supposed I had thought it best to relieve Jackson in a different manner from that indidicated by his orders. He therefore wrote that if I had found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it. I mention this incident simply to show the official relations that existed between General Lee and myself. As to our personal relations I present two letters throwing light upon that subject. One is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, assistant adjutant general, and the other is from General Lee himself: headquarters army of Northern Virginia, April 26, 1864. My dear General: I have received your note of yesterday, and have consulted the General about reviewing your command. He directs me to say that he has written to the President to know if he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give
R. E. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.24
e collided with them unexpectedly, and that General Lee had lost the matchless equipoise that usual10): The number of infantry present for duty in Lee's army on the 31st of May, 1863, was precisely st have discovered that (page 365) he says: General Lee's aggregate force present for duty on the 3ory that Meade's army was nearly double that of Lee. In my first article I claimed that my trooprated beyond cavil in my first article that General Lee never ordered a sunrise attack, that he nevardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statemertainly never was in the relations between General Lee and myself anything to admit the possisibil were then arranged for battle, but I asked General Lee to withhold the order for attack until I ha life that a serious attack would involve. General Lee was not satisfied, however, but seemed dispithout very severe loss, and I suggested to General Lee that the attack be postponed, and that we m[27 more...]
R. H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 3.24
tion of his brigade on the 2d. I much prefer the evidence that I used in my first article, and think it will be generally accepted as much better authority than the maps. I quoted from General Lee's report as follows: But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines, etc. But having become separated from McLaws, etc., were compelled to retire. This is certainly sufficient authority; but I quote further. General Anderson, General Wilcox's division commander, says: A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left. This testimony is corroborated by General McLaws, the division commander on his right, and by General Humphries, the brigade commander on his right. It is a plain case. General Wilcox was given the directing brigade and ordered to cover McLaws' left flank. He failed to do this. There is no doubt that he and his. troops fought gallantly, as did thos
Gederal Meade (search for this): chapter 3.24
d for my proof upon the official report of General Meade himself. He made this report, it will be ore conclusive, I may add the testimony of General Meade, given before the Committee on the Conductprecisely what these detachments were. As General Meade states, however, that he left but a singleical record, but simply as confirmatory of General Meade's statements, which are, of course, historth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupynd was wholly inadequate to hold it; hence Gederal Meade's anxiety to hurry up additional troops afwell dates his co-operative move at dusk. General Meade says it was at 8 o'clock. In any event, itg and mourning for-or we should have dislodged Meade from his position without striking a blow. Ifed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck, just before my battle 500. In the paragraph where I stated that General Meade anticipated my attack of the 3d, and told [13 more...]
Grant (search for this): chapter 3.24
nt, and as fast as my troops came up they were thrown into action to check the advance of the Federals until night had come to cover our withdrawal. We fought all day, and at night again took up our march, and from that time forward until the surrender we marched and fought and hungered, staggering through cold and rain and mud to Appomattox-contesting every foot of the way, beset by overwhelming odds on all sides. It was one constant fight for days and days, the nights even giving us no rest. When at length the order came to surrender, on the 9th, I ordered my men to stack their arms, and surrendered four thousand bayonets of Field's division-the only troops that General Lee had left me. I also turned over to General Grant 1,300 prisoners taken by the cavalry and by my troops while on the retreat. As to the conference of officers on the 7th I never attended, and of course did not join in the advice it gave to General Lee. Mr. Swinton has been clearly misinformed upon this point.
Birney (search for this): chapter 3.24
diately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful. attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third corps, under Major-General. Birney (Major-General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired tGeneral Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major-General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps, to which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps; were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left,
Wiley (search for this): chapter 3.24
paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging columns would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage. The result was anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadsid
Fitz John Porter (search for this): chapter 3.24
n to suggest moves by which an advantageous assault might be made. Before the question was at all decided a dispatch was received from General Stuart, giving us notice that a very strong column was moving up against my right. General Lee ordered me at once to reinforce that part of my line and be ready to repel the attack. I ordered the reinforcing column to the march and rode out rapidly in advance, that I might see precisely what was needed. The threatening column proved to be General Fitz John Porter's command. After seeing it, I reported back to General Lee that it was too light a column in my opinion to mean a real attack. This presumption was correct, and the advance soon halted and then withdrew. General Lee then recalled the question of an immediate attack upon the main position of the Federals. I was thoroughly convinced that the position was too strong to be taken without very severe loss, and I suggested to General Lee that the attack be postponed, and that we make
Lockwood (search for this): chapter 3.24
reform behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major-General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps, to which I had assigned Major-General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps; were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy. Duri a single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Green. Then the troops opposing my 13,000 men (two divisions of my corps) were as follows: Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Pennsylvania reserves, 4,500; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, 2,500; total, 44,442. The above figures are taken from the Congressional Report, page 428. To these figures must be added the detachments from the other corps enumerated by General Meade. As he is not minute in his statemen
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