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William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid, Chapter 11: (search)
y direction; but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his. From sending in estimates of the number of troops needed to guard the roads and bridges from Nashville south, both by way of Decatur and of Stevenson, on to Chattanooga, and south to Atlanta. This appears clearly enough from the following telegram: o guard that line, two regiments of which force should be cavalry. From what I know of the road between Nashville and Decatur, two thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry will be sufficient to protect that line. One thousand infantry will be e balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications, and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could be reen
William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid, Chapter 13: (search)
I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. * * * * I have retained about fifty thousand good troops and have sent back full twenty-five thousand, and have instructed General Thomas to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly fortified and provisioned for a long siege. * * * * The points to be noted in connection with this telegram are, that Hood's forces were then estimated by Sherman at from thirty-seven to forty thousand, while Thomas' troops weom Florence, urging me to go ahead and give myself no concern about Hood's army in Tennessee. Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking and discomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do not approve of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumed the offensive against Hood from Pulaski in the direction of Waynesburg. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action, but he is judicious and brave, and the troops feel great confidence in
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Chapter 17: (search)
lson, who were reorganized, the force of General Johnston was increased to seventeen thousand men. The stores not required for immediate use were ordered to Chattanooga, and those which were necessary on the march were ordered to Huntsville and Decatur. On February 28th the march was commenced for Decatur through Shelbyville and Fayetteville. Halting at those points for the purpose, he saved his provisions and stores, removed his depots and machine shops, obtained new arms, and finally, at tDecatur through Shelbyville and Fayetteville. Halting at those points for the purpose, he saved his provisions and stores, removed his depots and machine shops, obtained new arms, and finally, at the close of March, joined Beauregard at Corinth with twenty thousand men, making their aggregate force fifty thousand. Considering the great advantage which the means of transportation upon the Tennessee and Cumberland afforded the enemy, and the peculiar topography of the state, General Johnston found that he could not with the force under his command successfully defend the whole line against the advance of the enemy. He was, therefore, compelled to elect whether the enemy should be permi
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter IX (search)
these suggestions, and thus ended the embarrassment occasioned by the faulty instructions. But his official report on that point has made it necessary for me to comment upon it more fully later. The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorable for aggressive operations, and hence correspondingly favorable for the defense. The ordinary country roads were almost impassable, while the turnpikes were in good condition. As we held the crossing of the Tennessee River at Decatur, Hood was compelled to cross at the Shoals below, and to advance over those very bad roads; hence we had ample time in which to make the necessary dispositions to oppose him. Our cavalry gave us accurate information that the enemy was advancing on the 21st, when Cox, with Wagner in support, was ordered to interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley, with two divisions of the Fourth Corps, marched from Pulaski to that place, and our cavalry moved on the enemy's righ
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning all points of less importance than the three named, so that allt until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his garrisons or guards. I knew nothing at that timg summer,—no more and no less,—and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But n given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by fully 10,000 men. If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to guard his bridges at Florence, or else wou
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
plies would have been drawn, first from Chattanooga and afterward from Stevenson, and then from Decatur, Sherman's line of supply being thus very much shortened. A small detachment at Atlanta could opose. Thus Grant gave his assent to Sherman's proposition that Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur be held defensively, even during a long siege if necessary, instead of the line of the Tennessen his Memoirs to the despatches respecting a possible long siege of Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2 to Grant, quoted in his Memoirs: If I turn back, ter, that public clamor will force him to turn and follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. . . . You may act . . . onHe would not wait for anything but his own necessary preparations. Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur could stand a long siege, and these alone he regarded as of strategical importance. The enemy
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
Gordon's Ferry, Tenn., proposal to obstruct roads at, 211 Grand Hotel, Paris, S.'s speech at, 386, 387 Granger, Brig.-Gen. R. S., proposed concentration of his troops on the Chattanooga railroad, 194, 197, 203; possibilities of his holding Decatur, 197; detained at Murfreesboroa, 197; Sherman advises that he threaten the rear, 199; expected at Murfreesboroa, 205 Granny White Turnpike, Tenn., military operations on, 244, 245, 264, 268-270 Grant, Col. Frederick D., on Gen. Grant's estthe Tennessee, 311, 312, 315; opposing Hood in Tennessee, 313; smallness of his force, 314; campaign in Tennessee, 315 et seq.; extended command for, 317; to watch Hood, 317; to move toward Selma and Columbus, Miss., 317; to hold Chattanooga and Decatur, 317, 319; to assume offensive against Hood, 319-321, 325, 326; possible movement of Beauregard against, 321; official report of battle of Nashville, 327; failure to destroy Hood, 335; Sherman's knowledge of his character, 336; possibilities of
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing), Nashville, (search)
he Army of the Ohio. At the same time National gunboats were ascending the Cumberland River to co-operate with the troops. The Confederates of Nashville were fearfully excited. The governor of Tennessee (Harris) rode through the streets, and with his associates gathered as many papers as possible at the capitol as concerned themselves and fled by railway to Memphis. The officers of banks bore away their specie. Citizens, with their most valuable portable possessions, fled by railway to Decatur and Chattanooga. The public stores were thrown wide open, and everybody was allowed to carry away provisions and clothing. Johnston and his troops passed rapidly through the city, southward, and Nashville was surrendered to the Nationals, Feb. 26, 1862, by the civil authorities. Andrew Johnson (q. v.) was appointed provisional governor of Tennessee with the military rank of brigadier-general. He entered upon the duties in Nashville on March 4. Gen. A. J. Smith had arrived at Nashvil
Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865, Chapter 15: (search)
n and his forces at Columbus, western Kentucky, was cut off, as had been apprehended, leaving, as the shortest route available, the line of railroad by Nashville, Decatur, Corinth, and Jackson. On the morning of the 7th, while confined to his bed by sickness, General Beauregard was visited by General Hardee, a classmate of his aphis and Charleston railroads, with Jackson as his centre, and Humboldt and Corinth as left and right flanks, with proper detachments at Iuka, Tuscumbia, and even Decatur; thus guarding his communications by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad with the east, as he apprehended incursions in advance of the enemy's main offensive move In haste, yours truly, G. T. Beauregard. Colonel R. A. Pryor, Richmond, Va. General Beauregard left Nashville on the 15th, and as there was no train from Decatur that afternoon, resumed his journey next morning with the opportunity—which he desired—of observing the character of the country. At Corinth, on the morning of t
Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865, Chapter 17: (search)
orcements coming from the adjacent States. On the 3d, General Johnston, through Colonel Mackall, A. A. G., replied, from Shelbyville, that the 10th Mississippi would be forwarded from Chattanooga, and that his own army would move as rapidly as it could march. He then answered General Beauregard's letter, from Fayetteville, on the 5th, stating that his army was advancing; that it had already reached that place; would move on to join him, as fast as possible; and that, upon his arrival at Decatur, he would decide upon the promptest mode of effecting the desired junction. General Beauregard, by most strenuous efforts, and in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles, was thus enabled to hope that all our available forces would be assembled in the quarter designated, ready to meet the enemy as soon as he should venture upon the west bank of the Tennessee River, and before he could be fully prepared for our attack. Hitherto, in order to avoid the burden of the irksome details i
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