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1863 AD (search for this): chapter 34
onsidered lost in Europe, and the South surrendered. The recognition of the South by foreign governments entered largely into the political and military operations of the government at Richmond; and the invasion of Pennsylvania by General Lee, in 1863, cannot properly be explained by military seasons alone. The attempt to do this is the weak point of General Longstreet's defense of that campaign. The chances of that campaign from a military point of view were so much against General Lee, and Washington, by the way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to the south of the Potomac, to oppose the crossing of Lee. With the Army of the Potomac in his rear, and fifty thousand men to oppose his crossing, the war in Virginia would have ended in 1863, instead of 1865. The third blunder was the refusal of General Meade to follow the enemy after the repulse on the 3d of July. This lost the army all the advantages for which they had toiled and struggled for many long and weary days; but it coul
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 34
mond, General Lee pursued the same strategy and same tactics adopted by the Army of the Potomac in the campaign of Gettysburg. While General Grant is open to the severest criticism, in a military point of view, for operating on an exterior line, and leaving his adversary secure in his communications and bases of supplies (precisely the blunder committed by Lee in his Gettysburg campaign), Lee's reputation as a general rests on the splendid defense of Richmond, which he conducted in the years 1864 and 1865. The immense loss of life in General Grant's campaign against Richmond was due to his violation of the principles of war. The two campaigns are good illustrations that neither governments or generals can disregard the fundamental principles of war, without suffering immense sacrifices and with uncertain results of success. To close as I began, that justice had not been done to the cavalry in the campaign of Gettysburg, the above review, in my opinion, clearly shows it. I can sa
2nd (search for this): chapter 34
rg, and it was ably handled throughout the campaign, and until after the battle of Gettysburg. The army had three roads to concentrate on Gettysburg, viz.: the Emmettsburg road, the Taneytown road, and the Baltimore pike, and could naturally arrive there before Lee's army, coming from Chambersburg, on a single road through Cashtown. On the night of the 1st of July, we had more troops in position than Lee, and from that time victory was assured to us. Had Lee attacked on the morning of the 2d, he would have been repulsed, as he was when he did attack. The failure of Lee to make any impression on our right, which General Meade expected on both days, the 2d and 3d of July, showed that General Lee was either too weak, or did not have his army well in hand. As to General Lee maneuvring to our left, the supposition shows the ignorance existing of our position and the nature of the country. I had two divisions of cavalry, one in rear of our position, and one on Lee's right flank. Thi
1865 AD (search for this): chapter 34
e way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to the south of the Potomac, to oppose the crossing of Lee. With the Army of the Potomac in his rear, and fifty thousand men to oppose his crossing, the war in Virginia would have ended in 1863, instead of 1865. The third blunder was the refusal of General Meade to follow the enemy after the repulse on the 3d of July. This lost the army all the advantages for which they had toiled and struggled for many long and weary days; but it could not detract frohis adversary secure in his communications and bases of supplies (precisely the blunder committed by Lee in his Gettysburg campaign), Lee's reputation as a general rests on the splendid defense of Richmond, which he conducted in the years 1864 and 1865. The immense loss of life in General Grant's campaign against Richmond was due to his violation of the principles of war. The two campaigns are good illustrations that neither governments or generals can disregard the fundamental principles of w
June, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 34
ntered at Brandy Station, on the morning of the 9th, and repulsed. General Longstreet also expresses the opinion that if there was an occasion which justified General Lee in departing from his plan of campaign, viz., offensive strategy and defensive tactics, it was at this battle of Beverly ford, and that Lee should have fallen upon this command with his whole force and crushed it. Now for the facts on our side. General Hooker, having received reports from different sources early in June, 1863, that General Lee was quietly withdrawing his army from Fredericksburg toward Culpepper Court-House, wanted positive information on the subject; so he directed me to make a reconnoissance in force toward Culpepper, to attack the enemy, if necessary, and force him to display his infantry; but not to return without positive information of Lee's whereabouts. My command consisted at this time of two divisions of cavalry and six batteries of horse artillery, and I suggested to General Hooker,
June 28th (search for this): chapter 34
hould have the cavalry so placed that he would not be able to escape us. General Meade then decided to leave the affair with me, and, as I expected, three or four days after, near a place called Hanover, Kilpatrick's Division met Stuart's command loaded down with plunder, which was recaptured, and, after a severe fight, Stuart was compelled to make such a detour that he only joined Lee at Gettysburg on the second day of the battle, July 2d. The Army of the Potomac was in motion by the 28th of June, moving north from Frederick City. In arranging the line of march of the different corps, I was impressed with the idea that General Meade considered that General Lee would move toward Harrisburg and cross the river in that vicinity. He spoke of it to me more than once. I could not believe it, although General Longstreet states that, at one time, General Lee did entertain that idea. The general line of march of the army was too much to the east for a rapid concentration on Gettysburg,
June 27th (search for this): chapter 34
xecute them it was his first duty to find out where the Army of the Potomac was located. This he was doing when he attempted to pass the Bull Run mountains; but, unfortunately for Stuart, the enemy harassed him so much, and drove him back into Ashby's gap in such condition that he was unable to reach the Potomac in time to see the enemy cross. General Stuart, at Ashby's gap on the 21st of June, was as ignorant of the position of Hooker's army as were Generals Lee and Longstreet, on the 27th of June, at Chambersburg. That Lee and Longstreet should have hurried on to Chambersburg under such conditions, is best explained by the ancient adage : Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad. Generals Lee and Longstreet lay great stress on the absence of Stuart's cavalry as one of the principal causes of failure of the campaign on their side. I have shown that the two divisions of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac had effectually prevented Lee's cavalry from obtaining an
June 21st (search for this): chapter 34
Shenandoah Valley toward Winchester. There being no infantry in the Loudon Valley, it was evident General Lee did not intend to cross the Potomac lower down than Shepherdstown. These facts were reported to General Hooker on the night of the 21st of June, and he shortly after set the army in motion for the vicinity of Frederick City, Maryland, Buford's Division of cavalry taking up a position at Middletown, to the west of Frederick City. I desire, here, to call attention to General Longstreet's statement, in which he ignores all the operations of Stuart's cavalry from the 17th to the 21st of June. General Longstreet states that he was occupying Ashby's and Snicker's gaps at that time with his corps, and communicated with General Stuart. He knew, therefore, that General Stuart had been most actively engaged from the 17th of June, attempting to push through the Bull Run mountains, in order to ascertain the whereabouts of General Hooker's army. Stuart had been doing his best to ex
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