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[1232b]
[1]
for example, courage makes a man
disdainful of dangers, for he thinks that to consider danger a great
matter is a disgraceful thing, and that numbers are not always
formidable; and the sober-minded man disdains great and numerous
pleasures, and the liberal man wealth. But the reason why this is thought
characteristic of the great-spirited man is because of his caring
about few things and those great ones, and not about whatever somebody
else thinks. And a great-spirited man would consider more what one
virtuous man thinks than what many ordinary people think, as Antiphon
after his condemnation said to Agathon when he praised his speech for
his defence.1 And a feeling thought to be specially
characteristic of the great-spirited man is disdain. On the other hand, as to the
accepted objects of human interest, honor, life, wealth, he is thought
to care nothing about any of them except honor; it would grieve him to
be dishonored and ruled by someone unworthy, and his greatest joy is
to obtain honor.Thus he might therefore be thought
inconsistent, on the ground that to be specially concerned about honor
and to be disdainful of the multitude and of reputation do not go
together. But in saying
this we must distinguish. Honor is small or great in two ways: it
differs in being conferred either by many ordinary people or by
persons of consideration, and again it differs in what it is conferred
for,
[20]
since its
greatness does not depend only on the number or the quality of those
who confer it, but also on its being honorable; and in reality those
offices and other good things are honorable and worthy of serious
pursuit that are truly great, so that there is no goodness without
greatness; owing to which each of the virtues seems to make men
great-spirited in regard to the things with which that virtue is
concerned, as we said.2 But
nevertheless there is a single virtue of greatness of spirit side by
side with the other virtues, so that the possessor of this virtue must
be termed great-spirited in a special sense. And since there are
certain goods which are in some cases honorable and in others not,
according to the distinction made before,3 and of goods of this sort
some are truly great and others small, and some men deserve and claim
the former, it is among these men that the great-spirited man must be
looked for. And there
are necessarily four varieties of claim: it is possible to deserve
great things and to claim them as one's desert; and there are small
things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as
regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is
possible—one man may be of such a character that although
deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held
in high honor, and another man though deserving great things may claim
small ones. Now the man
worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it
is foolish and not fine to obtain what does not correspond to one's
deserts. And he also is blameworthy who though worthy of such things
does not deem himself worthy to partake of them although they are
available for him.
1 A variant reading gives 'as A. said to A. when he insincerely praised his defence.' For Antiphon's indictment as a leader in the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens see Thuc. 8.68. Agathon is presumably the tragic poet, see Plato's Symposium. The anecdote is not recorded elsewhere.
2 See 39.
3 i.e. ll. 17 ff.
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