[1241a]
[1]
It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of
agreement of feeling and kindly feeling1; for some people think
that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart.
Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet
identical with it. If
friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in
the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes
B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not
B's interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling
like . . .2 is not for the sake of
the person who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he
feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the
pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So
that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship
that is based on character. But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good,
whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he
wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every
friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend,
since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore
kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not
friendship.For it is thought that
friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are
friends. But the
agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things
practicable for the parties, and the good to all that contributes to
their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in
appetition, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite
things,
[20]
as in the man
lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another
in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire
also. Agreement occurs in
the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and
desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement,
like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the
primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for
bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown
even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same
objects. But it is only
proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when it is
possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a
thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will
quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice
as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to
rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for
the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel
more affection for those who have received it than those who have
received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice
seems to require the opposite. One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of
utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it
is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not this
alone; it is also a law
of nature—activity is a more desirable thing,
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