[
1079b]
[1]
and not in the case of absolute
duality and a particular 2?). But if the form is not the same, they
will simply be homonyms; just as though one were to call both Callias
and a piece of wood "man," without remarking any property common to
them.
1And if we profess
that in all other respects the common definitions apply to the Forms,
e.g. that "plane figure" and the other parts of the definition apply
to the Ideal circle, only that we must also state of what the Form is
a Form, we must beware lest this is a quite meaningless
statement.
2 For to
what element of the definition must the addition be made? to "center,"
or "plane" or all of them? For all the elements in the essence of an
Idea are Ideas; e.g. "animal" and "two-footed."
3 Further, it is obvious that "being an Idea," just like
"plane," must be a definite characteristic which belongs as genus to
all its species.
45Above all we
might examine the question what on earth the Ideas contribute to
sensible things, whether eternal or subject to generation and decay;
for they are not the cause of any motion or change in them.Moreover they are no help
towards the knowledge of other things (for they are not the substance
of particulars, otherwise they would be
in particulars)
or to their existence (since they are not present in the things which
participate in them. If they were, they might perhaps seem to be
causes, in the sense in which the admixture of white causes a thing to
be white.
[20]
But this theory, which was stated
first by Anaxagoras and later by Eudoxus in his discussion of
difficulties, and by others also, is very readily refuted; for it is
easy to adduce plenty of impossibilities against such a view). Again,
other things are not in any accepted sense derived from the
Forms.To say that
the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is
to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that
fashions things on the model of the Ideas? Besides, anything may both
be and come to be without being imitated from something else; thus a
man may become like Socrates
whether Socrates exists or
not,and even if
Socrates were eternal,
clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several
"patterns" (and therefore Forms) of the same thing; e.g., "animal" and
"two-footed" will be patterns of "man," and so too will the Idea of
man.Further, the
Forms will be patterns not only of sensible things but of Ideas; e.g.
the genus will be the pattern of its species; hence the same thing
will be pattern and copy. Further, it would seem impossible for the
substance and that of which it is the substance to exist in
separation;