[1013b]
[1]
for they all have the end
as their object, although they differ from each other as being some
instruments, others actions.These are roughly all the
meanings of "cause," but since causes are spoken of with various
meanings, it follows that there are several causes (and that not in an
accidental sense) of the same thing. E.g., both statuary
and bronze are causes of the statue; not in different
connections, but qua statue. However, they are
not causes in the same way, but the one as material and
the other as the source of motion. And things are causes
of each other; as e.g. labor of vigor, and vigor of
labor—but not in the same way; the one as an
end , and the other as source of
motion .And again the same thing is sometimes the cause of contrary results;
because that which by its presence is the cause of so-and-so we
sometimes accuse of being, by its absence, the cause of the
contrary—as, e.g., we say that the absence of the pilot is
the cause of a capsize, whereas his presence was the cause of
safety.And both,
presence and privation, are moving causes.Now there are four senses which are most
obvious under which all the causes just described may be
classed.The
components of syllables; the material of manufactured articles; fire,
earth and all such bodies; the parts of a whole;
[20]
and the premisses of a syllogistic
conclusion; are causes in the material sense. Of these
some are causes as substrate: e.g. the parts; and others as
essence : the whole, and the composition, and the
form.The seed and
the physician and the contriver and in general that which produces,
all these are the source of change or stationariness. The remainder
represent the end and good of the others;
for the final cause tends to be the greatest good and end
of the rest.Let it be
assumed that it makes no difference whether we call it "good" or
"apparent good." In kind , then, there are these four
classes of cause.The modes
of cause are numerically many, although these too are fewer when
summarized.For
causes are spoken of in many senses, and even of those which are of
the same kind, some are causes in a prior and some in a posterior
sense; e.g., the physician and the expert are both causes of health;
and the ratio 2:1 and number are both causes of the octave; and the
universals which include a given cause are causes of its particular
effects.Again, a
thing may be a cause in the sense of an accident, and the classes
which contain accidents; e.g., the cause of a statue is in one sense
Polyclitus and in another a sculptor, because it is an accident of the
sculptor to be Polyclitus.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.